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Abstract
In recent years the power sector has experienced a significant growth of the de-
ployment of renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar power. This brings
new challenges to the optimal operation and management of power systems. The
output of these stochastic sources can only be predicted with limited accuracy, lead-
ing to real-time deviations from their contracted schedule. Therefore, such stochastic
sources need to be operated differently than conventional generation units, such as
gas- or coal-fired plants. The operation of conventional production units may also
be strongly affected by the massive deployment of renewable energy sources as their
growing penetration is leading to a decrease in the market prices and an increase in
the balancing energy need.
The thesis focuses on the optimal participation of power producers in competi-
tive electricity markets with high penetration of renewable energy sources. We pro-
pose to derive the optimal offering strategy of a power producer with a modular
approach. Indeed, we provide a general formulation of the optimal offering strat-
egy, and each "block" (i.e., a set of constraints) of the optimization model can be
replaced depending on the electricity market structure considered or the specific
power production unit.
The thesis analyses three case studies, i.e., the optimal market participation of a
stochastic power producer, a conventional power producer and a group of stochas-
tic and conventional production units. We start from a stochastic power producer
trading in an electricity market. The real-time deviations are settled under two al-
ternative imbalance settlement schemes available in the Italian electricity market.
These schemes add a tolerance band around the quantity of energy contracted in the
day-ahead market. The portion of the imbalance within the band is priced differ-
ently than the part exceeding the band. We conclude that those imbalance pricing
schemes may lead to a market distortion and therefore they may not be a preferable
alternative to conventional schemes (e.g., the dual-price scheme).
Then, the thesis takes the perspective of a conventional power producer. Even
though European day-ahead electricity markets are mostly settled under a uniform
pricing scheme, several balancing markets (e.g., in Germany and Italy) are settled
iv
under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme. We propose an innovative approach that al-
lows modeling the trading problem under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme as a linear
programming model. Thanks to this novel formulation, we derive the optimization
problem that a conventional power producer would solve to evaluate its optimal
day-ahead market offers while considering the future expected revenues from the
balancing market. The proposed model is tested on a realistic case study against a
sequential offering approach, showing the capability of increasing profits in expec-
tation.
Lastly, we consider the case of a virtual power plant, defined as a cluster of con-
ventional generating units, stochastic power units, and storage systems, which to-
gether act as a single participant in the electricity market. We introduce a novel
structure of the balancing market, which allows an active/passive participation of
the virtual power plant. Indeed, the virtual power plant can decide to be an active
actor (i.e., offering regulating energy) in some trading intervals, and a passive one
(i.e., deviating from the contracted schedule) in the remaining hours. The model is
tested in a realistic case study against alternative benchmark strategies (e.g., active-
only and passive-only participation).
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context and Motivation
In recent years, the power sector has experienced major structural changes. On one
side, the liberalization of the electric energy industry has brought to the unbundling
of vertically integrated utilities and has enhanced competitivity through the creation
of electricity markets trading platforms. On the other side, the need of replacing
fossil fuels with environmental-friendly energy sources has led to an increasing de-
ployment of renewable energy production.
Traditionally, a single vertically integrated utility was responsible for the whole
chain, from the generation to the delivery of electricity. The inflexible consumers’
demand was covered by few centralized conventional units, generally fueled by
fossil energy sources, which required to be dispatched well in advance as several
technical limitations constrain their operation. As an example, ramping constraints
limit the capability of varying the power output of a conventional production unit
in a short time span. Accordingly, the typical pattern was to use "slow" (i.e., with
important ramping limitations) and cheap technologies, such as coal-fired units or
nuclear power plants, to cover the base load. Differently, pick loads were covered by
"fast" but expensive technologies, such as gas-fired turbines or diesel units. In this
context, the few uncertainties in the operation of power systems were related to rel-
atively small forecasting errors in the consumers’ energy demand and unpredictable
units’ failures.
The appeal for competition and innovation has motivated a progressive estab-
lishment of electricity markets across the worldwide. The critical feature of the
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process is the separation between activities of generation, transmission, distribu-
tion, and retail while banning the vertical integration among different sectors. Com-
petition is promoted mainly in generation and retail, while the transmission and
distribution sectors are still natural monopolies, due to the prohibitive investment
cost of transmission and distribution lines. The idea is to develop a marketplace
managed by a non-commercial entity that matches the needs of numerous partic-
ipants in both the generation and demand side, providing transparent and non-
discriminatory price signals. However, this competitive environment must consider
several physical aspects that differentiate electricity from other commodities. As an
example, the storage of large quantities of electricity is still not convenient in an eco-
nomic perspective. Consequently, injections and withdrawals of electric energy need
to be matched continuously to ensure a safe and stable operation of the power sys-
tem. The structure of electricity markets was initially tailored for the technical and
economic requirements of conventional production units with non-negligible fuel
costs. The main short-term trading floor, i.e., the day-ahead market stage, is usually
cleared from 12 to 36 hours before the delivery of energy. In this way, conventional
units can schedule their production pattern well in advance of the real-time opera-
tion.
The increasing deployment of renewable energy sources, such as wind and so-
lar power, has brought significant changes in the electricity market context. Indeed,
these sources are non-dispatchable, i.e., their power production is only partially con-
trollable, and stochastic, i.e., their power output can only be predicted with limited
accuracy, which decreases as the time horizon of the forecast increases. This natu-
rally brings a higher level of uncertainty in the optimal management of power sys-
tems as these stochastic units cannot follow the production schedule contracted in
the day-ahead market and they create imbalances in the real-time. From an economic
perspective, these energy sources are usually traded at zero marginal cost, thus low-
ering the average prices while increasing their variability. All the participants in elec-
tricity markets are affected by this revolution. On the one hand, stochastic sources
need to be traded in a market platform not yet restructured to accommodate this
increasing level of uncertainty. In fact, stochastic producers may incur in important
financial penalties for the creation of imbalances, which are inherent in the nature
of their energy source. On the other hand, conventional units may have to adapt
their offering and operating strategy as their profits from the day-ahead market are
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affected by the decrease of the market prices. Moreover, they are generally required
to be more flexible in the real-time to compensate the imbalances created by the
stochastic producers.
In this context, it is important to develop offering and operating strategies for the
different power producers involved. Indeed, the importance of an efficient market
participation of power producers is twofold. From the producer’s point of view, it
results in reaching higher market profits. From the system’s perspective, this may
result in prices that can reflect the operational cost of the system and in having a
sufficient level of flexibility to safely operate it. As an example, a conventional pro-
ducer that does not schedule its power unit in the day-ahead market due to the low
market prices is limited from possible huge profits deriving from offering regulating
energy in the real-time. Hence, this penalizes both the producer, that gains lower
profits, and the system, which has less available flexibility in the real-time.
1.2 Thesis Description and Contributions
The thesis proposes a comprehensive approach to derive the optimal offering strat-
egy of a power producer in a competitive electricity market. The offering strategies
are formulated as mathematical models, i.e., optimization models, that can be used
as decision-making tools for the different power producers to tackle the increasing
level of uncertainty in the electricity market context.
We focus on a price-taker and risk-neutral power producer trading in a short-
term electricity market, composed of a day-ahead and a balancing market. Thanks to
the price-taker assumption, the uncertain market prices can be represented through
marginal distributions or discrete sets of possible scenarios, as we neglect the in-
fluence of the producer’s decisions on the market clearing process. The idea is to
develop these optimal offering strategies with a modular approach. This translates
in deriving a compact formulation of a general offering strategy, where each set of
variables and constraints within the general formulation can be replaced depending
on the electricity market structure considered or the specific production units. As we
assume a risk-neutral producer, the objective function of the general strategy max-
imizes the expectation of the market profit, incorporating the participation in both
the day-ahead and the balancing market, and including the production cost of the
producer. An energy balance imposes that the amount of energy exchanged with the
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electricity market matches the total power production of the producer. Then, three
set of constraints model the trading problem in the different market stages, i.e., the
day-ahead market, the balancing market as an active participant (i.e., a producer
that offers its regulating energy), and the balancing market as a passive participant
(i.e., a producer that deviates from the contracted day-ahead schedule). For the trad-
ing problem, we intend a set of constraints and variables that simulate the market
clearing mechanism, the market pricing scheme, and other additional constraints as-
sociated with the market offers. The general formulation is concluded by two extra
set of constraints related to the specific production unit or cluster of units. The first
yields the expected production cost while the second imposes the feasible operating
region of the units.
Together with the general model of an offering strategy, the thesis provides an
extensive series of formulations aimed at representing the trading problem in the
different market stages. For the day-ahead market, we start considering single price-
quantity offers and a continuous distribution of the uncertain market prices. Then,
we extend the formulation including non-decreasing step-wise offer curves that al-
low the producer to schedule an increasing amount of energy production as the day-
ahead market price realization increases. In both cases, the result is a non-linear
model, where the non-linearities arise from the product of prices and quantities to
compute the producer’s market income. A linear alternative is proposed by mean
of a stochastic-programming approach. The idea is to use the market price scenar-
ios as potential offer prices for the price-taker producer building its optimal offer
curves. Then, we develop the trading problem for an active participant offering in
the balancing market. Similarly to the day-ahead market, we start from single price-
quantity offers, and then we extend it to offer curves. Note that for the balancing
market trading problem we consider both a uniform pricing and a pay-as-bid pric-
ing scheme. The thesis proposes an innovative formulation that allows casting the
trading problem with offer curves under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme as a linear pro-
gramming (LP) program. Conversely, the alternative formulations available within
the literature are non-linear and may limit the possibility of deriving offering strate-
gies including multiple market stages and complex cost functions or operating re-
gions of the units. Finally, we formulate the trading problem in the balancing market
for a passive participant, considering both a single-price and dual-price imbalance
settlement scheme.
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Subsequently, we take the perspective of different power producers offering in
the electricity market. We start from a stochastic power producer that includes the
future imbalance revenue from the balancing market while deriving its optimal day-
ahead quantity offer. We adapt the general formulation of the offering strategy to the
characteristics of a stochastic energy source (e.g., we assume that the producer offers
its energy at zero marginal cost in the day-ahead market), deriving its optimal offer-
ing strategy under a single-price and a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme (in
the balancing market). Then, we formulate its optimal trading strategy under two al-
ternative imbalance settlement schemes used in the Italian electricity market. Such
schemes consider tolerance margins, i.e., they introduce a tolerance band around
the quantity of energy contracted in the day-ahead market. For both the pricing
schemes we prove that the market offer that maximizes the producer’s expected
profit is unique. We also investigate how these alternative schemes may influence
the real-time imbalance of a rational stochastic power producer, i.e., a producer seek-
ing at maximizing its expected profit. Note that a formulation of the optimal trading
strategy under those pricing schemes is novel, together with the analysis of their
influence on the real-time imbalance of a rational producer.
Then, we move to a conventional power producer that offers in an electricity
market where the balancing stage is cleared under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme. We
formulate the operating region and the production cost function of the unit as a
mixed-integer and linear (MILP) problem. We derive two alternative offering strate-
gies in the day-ahead market. The first considers the day-ahead market only. Dif-
ferently, the second models the future decisions in the balancing market as recourse
decisions in a stochastic programming setup. The trading problems (for the day-
ahead and the balancing market) are merged with the MILP operating region of the
unit to derive the optimal offering strategy of the conventional power producer. As
mentioned before, the models available in the literature for the trading problem un-
der a pay-as-bid pricing scheme are non-linear. Introducing the feasibility region
of the production unit would result in a mixed-integer non-linear problem, which
may have high computational cost and, generally, does not guarantee the optimality
of the solution. Thanks to our novel linear approach, the result is instead a MILP
two-stage stochastic programming problem with recourse. We show how an accu-
rate modeling of the expected revenues from the balancing market is of increasing
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importance as the penetration of the renewable energy production in the market in-
creases. Indeed, an increasing share of renewable energy generation translates into
lower day-ahead market prices and a rising need for regulating energy. Therefore, it
may happen that a producer that uses a sequential offering strategy (i.e., consider-
ing one market stage at the time) is not going to schedule its unit at the day-ahead
stage due to the low market prices. Then, at the balancing stage, it has few possibil-
ities of offering regulating energy. Differently, by co-optimizing its offering strategy
in the day-ahead and the balancing market, the power producer may be willing to
operate in the day-ahead even when the prices are not convenient (i.e., it is in a neg-
ative position after the day-ahead market clearing). However, by being scheduled
in the day-ahead market, it can offer both upward and downward regulation to the
balancing market and increase its total market profit.
Finally, we take the perspective of a Virtual Power Plant (VPP). A VPP is defined
as a cluster of conventional generating units, stochastic generating units, storage sys-
tems, and flexible loads, which together act as a single participant in the electricity
market. We assume that the balancing market allows an Active-Passive participation
of the VPP. With Active-Passive participation, we mean that the VPP can decide to be
an active actor in some trading periods, and a passive one in the remaining. Indeed,
given the presence of some dispatchable units and storage units, in some hours it
may be able to provide regulating power to the system. Differently, the available
models in the literature only consider a passive-only participation. The innovative
offering model is tested in a realistic case study against alternative benchmark strate-
gies (e.g., passive-only participation), showing the capability of increasing profits in
expectations. We also analyze in which condition the VPP is willing to be active (less
flexibility of operation but more favorable prices) and when passive (more flexibility
but penalized prices). This market setup may be also interesting from the system’s
perspective. Indeed, by allowing this Active-Passive participation the system may
have more regulating energy available for some trading intervals.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the main principles and struc-
ture of European Electricity markets, focusing on the short-term trading floors. It
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also introduces a simplified electricity market model, while describing the submis-
sion process and its clearing mechanism. Chapter 3 provides the general formula-
tion of the producer’s offering strategy together with the trading problems in the
different market stages. Chapter 4 proposes a methodology to obtain a discrete set
of trajectories of the stochastic processes, e.g., electricity market prices or wind and
solar power production, to be used within a stochastic programming framework.
Then, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 take the perspective of a stochastic power producer, of a
conventional power producer, and of a VPP, deriving their optimal day-ahead offer-
ing strategy, respectively. The conclusions are drawn in Chapter 8.
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Electricity Markets
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, power systems moved to new frameworks aiming at enhanc-
ing the competition in the sector. Traditionally, a single vertically integrated en-
tity was entitled to manage and control the whole power system. This state-owned
company was in charge of the four main activities, i.e., generation, transmission,
distribution and retail of electric energy. A progressive movement toward the liber-
alization of the power sector pushed several countries to ban the vertical integration
among different areas while promoting competition in the activities of generation
and retail. Differently, a natural monopoly still holds in the transmission sector due
to the prohibitive investment cost of transmission lines. The essential role of operat-
ing and managing the transmission grid is carried out by non-commercial entities,
called Transmission System Operator in Europe and Independent System Operator
in the US.
The deregulation of the electricity supply sector helped to attract new investors
but brought challenges due to the nature of the commodity traded in the competi-
tive market framework. Different from similar commodities, such as natural gas, the
electric energy is not suitable to be stored in large quantities and the long term, at
least from an economic point of view. Hence, the injections and withdrawals of elec-
tricity in the grid need to be continuously matched to ensure a safe operation of the
system. Historically, a vertically integrated company was scheduling the power pro-
duction units (fully controllable conventional units) to follow an inflexible and quite
well predictable electric energy demand. This process is nowadays delegated to a
market structure that needs to ensure the reliability of the system while keeping a
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competitive and transparent trading environment. Additionally, it is usually impos-
sible to distinguish between electric energy generated by different energy sources.
Similarly, it is not possible to track the path of electric energy within the transmission
grid. Consequently, electricity markets are driven by aggregated curves obtained as
the sum of single production units or single loads.
This chapter introduces the reader to the structure of electricity markets and
their timeline. It is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a general overview of
the structure of European electricity markets, distinguishing between long-term and
short-term electricity markets. Then, Section 2.3 presents a simplified but realistic
electricity market model. It is used to explain the submission process of the different
participants and the clearing mechanism used to evaluate the accepted offers and to
compute the market price.
2.2 Overview of various markets and their time-line
In electricity markets, two main trading floors can be typically distinguished, de-
pending on the proximity of the trading. Medium/long-term markets (e.g., futures
markets) allow trading on long-term horizons. The participants in the market can
trade both physical and financial products. Examples of financial trading are for-
ward contracts and options. A forward contract is signed between a seller that un-
dertakes to produce a certain amount of energy, and a buyer that is willing consumes
that energy. These usually deal with standard products, e.g., base-load contracts in-
clude all the hours of the contracted time span, while peak-load include only the
hours with high energy demand, e.g., from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m. of working days. A
forward contract can also be coupled with options, which allow the buyer to decide
after the agreement whether to benefit or not of the forward contract.
Closer to the real-time operation, short-term markets (i.e., electricity pools or power
exchanges) allow trading electricity on a daily and hourly horizon. They include sev-
eral trading floors, i.e., day-ahead, intra-day adjustment and balancing markets. The
electricity pool model is, originally, a centralized market, where the producers oper-
ate under a cost recovery mechanism. Indeed, they recover their operating costs
through some fees, which have been approved by the market regulator and are paid
by the participants in the pool. Differently, power exchanges are more open and de-
centralized markets where the producers’ cost recovery is not guaranteed. These
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markets are accessible to every participant that satisfies specific admission require-
ments. The main goal of power exchanges is to ensure a transparent and reliable mar-
ket price formation, generally obtained by matching the aggregated supply and de-
mand curves of the market actors.
Power producers can participate in both futures and short-term markets. Usu-
ally, part of the thermal plants capacity is contracted in medium/long-term con-
tracts, since these ensure fixed revenues for the producers, avoiding the uncertain-
ties of the short-term trading. The remaining capacity is contracted in the short-
term markets. Contrariwise, renewable energy plants, e.g., wind farms and PV solar
plants, are stochastic and can only be predicted with a limited accuracy. Therefore,
they are not suitable for long-term contracts, as it is hard to guarantee a certain level
of production long time ahead of the real-time operation. This chapter (and the
thesis as well) focuses on short-term electricity markets. Section 2.2.1 presents the
day-ahead market trading floor. Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 do the same for the intra-day
and the balancing markets.
2.2.1 Day-ahead market
The day-ahead market hosts transactions for selling and buying electric energy one
day before the delivery day. It is the prominent and more liquid among the different
electricity market floors. Buyers and sellers submit their offers to a Market Oper-
ator, which acts as the central counterpart. A market offer includes a quantity of
energy and the price at which the market participant wants to produce or consume
it. In case of sell/buy offers/bids the price denotes the minimum/maximum price
at which the seller/buyer is willing to provide/consume electricity.
The day-ahead market gate closure occurs the day before the actual delivery
day, usually at noon. It includes 24 separate auctions, one per each hour of the
day, cleared simultaneously but independently (in the European Electricity mar-
kets). After the gate closure, the market operator clears the market and informs each
seller/buyer of their production/consumption schedule. Typically, the US approach
is to include the full representation of the transmission grid within the clearing al-
gorithm, thus leading to a different market price for each node of the network (i.e.,
nodal pricing). Differently, the European approach is to give a poor representation
of the grid by including only the more limiting transmission constraints. Accord-
ingly, it translates in market zones were each dispatch within the zone is assumed
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to be feasible (at least from a transmission point of view) and leads to zonal market
prices, i.e., the same market price for all the participants within the same market
zone.
2.2.2 Intra-day market and continuous trading
The intra-day market is the market for sale/purchase energy during the day of de-
livery. It opens after the day-ahead market gate closure and closes from hours to
minutes before the real-time operation. The intra-day market can be a useful tool
for the market participants which can use this additional floor to adjust their market
position. Indeed, conventional producers may access the intra-day market for fix-
ing an infeasible production schedule, as inter-temporal constraints (e.g., ramping
limits) cannot, usually, be directly included in the day-ahead market offers. On the
other hand, stochastic producers can use this additional trading floor to modify their
market position as their power production forecasts are more accurate closer to the
real-time operation. The trading process in the intra-day market is, usually, contin-
uous. The negotiation mechanism is based on the automatic matching of demand
bids and supply offers, which allows a continuous submission of new offers/bids
during the whole session. Similarly to the day-ahead market, the intra-day market
is managed by the Market Operator.
2.2.3 Balancing market
The balancing market is the last stage for trading electric energy. It plays an essential
role, as production and consumption levels must match during the entire operation
of power systems. Balancing markets are usually single-period markets, i.e., each
trading period has a separate associated session. They allow the possibility to trade,
in addition to electric energy, ancillary services (e.g., voltage control) needed to main-
tain the stability of the power system.
Conventional producers, usually, participate in the balancing market as active
participants. They offer regulating energy, both in upward (i.e., increasing their
power production) and downward (i.e., decreasing their power output) directions.
Differently, stochastic producers access the balancing stage as passive participants.
They use this last trading floor to settle the deviations from their contracted sched-
ule. The System Operator manages the balancing market. It uses the regulating
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offers submitted by the active participants to compensate the system imbalance gen-
erated by the passive participants (both in the supply and demand side).
2.3 Electricity Market Model
This section presents a simplified market model used as a reference for the remain-
ing of the thesis. We consider a two-settlement electricity market framework, which
includes a day-ahead and a balancing stage. The day-ahead market is cleared once
a day, at noon, simultaneously for the 24 hourly trading periods of the following
day. Subsequently, a separate balancing market is cleared for each hourly interval,
one hour before the real-time operation. The intra-day adjustment trading floor is
neglected for the sake of simplicity. The idea is to use a simple market structure,
provided that it maintains the key stages and properties of a real electricity mar-
ket. Indeed, the day-ahead stage is the main trading floor, and it is a reference for
the following stages (i.e., the intra-day adjustment and the balancing ones). Then,
the balancing market is of crucial importance as it allows the System Operator to
schedule the regulation energy needed to compensate the real-time imbalance of the
system and ensure a safe operation. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic representation of
the simplified electricity market structure. Note that the day-ahead market for the
day d1 closes at noon of the day d0 and hosts transaction for the 24 trading intervals
(blue shaded area) of the day d1. Differently, a separate balancing market is cleared
every hour, one hour before the operation. E.g., the balancing market for the interval
k1 (i.e., from midnight to 1 a.m. of the day d1) closes at 11 p.m. of the day d0. Note
that for the balancing market the trading intervals are illustrated with a red and a
green area. It highlights the fact that different producers may access the balancing
stage for various purposes. The green shaded area indicates an active participation
in the balancing stage, i.e., the submission of regulating energy offers to the System
Operator. Differently, other participants may use the balancing market to settle their
deviations from the production schedule contracted in the day-ahead market. A red
shaded are illustrates this passive participation.
Thanks to this simple structure, we can derive producers’ offering strategies that
are general and not customized for a specific electricity market. Indeed, a part of
the optimization problem aimed at obtaining the optimal market offers models the
electricity market rules and mechanism. This piece, called the trading problem, is
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FIGURE 2.1: Schematic representation of the electricity market struc-
ture. The day-ahead (DA) market is cleared at noon, simultaneously
for the 24 hourly interval of the following day. A balancing (BA) mar-
ket is cleared separately per each hourly interval, one hour before the
real-time.
strongly influenced by the electricity market structure. Besides, a trading problem
based on a simplified market can easily be adapted to electricity markets with addi-
tional stages (e.g., the intra-day adjustment stage) or with different size of the trad-
ing intervals (e.g., 15 minutes trading intervals in the balancing market).
Power producers, either conventional (e.g., coal- or gas-fired power unit) or
stochastic (e.g., wind and solar power producers) submit their market offers to the
Market Operator. The ensemble of the sell offers builds the so-called aggregated
supply curve. Stochastic producers are assumed to provide their energy production
at zero marginal cost. As for the sell offers, aggregating the buy bids (i.e., bids for
consuming electricity) the Market Operator obtains the demand curve. The inter-
section between those two curves gives the market clearing price and quantity. In
this simplified model, we consider an inflexible aggregated demand curve, i.e., the
amount of energy consumption does not depend on the market price.
At the balancing stage, we assume that only conventional producers can provide
regulating energy, either for upward or downward regulation (active participation).
Differently, stochastic producers use the balancing stage to settle their deviations
from their day-ahead contracted schedule (passive participation).
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2.3.1 Day-ahead Market Clearing
At noon of the day before the delivery of energy, the Market Operator collects the
producers’ offers for the day-ahead market. Let K be the set of the 24 hourly trading
intervals of the following day and k be the index of the trading intervals, so that
k ∈ K. The Market Operator receives the market offers for the 24 hourly trading
intervals of the following day, simultaneously. Let NOk be the number of sell offers
submitted by conventional generators for the hourly trading interval k, while let-
ting o be the index for this set of offers. An offer o includes a quantity of energy
Q
DA
ok (MWh) and a price α
DA
ok (e/MWh). The price-quantity offer
(
αDAok , Q
DA
ok
)
indi-
cates that the power producer is willing to generate the quantity of energy QDAok at
k, provided that the day-ahead market price λDAk (e/MWh) is greater or equal to its
offered price αDAok . The Market Operator also receives N
S
k sell offers submitted by the
stochastic producers. Let s be the index for this set of sell offers. The offer s includes
a quantity of energy EDAsk (MWh) offered at 0 e/MWh. Figure 2.2 shows a schematic
representation of the day-ahead market submission process.
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FIGURE 2.2: Schematic representation of the day-ahead (DA) electric-
ity market submission process. Conventional producers submit price
quantity offers
(
αDA
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, Q
DA
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)
, while stochastic producers quantity of-
fers E
DA
sk
.
The Market Operator wants to evaluate the optimal dispatch of energy to satisfy
the inflexible energy demand DDAk (MWh) at each interval k. It solves a separate
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economic dispatch per each hourly interval k, computing the amount of energy qDAok
(MWh) scheduled of each offer o and the energy eDAsk (MWh) contracted of each offer
s. Then, it computes the market clearing price λDAk at each interval k. The economic
dispatch problem at k is formulated as
Min
{qDAok ,eDAsk }
NO
k∑
o=1
αDAok q
DA
ok (2.1a)
s.t.
NO
k∑
o=1
qDAok +
NS
k∑
s=1
eDAsk = D
DA
k :
(
λDAk
)
(2.1b)
0 ≤ qDAok ≤ Q
DA
ok , ∀o ∈ {1, ..., N
O
k } (2.1c)
0 ≤ eDAsk ≤ E
DA
sk , ∀s ∈ {1, ..., N
S
k } (2.1d)
The objective function (2.1a) minimizes the cost for satisfying the energy demand
DDAk . Constraint (2.1b) imposes the balance between production (i.e.,
∑NO
k
o=1 q
DA
ok +∑NS
k
s=1 e
DA
sk ) and consumption (i.e., D
DA
k ). Constraint (2.1c) forces q
DA
ok to lie in its
feasibility region, i.e., between 0 and QDAok . Similarly, constraint (2.1d) imposes that
eDAsk is bounded between 0 and E
DA
sk . Finally, the market price λ
DA
k is obtained by
computing the sensitivity, i.e., the dual variable, of constraint (2.1b).
Figure 2.3 illustrates the day-ahead market clearing mechanism. The aggregated
supply curve is shown in blue, while the demand curve in black. Note that the sup-
ply curve is built with both the stochastic producers’ offers and the conventional
producers’ ones. As the energy EDAsk is offered at 0 e/MWh, it appears on the left
side of the curve. Differently, the conventional producers’ offers
(
αDAok , Q
DA
ok
)
are
ranked based on a merit order resulting in a step-wise curve. The intersection be-
tween the two curves gives the day-ahead market clearing price λDAk . Note that an
increase of the stochastic producers’ quantity offers would shift the supply curve
towards right thus resulting in lower values of the market price λDAk .
2.3.2 Balancing Market Clearing
Close to the real-time operation, the System Operator manages the balancing mar-
ket. The balancing market is used to ensure the continuous matching between in-
jections and withdrawals of electricity in the grid, as it is the last available trading
floor. Stochastic producers are usually not able to fulfill the production schedule
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FIGURE 2.3: Schematic representation of the day-ahead electricity
market clearing mechanism. The intersection between the supply
curve (blue) and the demand curve (black) identifies the market clear-
ing price.
contracted in the day-ahead market and access the balancing stage to settle their de-
viations. This, together with potential forecasting errors in the energy demand, re-
sults in a discrepancy between the scheduled energy generation and consumption.
Conventional generators offer their availability to upward or downward adjust their
power production to compensate the system imbalance.
In this context, we can distinguish between two kinds of balancing market par-
ticipation. The first, called active participation, refers to power producers that offer
their available regulating energy to the System Operator, thus ensuring a more flexi-
ble operation of the power system. The second, called passive participation, refers to
power producers that deviate from their production schedule and contribute to the
whole system imbalance. Conventional units are usually active actors in the balanc-
ing markets, while stochastic producers are passive participants and are prevented
from offering regulating energy.
A conventional producer can submit in the balancing market both upward and
downward regulation offers. An up-regulation offer
(
αUPok , Q
UP
ok
)
indicates that the
power producer can produce additionalQUPok (MWh) provided that it is remunerated
at a price higher or equal to αUPok (e/MWh). Note that usually α
UP
ok ≥ λ
DA
k as the
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marginal cost for producing the energy QUPok is likely to be higher than the day-
ahead market clearing price λDAk . Differently, a down-regulation offer
(
αDWok , Q
DW
ok
)
expresses that the producer can decrease its power production of QDWok (MWh) when
this energy is priced equally or lower than αDWok (e/MWh). As the quantityQ
DW
ok was
previously contracted in the day-ahead market at price λDAk , by "buying" back this
amount at αDWok the producer would receive a payment of
(
λDAk − α
DW
ok
)
Q
DW
ok . Note
that this payment increases as αDWok decreases, which explains the inverted merit
order compared to the up-regulation offers. Moreover, as a rule, αDWok ≤ λ
DA
k since
differently the producer may incur in a negative profit from the sell of downward
regulation.
Let us denote with EDAsk (MWh) the amount of energy contracted by the stochas-
tic producer s in the day-ahead market, while Esk (MWh) is the real-time production
of its power unit during the hourly interval k. In the balancing market the stochastic
producer settles a deviation
(
Esk − E
DA
sk
)
in order to balance its position. Conse-
quently, the real-time system imbalance δBAk is obtained as
δBAk =
(
Dk −D
DA
k
)
−
NS
k∑
s=1
(
Esk − E
DA
sk
)
, ∀k ∈ K. (2.2)
where Dk (MWh) is the real-time aggregate consumption demand.
The System Operator receives NOk upward and downward regulation offers, i.e.,(
αUPok , Q
UP
ok
)
and
(
αDWok , Q
DW
ok
)
, respectively. In the real-time, it receives the devi-
ations
(
Esk − E
DA
sk
)
settled by the stochastic producers and computes the system
imbalance δBAk . A schematic representation of balancing market submission process
is shown in Figure 2.4. Note that the offers from the conventional units are shown
in green (active participation), while the deviations settled by the stochastic produc-
ers are illustrated in red (passive participation). The System Operator computes the
more convenient (from an economic perspective) re-dispatch of the conventional
units aimed at compensating the system imbalance δBAk . Let q
UP
ok and q
DW
ok be the
amount of upward and downward regulating energy scheduled of producer o at
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FIGURE 2.4: Schematic representation of the balancing (BA) market
submission process. Conventional producers submit price-quantity
offers for upward
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regula-
tion, while stochastic producers settle the deviations Esk − EDAsk .
time k. The optimization problem solved to evaluate the optimal re-dispatch of con-
ventional generators is
Min
{qUPok ,qDWok }
NO
k∑
o=1
αUPok q
UP
ok −
NO
k∑
o=1
αDWok q
DW
ok (2.3a)
s.t.
NO
k∑
o=1
(
qUPok − q
DW
ok
)
=
(
Dk −D
DA
k
)
−
NS
k∑
s=1
(
Esk − E
DA
sk
)
:
(
λBAk
)
(2.3b)
0 ≤ qUPok ≤ Q
UP
ok , ∀o ∈ {1, ..., N
O
k } (2.3c)
0 ≤ qDWok ≤ Q
DW
ok , ∀o ∈ {1, ..., N
O
k } (2.3d)
The objective function (2.3a) minimizes the balancing cost, evaluated as the sum of
the up-regulation cost (positive) and the down-regulation cost (negative). Constraint
(2.3b) imposes that the system imbalance δBAk is compensated by the total regulation
energy scheduled (upward or downward). Note that δBAk is replaced with its formu-
lation provided in Equation 2.2. Constraints (2.3c) and (2.3d) force qUPok and q
DW
ok to
lie between 0 and QUPok , and between 0 and Q
DW
ok , respectively. The dual variable of
constraint (2.3b) gives the balancing market clearing price λBAk .
A graphical interpretation of the balancing market clearing mechanism is shown
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in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. The regulating offers of the conventional generators are
ranked based on their offered price, thus obtain a step-wise supply curve (shown
in green). Differently, the new demand curve (shown in red), is obtained as the
sum of DDAk and the aggregate deviation of the stochastic producers. In this exam-
ple, we assume that Dk = DDAk , so the system imbalance δ
BA
k is only given by the
stochastic producers’ deviation, i.e.,
∑NS
k
s=1
(
Esk − E
DA
sk
)
. Figure 2.5 illustrates an ex-
ample when δBAk > 0 and the System Operator schedules upward adjustments of the
power production of conventional units. This case results in λBAk ≥ λ
DA
k . Indeed, as
the total demand to fulfill is greater than the day-ahead one, generators with higher
marginal cost are required to operate. Differently, Figure 2.6 considers an example
when δBAk < 0 and the System Operator schedules downward adjustments of the
conventional production units. This leads to λBAk ≤ λ
DA
k , as the total energy de-
mand is lower than the day-ahead one and the more expensive generators (among
the scheduled ones) are shut down.
quantity (MWh)
p
ri
ce
(e
/M
W
h
)
∑
s
Esk − E
DA
skDDA
k
λDA
k
λBA
k
Q
DW
ok
αDW
ok
Q
UP
ok
αUP
ok
FIGURE 2.5: Schematic representation of the balancing market clear-
ing mechanism when upward regulation is required.
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FIGURE 2.6: Schematic representation of the balancing market clear-
ing mechanism, when downward regulation is needed.
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Chapter 3
A General Model for the Offering
Strategy
3.1 Introduction
A power producer offering in electricity markets bases its strategy on some decision-
making tool, usually in the form of a mathematical optimization problem. The lit-
erature proposes several models aimed at driving the optimal trading strategy of a
specific power producer. As examples, references (Bremnes, 2004; Pinson, Cheval-
lier, and Kariniotakis, 2007; Morales, Conejo, and Pérez-Ruiz, 2010) develop offer-
ing models for a price-taker, i.e., that does not influence the market price, stochas-
tic power producer. Similarly, references (Conejo, Nogales, and Arroyo, 2002; Ni,
Luh, and Rourke, 2004; Maenhoudt and Deconinck, 2014) propose offering mod-
els for a price-taker conventional power producer, while references (Mashhour and
Moghaddas-Tafreshi, 2011a; Mashhour and Moghaddas-Tafreshi, 2011b; Pandžic´,
Kuzle, and Capuder, 2013; Pandžic´ et al., 2013) consider an aggregate of different
technologies (e.g., conventional units, stochastic power units and storages) offering
in the electricity market as a single price-taker participant. Those trading models
can also be extended to include the producer’s price-maker (i.e., that influences the
market price outcome) effect on the market clearing mechanism, for a stochastic
power producer (Zugno et al., 2013; Baringo and Conejo, 2013), a conventional pro-
ducer (Gountis and Bakirtzis, 2004; Bakirtzis et al., 2007) or an aggregate of units
(Kardakos, Simoglou, and Bakirtzis, 2016).
This chapter wants to provide a more general approach to build the offering strat-
egy of a generic power producer. By analyzing the optimization models mentioned
above, we derive a general structure of the offering strategy for optimal electricity
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market participation. It is developed with a modular approach. Accordingly, the
general model is composed of blocks (in the form of sets of constraints) that can be
replaced depending on the specific electricity market structure or regulation and on
the particular production units. Some of these blocks simulate the trading problem
in different market stages. For the trading problem, we intend a set of constraints
and variables that can model the market clearing mechanism (endogenously or ex-
ogenously), the market pricing scheme (uniform or pay-as-bid pricing), and other
additional constraints associated with the market offers (e.g., the non-decreasing
condition of offer curves). Together with the general offering strategy, this chap-
ter provides several formulations for modeling the trading problem in the different
market stages.
The more general approach is to consider the power producer as a price-maker
in the market. The price-maker trading problem can be implemented through a
residual demand model (Baillo et al., 2004) or using a bilevel optimization setup to
include the market clearing mechanism within the optimal offering strategy (Goun-
tis and Bakirtzis, 2004; Bakirtzis et al., 2007). The result is a Mathematical Problem
with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), where the optimization problem that simu-
lates the market clearing mechanism is formulated as a set of constraints, obtaining a
single-level optimization problem. In this context, it is essential to mention the work
of Ruiz and Conejo (2009), that shows how to cast an MPEC as a mixed-integer and
linear optimization problem. They reformulate the non-linear producer’s market in-
come (where the non-linearity arises from the product between the market price and
the quantity offer) as a linear one by exploiting the strong duality of the lower level
problem (i.e., the market clearing optimization problem).
Although more general, MPECs may have high computational cost and rely on
strong assumptions on opponents’ behavior. Hence, when the power producer has a
small impact on the market, a price-maker setup may not be the preferable choice. In
this case, it is possible to assume that the power producer is price-taker as it strongly
simplifies the formulation of the trading problem. Indeed, the producer now sees the
market price as a parameter and no more as a variable. Its uncertainty can accord-
ingly be represented by a continuous marginal distribution or through a discrete set
of possible outcomes. When the market is settled under a uniform pricing scheme,
i.e., all the accepted offers are remunerated at the market price (disregarding the
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offered price), the price-taker trading problem can be formulated as linear program-
ming (LP) problem. E.g., Conejo, Carrión, and Morales (2010) show how a price-
taker power producer can derive its optimal offer curves by exploiting a stochastic
programming approach. The idea is to use the discrete set of possible market price
outcomes as the possible offering prices for the price-taker producer. Differently,
if the market is settled under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme, i.e., the accepted offers
are remunerated at the offered price (disregarding the market clearing price), fewer
trading models are available. Indeed, the topic of trading under a pay-as-bid scheme
and price uncertainty has not been extensively addressed in the literature. Ren and
Galiana (2004a) and Ren and Galiana (2004b) present an analysis on optimal offering
under pay-as-bid and uniform pricing schemes. The authors obtain the profit expec-
tation and variance for both pricing schemes while assuming that the market price
follows a uniform distribution. Swider and Weber (2007) propose a methodology
that aims to maximize the profit expectation in a pay-as-bid auction. Other formu-
lations of the trading problem under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme are also proposed
by Swider (2007), Khorasani and Mashhadi (2012) and Sadeh, Mashhadi, and Latifi
(2009). These references show how to model the price-taker trading problem un-
der a pay-as-bid pricing scheme using a non-linear programming (NLP) approach.
Compared to the available literature, this chapter provides a novel approach that
allows casting the price-taker trading problem in pay-as-bid markets under price
uncertainty as an LP problem. For that purpose, we represent continuous random
variables (i.e., market-clearing prices) as discrete variables. Then, following the idea
of Conejo, Carrión, and Morales (2010), we use the market price scenarios as po-
tential offering prices of the price-taker power producer. It is worth mentioning
that Khorasani and Mashhadi (2012) propose to solve the trading problem in pay-
as-bid markets under price uncertainty with a two-step approach, obtaining the ex-
pected profit as a linear function of the quantity offer. However, this approach is not
applicable in case of problems with inter-temporal constraints or with more complex
cost functions.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
general formulation of an offering strategy for a producer trading in a two-settlement
electricity market. Section 3.3 yields a formulation of the trading problem, both for
the day-ahead and the balancing market, for a price-maker power producer. Then,
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Section 3.4 introduces the assumptions of a price-taker and risk-neutral power pro-
ducer.
3.2 General Formulation of an Offering Strategy
We consider a two-settlement electricity market, composed of a day-ahead and a bal-
ancing market. The power producer submits to the day-ahead market the quantity
qDAk (MWh) that it wants to produce during the hourly interval k. In the remaining
of the chapter, we develop the trading problem for a single hourly interval k. Con-
sequently, we skip the subscript k for the clarity of the notation, e.g., qDAk → q
DA.
Then, at the balancing stage, it can offer to adjust upward its power production of
qUP (MWh) or to decrease it of qDW (MWh). These market offers are related to an
active participation in the balancing stage, i.e., the power producer is offering to the
System Operator its available regulating energy. Differently, a passive participation
allows the producer to create a deviation qBA (MWh) from its day-ahead contracted
schedule qDA. The total amount of energy exchanged with the market platform has
to match the energy production qA (MWh) of the power unit, i.e.,
qDA + qUP − qDW + qBA = qA. (3.1)
Note that Equation (3.1) considers both an active and passive participation in the
balancing market, which is usually not allowed in a real-world electricity market.
Indeed, a power producer cannot simultaneously offer regulating energy while de-
viating from its contracted schedule. However, as we want to provide a general
formulation, we include both of them. A schematic representation of the interface
between the producer and the electricity market is shown in Figure 3.1, where the
question mark represents a generic power producer.
The day-ahead quantity offer qDA yields an income ρDA (e) to the power pro-
ducer, and it is associated with a feasibility region. Consequently, we impose
qDA, ρDA ∈ ΠDA, (3.2)
where ΠDA is a set of constraints associated with the day-ahead market offer. Sim-
ilarly, the balancing market incomes ρUP (e) and ρDW (e) are linked to the upward
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FIGURE 3.1: Illustration of the energy balance between the power
producer and the electricity market, considering a single hourly in-
terval k. The question mark indicates a generic power production
unit.
and the downward regulation offers, i.e., qUP and qDW. Accordingly, we impose
qUP, qDW, ρUP, ρDW ∈ ΠBAAct, (3.3)
where ΠBAAct is a set of constraints associated with the balancing market offers. Like-
wise the active participation, also a passive deviation qBA is related to a market in-
come ρBA (e), given by
qBA, ρBA ∈ ΠBAPas. (3.4)
These three set of constraints, i.e., ΠDA, ΠBAAct, and Π
BA
Pas, are a compact representation
of the trading problem in different market stages. Together with these constraints,
the energy production qA has a feasible operating region, generically described by
the set of constraints Ω, i.e.,
qA ∈ Ω, (3.5)
where the set Ω depends on the production unit considered. Then, the cost c (e) for
producing the quantity qA is evaluated by mean of the generic function h(·). This
writes
c = h
(
qA
)
. (3.6)
28 Chapter 3. A General Model for the Offering Strategy
The total profit µ (e) of the power producer is computed as the sum of incomes from
the electricity markets minus the production cost c, thus leading to
µ = ρDA + ρUP + ρDW + ρBA − c. (3.7)
The producer is usually solving a stochastic model as several market parameters
are still uncertain at the moment of submitting its market offers. Consequently, the
producer’s profit µ is a random value. We introduce the generic function g(·) trans-
forming a random variable into a deterministic one. As an example, the function g(·)
can be the expectation or the worst case realization of µ. The generic structure of the
offering strategy is formulated as
Max
Γ
g
(
ρDA + ρUP + ρDW + ρBA − c
)
(3.8a)
s.t. qDA + qUP − qDW + qBA = qA, (3.8b)
qDA, ρDA ∈ ΠDA, (3.8c)
qUP, qDW, ρUP, ρDW ∈ ΠBAAct, (3.8d)
qBA, ρBA ∈ ΠBAPas, (3.8e)
c = h
(
qA
)
, (3.8f)
qA ∈ Ω, (3.8g)
where
Γ = {qA, qDA, qUP, qDW, qBA, ρDA, ρUP, ρDW, ρBA, c}. (3.9)
The objective function (3.8a) maximizes a certain function g(·) of the producer’s
profit µ. The energy balance between the power production qA and the total amount
of energy exchanged with the market platform is enforced by constraint (3.8b). Then,
constraints (3.8c) and (3.8d) impose a set of constraints related to the day-ahead and
the balancing market offers. Constraint (3.8e) enforces a set of constraints related
to a passive participation in the balancing market. Then, constraint (3.8f) yields the
cost c for producing the energy qA. Finally, constraint (3.8g) imposes the feasible
operating region of the power production units.
3.3. General Formulation of the Trading Problem 29
3.3 General Formulation of the Trading Problem
This section derives the formulation of the trading for a price-maker power pro-
ducer, i.e., a producer that can influence the market price outcome with its deci-
sions. Section 3.3.1 considers the day-ahead market trading problem, while Section
3.3.2 the balancing market one.
3.3.1 Day-Ahead Market Trading Problem
Let us assume that the power producer submits a single price-quantity offer (pDA, qDA)
in the day-ahead market. With the market offer (pDA, qDA) the power producer in-
dicates its willingness to produce qDA, provided that it is remunerated at a price
higher or equal to pDA (e/MWh). Together with the producer’s offer (pDA, qDA),
the Market Operator receives NO +NS opponents’ offers. NO price-quantity offers
are submitted by conventional producers, i.e., {(αDAo , Q
DA
o ), o = 1, ..., N
O}, and NS
quantity offers by the stochastic producers, i.e., {(EDAs ), s = 1, ..., N
S}. The Mar-
ket Operator clears the market and computes the day-ahead market price λDA by
solving the economic dispatch presented in Section 2.3.1, i.e.,
Min
{qDA,qDAo ,e
DA
s }
NO∑
o=1
αDAo q
DA
o + p
DAqDA (3.10a)
s.t.
NO∑
o=1
qDAo + q
DA +
NS∑
s=1
eDAs = D
DA :
(
λDA
)
(3.10b)
0 ≤ qDAo ≤ Q
DA
o , ∀o ∈ {1, ..., N
O} (3.10c)
0 ≤ qDA ≤ qDA (3.10d)
0 ≤ eDAs ≤ E
DA
s , ∀s ∈ {1, ..., N
S} (3.10e)
where qDA is the amount of energy that the power producer is contracted to produce
in the day-ahead market. Note that we add the producer’s offer to the economic dis-
patch formulation (2.1) as we assume the the offer (pDA, qDA) influences the market
outcome.
The market revenue ρDA of the producer is computed differently, depending
on the pricing scheme considered. We can distinguish among two main pricing
schemes, i.e., uniform pricing and pay-as-bid pricing. In a uniform pricing scheme,
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all the accepted offers are remunerated at the day-ahead market price λDA, disre-
garding the offered price. Differently, under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme, the ac-
cepted offers are paid at the proposed price pDA. Since the structure of the day-ahead
electricity markets across the European countries has been harmonized and consid-
ers a uniform pricing scheme, we assume that the day-ahead market is settled under
a uniform pricing scheme. Accordingly, the market income ρDA is computed as
ρDA = λDAqDA. (3.11)
A price-maker power producer that submits a single price-quantity offer in the day-
ahead market formulates the set ΠDA of the general model (3.8) as
ρDA = λDA qDA (3.12a)
qDA, λDA = arg{(3.10)} (3.12b)
Q ≤ qDA ≤ Q (3.12c)
Constraint (3.12a) gives the day-ahead market income ρDA under a uniform pricing
scheme. Constraint (3.12b) solves the economic dispatch (3.10) and computes the
accepted quantity qDA and the market price λDA. Finally, constraint (3.12c) limits
the quantity offer qDA between Q and Q. Usually, Q is the unit’s capacity while Q
is 0 MWh for a production unit. However, Q can also be a negative value in case
the power unit can buy (i.e., consume) electricity. An example is an electric stor-
age system, which is producing energy when discharging and consuming it while
charging. Note that the general formulation (3.12) would lead to a bi-level optimiza-
tion problem (3.8), as constraint (3.12b) is an optimization problem itself. We do not
investigate how to formulate an MPEC as a single-level optimization problem, as
the thesis focuses on a price-taker power producer. We refer the interested reader
to (Gountis and Bakirtzis, 2004; Bakirtzis et al., 2007; Ruiz and Conejo, 2009) for an
extensive coverage of the topic.
3.3.2 Balancing Market Trading Problem
At the moment of offering in the balancing market, the power producer knows the
amount of energy qDA contracted in the day-ahead market. We assume that the
producer submits single price-quantity offers in the balancing market, as an active
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participant. It can offer to increase its power production of a quantity qUP at price
pUP or to decrease it of a quantity qDW at price pDW. Let consider that the producer
submits both an up-regulation and a down-regulation offer in the balancing market.
Moreover, as a passive participant, it can deviate of a quantity qBA from its day-
ahead contracted schedule qDA. As mentioned in Section 3.2, a simultaneous active
and passive participation at the balancing stage is not allowed by the System Op-
erator. However, to provide a general formulation of the balancing market trading
problem we include both of them.
The System Operator also receives NO opponents’ offers for upward regulation
{(αUPo , Q
UP
o ), i = 1, ..., N
O}. Similarly, it receives NO downward regulation offers
{(αDWo , Q
DW
o ), i = 1, ..., N
O}. We indicate with δBA the system imbalance (without
the producer’s deviation) that needs to be restored through the balancing market.
The System Operator clears the balancing market by solving the economic dispatch
presented in Section 2.3.2, adapted with the producer’s participation, i.e.,
Min
{qUPo ,q
UP,qDWo ,q
DW}
NO∑
o=1
αUPo q
UP
o + p
UPqUP −
NO∑
o=1
αDWo q
DW
o − p
DWqDW (3.13a)
s.t.
NO∑
o=1
(
qUPo − q
DW
o
)
+ qUP − qDW = δBA − qBA :
(
λBA
)
(3.13b)
0 ≤ qUPo ≤ Q
UP
o , o = 1, ..., N
O (3.13c)
0 ≤ qUP ≤ qUP, (3.13d)
0 ≤ qDWo ≤ Q
DW
o , o = 1, ..., N
O (3.13e)
0 ≤ qDW ≤ qDW, (3.13f)
where qUP and qDW are the producer’s quantity of up-regulation and down-regulation
energy scheduled by the System Operator, while λBA is the balancing market clear-
ing price. Note that the producer’s decision variables, i.e., qUP, qDW, and qBA, are not
variables but parameters for the economic dispatch in (3.13), as the System Operator
solves it after having received the producer’s offers and deviation.
The market revenues ρUP and ρDW are computed differently, depending on the
pricing scheme considered. Differently than the day-ahead market, which is mainly
settled under a uniform pricing scheme, several European balancing markets, e.g.,
Italy and Germany (Wang et al., 2015), are settled under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme.
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Accordingly, we provide a formulation of the up- and down-regulation market in-
comes under both the pricing schemes, i.e.,
ρUP =

λBA, qUP if uniform pricing scheme
pUP, qUP if pay-as-bid pricing scheme
(3.14a)
ρDW =

−λBA, qDW if uniform pricing scheme
−pDW, qDW if pay-as-bid pricing scheme
(3.14b)
The income ρBA, linked to a passive participation, is evaluated based on the imbal-
ance settlement scheme considered. Two main imbalance pricing schemes can be
distinguished in the European electricity markets, i.e., the single- and the dual-price
imbalance settlement scheme. Under a single-price imbalance settlement scheme,
imbalances are priced at the balancing market price λBA, disregarding the sign of
the deviation qBA. Differently, under a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme, the
imbalance qBA is priced at the least convenient (for the producer) price between the
balancing market price λBA and the day-ahead one λDA. This leads to
ρBA =

λBAqBA, if single-price scheme
min
(
λBAqBA, λDAqBA
)
, if dual-price scheme
(3.15)
Consequently, a price-maker producer that submits single price-quantity regulation
offers and deviates from its contracted schedule, can formulate the sets ΠBAAct and
ΠBAPas of the general model (3.8) as
ρUP =

λBA, qUP if uniform pricing scheme
pUP, qUP if pay-as-bid pricing scheme
(3.16a)
ρDW =

−λBA, qDW if uniform pricing scheme
−pDW, qDW if pay-as-bid pricing scheme
(3.16b)
ρBA =

λBAqBA, if single-price scheme
min
(
λBAqBA, λDAqBA
)
, if dual-price scheme
(3.16c)
qUP, qDW, λBA = arg{(3.13)} (3.16d)
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Constraints (3.16a) and (3.16b) yield the producer’s upward and downward regula-
tion incomes, considering both a uniform and a pay-as-bid pricing schemes. Con-
straint (3.16c) gives the income associated with the uncontracted deviation qBA. Fi-
nally, constraint (3.16d), given the producer’s decisions (qUP, qDW, and qBA), simu-
lates the balancing market clearing process and computes the quantity of up- and
down-regulation energy scheduled, i.e., qUP and qDW, and the market price λBA. As
for the day-ahead market trading problem (3.12), we do not present the method-
ology to reformulate the bi-level structure of (3.16) into a single-level one, as the
thesis focuses on a price-taker producer. We refer the interested reader to (Gountis
and Bakirtzis, 2004; Bakirtzis et al., 2007; Ruiz and Conejo, 2009) for an extensive
coverage of the topic.
3.4 Trading Problem for a Price-Taker and Risk-Neutral Pro-
ducer
This section introduces two fundamental assumptions on the power producer. First,
we consider a risk-neutral power producer. This translates in maximizing the expec-
tation of its future marker profit, disregarding possible huge losses. Consequently,
the objective function (3.8a) of the general offering strategy, can be written as
g
(
ρDA + ρUP + ρDW + ρBA − c
)
= ρˆDA + ρˆUP + ρˆDW + ρˆBA − cˆ, (3.17)
where the ·ˆ symbol indicates the mean expected value, e.g., ρˆDA = E
[
ρDA
]
. Accord-
ingly, we reformulate the general offering model (3.8) as
Max
Γ
ρˆDA + ρˆUP + ρˆDW + ρˆBA − cˆ (3.18a)
s.t. qDA + qUP − qDW + qBA = qA, (3.18b)
qDA, ρˆDA ∈ ΠDA, (3.18c)
qUP, qDW, ρˆUP, ρˆDW ∈ ΠBAAct, (3.18d)
qBA, ρˆBA ∈ ΠBAPas, (3.18e)
cˆ = h
(
qA
)
, (3.18f)
qA ∈ Ω, (3.18g)
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where
Γ = {qA, qDA, qUP, qDW, qBA, ρˆDA, ρˆUP, ρˆDW, ρˆBA, cˆ}. (3.19)
Then, we consider that the power producer is price-taker in the electricity mar-
ket. It means that the influence of its decisions on the market clearing process of
both the day-ahead and the balancing market is negligible. This assumption is, gen-
erally, acceptable for producers with a small market power. As a consequence, the
day-ahead market clearing problem in (3.10), under the price-taker assumption, can
be simplified as
Min
{qDAo ,e
DA
s }
NO∑
o=1
αDAo q
DA
o (3.20a)
s.t.
NO∑
o=1
qDAo +
NS∑
s=1
eDAs = D
DA :
(
λDA
)
(3.20b)
0 ≤ qDAo ≤ Q
DA
o , ∀o ∈ {1, ..., N
O} (3.20c)
0 ≤ eDAs ≤ E
DA
s , ∀s ∈ {1, ..., N
S} (3.20d)
The day-ahead market clearing model (3.20) can be solved exogenously to the trad-
ing problem, as λDA is no more influenced by the producer’s offer (pDA, qDA). Hence,
the uncertain market price λDA can be modeled as a random variable following the
density function fDAλ : R
+ 7→ R+.
Similarly, the price-taker assumption allows to reformulate the balancing market
clearing problem in (3.13) as
Min
{qUPo ,q
DW
o }
NO∑
o=1
αUPo q
UP
o −
NO∑
o=1
αDWo q
DW
o (3.21a)
s.t.
NO∑
o=1
(
qUPo − q
DW
o
)
= δBA :
(
λBA
)
(3.21b)
0 ≤ qUPo ≤ Q
UP
o , o = 1, ..., N
O (3.21c)
0 ≤ qDWo ≤ Q
DW
o , o = 1, ..., N
O (3.21d)
The balancing market economic dispatch in (3.21) can be solved as well exogenously
to the trading problem. Consequently, for a given realization of the day-ahead mar-
ket price λDA, the balancing market one, i.e., λBA, can be modeled as a random
variable following the density function fBAλ : R 7→ R
+.
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Instead of representing the uncertain market prices λDA and λBA with contin-
uous distributions, the power producer can use a discrete representation. This is
generally required in a stochastic programming framework. Under such approach,
the continuous distributions of random variables are replaced by discrete distribu-
tions. In our problem, we can indeed represent the uncertain market price λDA using
a set I of possible scenarios {λDAi , i ∈ I}, where each price scenario λ
DA
i is associ-
ated with a probability πDAi of occurrence, such that
∑
i π
DA
i = 1. Similarly, we can
do for the balancing market price λBA. For each day-ahead market scenario i ∈ I , we
represent the uncertain λBA using a set J of scenarios, i.e., {λBAij , i ∈ I, j ∈ J}. Each
scenario (ij) is associated with a discrete probability πBAij , such that
∑
j π
BA
ij = 1, ∀i.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the difference between a continuous distribution (in blue) and
a discrete one (in green).
λDA (e/MWh)
pdf (fλ)
pmf (pi)
FIGURE 3.2: Example of a probability density function (pdf) in blue
vs a probability mass function (pmf) in green
The remaining of the section is organized as follows. Section 3.4.1 develops the
trading problem in the day-ahead market when the producer submits a single price-
quantity offer. Section 3.4.2 extends the formulation by considering non-decreasing
step-wise offer curves. Then, Section 3.4.3 uses a stochastic programming approach
to formulate the day-ahead market trading problem with offer curves as an LP prob-
lem. Section 3.4.4 formulates the trading problem in the balancing market for an
active participant submitting single price-quantities offers. Subsequently, Sections
3.4.5 and 3.4.6 extend the problem to offer curves and to a stochastic programming
framework, respectively. Finally, Section 3.4.7 models the trading problem for a pas-
sive participant in the balancing market while Section 3.4.8 does the same based on
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a stochastic programming approach.
3.4.1 Day-Ahead Market Trading Problem with Single Offers
We consider that the power producer submits a single price-quantity offer (pDA, qDA)
in the day-ahead market and we denote with qDA the quantity accepted by the Mar-
ket Operator. With the price-taker assumption, qDA is no more computed endoge-
nously by the market clearing model as in Equation (3.12b). However, it can be
evaluated as
qDA =

0, if λDA < pDA,
qDA, if λDA ≥ pDA.
(3.22)
Indeed, the accepted quantity qDA is equal to qDA when the offer price pDA is lower
or equal to the day-ahead market price λDA and 0 otherwise. Figure 3.3 shows an il-
lustrative example, where the continuous blue line represents the accepted quantity
qDA as a function of the future realization of the uncertain day-ahead market price
λDA. Therefore, the probability that the Market Operator accepts the market offer
price λDA (e/MWh)
qu
an
ti
ty
q
D
A
(M
W
h
)
(pDA, qDA)
FIGURE 3.3: Example of a single offer (pDA, qDA) in the day-ahead
market.
(pDA, qDA) is given by
P
[
pDA ≤ λDA
]
=
∫ ∞
pDA
fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.23)
as it is only accepted when pDA ≤ λDA, in accordance with Equation (3.22). The
variable ℓ in Equation (3.23) is an auxiliary integration variable. A graphical inter-
pretation of the probability of acceptance of the single price-quantity market offer
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is shown in Figure 3.4. Let pDA∗ be the remuneration price provided that the of-
λDA (e/MWh)
f
λ
pDA
pdf fλ
P
[
pDA ≤ λDA
]
FIGURE 3.4: Graphic representation of the probability of acceptance
of the price-quantity offer.
fer (pDA, qDA) is being accepted (i.e., that pDA ≤ λDA) by the Market Operator. Its
expected value can be evaluated as
E
[
pDA∗ | pDA ≤ λDA
]
=
∫∞
pDA
ℓ fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ∫∞
pDA
fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ
. (3.24)
Then, the expected market revenue ρˆDA is given by the product of the offered quan-
tity qDA, the probability of acceptance of the offer, and the expected remuneration
price provided that the offer is being accepted, i.e.,
ρˆDA = qDA P
[
λDA ≥ pDA
]
E
[
p∗ | λDA ≥ pDA
]
. (3.25)
Let us rewrite Equation (3.25) by replacing the term P
[
pDA ≤ λDA
]
with Equation
(3.23), and E
[
pDA∗ | pDA ≤ λDA
]
with Equation (3.24). This leads to
ρˆDA = qDA
∫ ∞
pDA
ℓ fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.26)
The set ΠDA in the risk-neutral offering strategy (3.18), can be replaced by the
following set of constraints:
ρˆDA = qDA
∫ ∞
pDA
ℓ fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.27a)
Q ≤ qDA ≤ Q. (3.27b)
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Constraint (3.27a) yields the expected day-ahead market income ρˆDA, given the sin-
gle price-quantity offer (pDA, qDA). Then, constraint (3.27b) limits the quantity offer
qDA between its minimum and maximum values, i.e., Q and Q.
3.4.2 Day-Ahead Market Trading Problem with Offer Curves
The market offers in a real-world electricity market for the generation-side are, gen-
erally, non-decreasing step-wise functions called offer curves. Such offer curves al-
low the producer to schedule more production as the market price increases. Figure
3.5 illustrates an example of multiple offer curves with three blocks. The continu-
ous red line represents the quantity qDA that would be contracted, depending on the
future realization of the uncertain market price λDA. Such accepted quantity qDA is
price λDA (e/MWh)
qu
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h
)
(pDA1 , q
DA
1 )
(pDA2 , q
DA
2 )
(pDA3 , q
DA
3 )
FIGURE 3.5: Example of a 3 blocks offer curve in the day-ahead mar-
ket.
evaluated as
qDA =

0, if λDA < pDA1 ,
qDA1 , if p
DA
1 ≤ λ
DA < pDA2 ,
qDA2 , if p
DA
2 ≤ λ
DA < pDA3 ,
qDA3 , if p
DA
3 ≤ λ
DA.
(3.28)
The first bock offer (pDA1 , q
DA
1 ) is accepted if the market price λ
DA is greater or equal
to pDA1 but lower than p
DA
2 . Indeed, if λ
DA is greater or equal to pDA2 the second (or
third) block would be contracted. The probability of acceptance of the first block is
computed as
P
[
pDA1 ≤ λ
DA < pDA2
]
=
∫ pDA2
pDA1
fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.29)
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and similarly for the second block, i.e.,
P
[
pDA2 ≤ λ
DA < pDA3
]
=
∫ pDA3
pDA2
fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ. (3.30)
The third block is, in this example, the last one and it is accepted when λDA is greater
or equal to pDA3 , without an upper bound as for the first two blocks. In this case, we
replace the upper bound of the integral with ∞, thus obtaining
P
[
pDA3 ≤ λ
DA
]
=
∫ ∞
pDA3
fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ. (3.31)
Figure 3.6 shows a graphical interpretation of the acceptance probability of the three
blocks as in Equations (3.29), (3.30), and (3.31).
λDA (e/MWh)
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DA < pDA3
]
P
[
pDA3 ≤ λ
DA
]
FIGURE 3.6: Graphic representation of the probability of acceptance
of the offer curves composed of three blocks.
Let ρˆDA1 , ρˆ
DA
2 , and ρˆ
DA
3 be the expected revenues associated with the blocks 1, 2,
and 3 composing the offer curve, respectively. They can be computed similarly to
the case of a single market offer in Equation (3.25), i.e.,
ρˆDA1 = q
DA
1
∫ pDA2
pDA1
ℓ fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.32a)
ρˆDA2 = q
DA
2
∫ pDA3
pDA2
ℓ fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.32b)
ρˆDA3 = q
DA
3
∫ ∞
pDA3
ℓ fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ. (3.32c)
Note that for blocks 1 and 2 we replace the upper bound of the integral (i.e., ∞ for
the single market offer) with their associated upper bound pDA2 and p
DA
3 , respectively.
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Then, the day-ahead market expected income ρˆDA can be computed as
ρˆDA = ρˆDA1 + ρˆ
DA
2 + ρˆ
DA
3 . (3.33)
The formulation for the offer curve made of three blocks can be generalized to an
offer curve with B blocks. Let (pDAb , q
DA
b ) be the price-quantity offer block b of the
offer curve. The offer curve needs to be non-decreasing, as it is usually a requirement
of electricity markets. This condition is imposed by the following constraints:
qDAb+1 ≥ q
DA
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.34a)
pDAb+1 ≥ p
DA
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1. (3.34b)
Then, the expected market revenue of the multiple block offer curve {(pDAb , q
DA
b ), b =
1, ..., B} is given by
ρˆDA =
B∑
b=1
qDAb
∫ pDA
b+1
pDA
b
ℓ fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.35)
where pDAB+1, i.e., the upper integral limit of the last offer block of the curve, is equal
to ∞.
When the price-taker producer submits offer curves, the set ΠDA in the risk-
neutral offering strategy (3.18), is replaced by
ρˆDA =
B∑
b=1
qDAb
∫ pDA
b+1
pDA
b
ℓ fDAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.36a)
qDAb+1 ≥ q
DA
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1 (3.36b)
pDAb+1 ≥ p
DA
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1 (3.36c)
Q ≤ qDAb ≤ Q, b = 1, ..., B (3.36d)
Constraint (3.36a) gives the expected day-ahead market income associated with the
offer curve {(pDAb , q
DA
b ), b = 1, ..., B}. Constraints (3.36b) and (3.36c) impose the
non-decreasing condition of the offer curve. Finally, constraint (3.36d) limits the
day-ahead market offers qDAb between Q and Q.
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3.4.3 Day-Ahead Market Trading Problem via Stochastic Programming
The trading problem (3.36) derived in Section 3.4.2 is formulated as a non-linear
problem. Since the uncertain market clearing price λDA is modeled as a random vari-
able with a continuous distribution function (i.e., fDAλ ), the probability of acceptance
of each block of the curve needs to integrate the density function fDAλ over the price
domain. Moreover, to evaluate the expected market income, we need to compute
the product of quantities and prices, thus resulting in a non-linear model. A stochas-
tic programming approach can provide an alternative linear formulation. As men-
tioned in Section 3.4, under such approach, the continuous distribution of random
variables is replaced by a discrete distribution. Indeed, the uncertain market price
λDA is represented by mean of a discrete set I of possible realizations {λDAi , i ∈ I},
where each scenario i is associated with a probability πDAi of occurrence, such that∑
i π
DA
i = 1.
As the possible outcomes of the random variable λDA belongs to the discrete set
I , we consider each price scenario λDAi as the potential offer price of the price-taker
producer. This simplifies the trading problem, as the offer price of each block of the
curve is now a parameter instead of a variable. Moreover, it seems a natural choice
as any offer price different than λDAi would have a null probability of occurrence.
For each potential offer price, we evaluate the optimal quantity qDAi to be offered in
the market, provided that the market price outcome is λDAi . The result is a collection
of N price-quantity offers, i.e., (λDAi , q
DA
i ) that allows building the offer curve of the
producer. Similarly to the continuous case, we need to enforce that the offer curve is
non-decreasing. The following constraints impose such condition:
qDAi ≥ q
DA
i′ if λ
DA
i ≥ λ
DA
i′ , ∀i, i
′, (3.37a)
qDAi = q
DA
i′ if λ
DA
i = λ
DA
i′ , ∀i, i
′, (3.37b)
where i and i′ are both indices of the market price scenarios. Constraint (3.37a) im-
poses the non-decreasing requirement, while constraint (3.37b) the non-anticipativity
one. Indeed, constraint (3.37b) prevents the power producer from offering different
quantities at the same market price. Note that this offer curve {(λDAi , q
DA
i ), i ∈ I} is
still scenario-independent, i.e., it is adapted to the all set I of scenarios, though it is
build based on scenario-dependent price-quantity offers.
Let us initially consider an offer curve composed of three blocks, similar to the
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one shown in Figure 3.5, though adapted to the new discrete formulation. Let λDA1 ,
λDA2 , and λ
DA
3 be the three scenarios of λ
DA, with πDA1 , π
DA
2 , and π
DA
3 their associated
probability, respectively. We assume that this set is in growing order, i.e., λDA1 ≤
λDA2 ≤ λ
DA
3 . An example of such offer curve is shown in Figure 3.7. The probability
price λDA (e/MWh)
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FIGURE 3.7: Example of a 3 blocks offer curve under a stochastic pro-
gramming approach.
of acceptance of the first block can be computed as
P
[
λDA1 ≤ λ
DA < λDA2
]
= P
[
λDA = λDA1
]
= πDA1 . (3.38)
Similarly, the probability of acceptance of the second block is
P
[
λDA2 ≤ λ
DA < λDA3
]
= P
[
λDA = λDA2
]
= πDA2 , (3.39)
and the one of the third block is
P
[
λDA3 ≤ λ
DA
]
= P
[
λDA = λDA3
]
= πDA3 . (3.40)
Then, we evaluate the expected revenue of the 3 blocks composing the offer curve
(i.e., ρˆDA1 , ρˆ
DA
2 , and ρˆ
DA
3 ) as
ρˆDA1 = π
DA
1 λ
DA
1 q
DA
1 , (3.41a)
ρˆDA2 = π
DA
2 λ
DA
2 q
DA
2 , (3.41b)
ρˆDA3 = π
DA
3 λ
DA
3 q
DA
3 . (3.41c)
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and the total day-ahead income as
ρˆDA = ρˆDA1 + ρˆ
DA
2 + ρˆ
DA
3 . (3.42)
Let us now generalize to the case with a set I of market price scenarios. In this
case, the expected revenue ρˆDA is given by
ρˆDA =
∑
i
πDAi λ
DA
i q
DA
i , (3.43)
Accordingly, under a stochastic programming approach, the set ΠDA in (3.18) is re-
placed by
ρˆDA =
∑
i
πDAi λ
DA
i q
DA
i (3.44a)
qDAi ≥ q
DA
i′ if λ
DA
i ≥ λ
DA
i′ , ∀i, i
′, (3.44b)
qDAi = q
DA
i′ if λ
DA
i = λ
DA
i′ , ∀i, i
′, (3.44c)
Q ≤ qDAi ≤ Q, ∀i (3.44d)
Constraint (3.44a) yields the expected day-ahead market income of the power pro-
ducer. The non-decreasing and non-anticipativity conditions are imposed by con-
straints (3.44b) and (3.44c), respectively. Lastly, constraint (3.44d) forces the day-
ahead market offers qDAi between Q and Q.
3.4.4 Balancing Market (Active) Trading Problem with Single Offers
We assume that the power producer submits a single price-quantity offer for both
upward and downward regulation, i.e., (pUP, qUP) and (pDW, qDW), respectively.
This section restricts the balancing market participation to the active one, i.e., the
power producer can offer regulating energy but it can not passively deviate from its
contracted production schedule. In the general formulation of the balancing mar-
ket trading problem, i.e., (3.16), the accepted regulation adjustments qUP and qDW
are endogenously computed within the offering strategy by constraint (3.16d), as
well as the balancing market price λBA. Differently, the price-taker producer, given
the already revealed day-ahead market price λDA, considers the balancing market
price λBA as a random variable with marginal distribution fBAλ : R 7→ R
+. Then, it
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evaluates the accepted regulation adjustments qUP and qDW as
qUP =

0, if λBA < pUP,
qUP, if λBA ≥ pUP.
(3.45)
qDW =

0, if λBA > pDW,
qDW, if λBA ≤ pDW.
(3.46)
In Equation (3.46) the merit order of qDW is inverse compared to qUP. Indeed, it is
more convenient for the System Operator to schedule down-regulation energy of-
fered at higher price pDW, as it is going to receive a payment of pDW qDW from the
producer. Figure 3.8 shows the accepted quantities qUP and qDW, given the single
offers (pUP, qUP) and (pDW, qDW). In order to show that the down-regulation is ac-
tually a decrease of production, Figure 3.8 illustrates −qDW instead of qDW. Then, in
price λBA (e/MWh)
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FIGURE 3.8: Example of single offers (pUP, qUP) and (pDW, qDW) in
the balancing market.
accordance with Equation (3.45), the probability of acceptance of the up-regulation
offer is evaluated as
P
[
pUP ≤ λBA
]
=
∫ ∞
pUP
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.47)
since (pUP, qUP) is going to be accepted if λBA is greater or equal the up-regulation
offer price pUP. Following Equation (3.46), the acceptance probability of the down-
regulation offer is given by
P
[
pDW ≥ λBA
]
=
∫ pDW
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ. (3.48)
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Indeed, the down-regulation offer (pDW, qDW) is accepted if λBA is lower or equal to
pDW. A graphical interpretation of the probability of acceptance of the price-quantity
offers in the balancing market is shown in Figure (3.9). The acceptance probability
of the up-regulation offer is the blue area, while the one of the down-regulation offer
is the red area. Let pUP∗ be the remuneration price provided that the up-regulation
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FIGURE 3.9: Graphic representation of the offer probability accep-
tance of the up-regulation offer (blue) and the down-regulation one
(red).
offer is being accepted by the System Operator. Its expected value is computed as
E
[
pUP∗ | λBA ≥ pUP
]
=

∫∞
pUP
ℓ fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ∫∞
pUP
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ
, if uniform pricing,
pUP, if pay-as-bid pricing,
(3.49)
Similarly, being pDW∗ the remuneration price given that the down-regulation offer is
accepted, its expected value is evaluated as
E
[
pDW∗ | λBA ≤ pDW
]
=

∫ pDW
−∞ ℓ f
BA
λ (ℓ) dℓ∫ pDW
−∞ f
BA
λ (ℓ) dℓ
, if uniform pricing,
pDW, if pay-as-bid pricing.
(3.50)
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Then, the expected revenues ρˆUP and ρˆDW are computed as
ρˆUP =

qUP
∫∞
pUP
ℓ fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, if uniform pricing,
qUP pUP
∫∞
pUP
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, if pay-as-bid pricing,
(3.51a)
ρˆDW =

−qDW
∫ pDW
−∞ ℓ f
BA
λ (ℓ) dℓ, if uniform pricing,
−qDW pDW
∫ pDW
−∞ f
BA
λ (ℓ) dℓ, if pay-as-bid pricing,
(3.51b)
The set ΠBAAct in the risk-neutral offer strategy (3.18), can be replaced by the fol-
lowing set of constraints:
ρˆUP =

qUP
∫∞
pUP
ℓ fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, if uniform pricing,
qUP pUP
∫∞
pUP
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, if pay-as-bid pricing,
(3.52a)
ρˆDW =

−qDW
∫ pDW
−∞ ℓ f
BA
λ (ℓ) dℓ, if uniform pricing,
−qDW pDW
∫ pDW
−∞ f
BA
λ (ℓ) dℓ, if pay-as-bid pricing,
(3.52b)
qUP, qDW ≥ 0. (3.52c)
Constraint (3.52a) yields the expected market income from offering up-regulation
energy. Constraint (3.52b) does the same for the down-regulation market income.
Note that (3.52a) and (3.52b) give the formulation for both an uniform and a pay-as-
bid pricing scheme. Finally, constraint (3.52c) imposes that the quantities qUP and
qDW are non-negative.
3.4.5 Balancing Market (Active) Trading Problem with Offer Curves
The possibility of submitting a market offer through non-decreasing step-wise curves
is usually available even in the balancing market. We first develop the balancing
market trading problem with offer curves for a balancing market settled under a
uniform pricing scheme. Subsequently, we assume a pay-as-bid balancing market.
Uniform Pricing Scheme
Figure 3.10 shows an example of offer curves for upward (blue) and downward (red)
regulation in the balancing market, which is considered settled under a uniform
pricing scheme. The probability of acceptance of the first block (pUP1 , q
UP
1 ) of the
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FIGURE 3.10: Example of a 2 blocks offer curve for both upward
(blue) and downward (red) regulation in the balancing market.
up-regulation offer curve is computed as
P
[
pUP1 ≤ λ
BA < pUP2
]
=
∫ pUP2
pUP1
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ. (3.53)
Similarly, the one of the second (and last) block (pUP2 , q
UP
2 ) is given by
P
[
pUP2 ≤ λ
BA
]
=
∫ ∞
pUP2
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.54)
Conversely, the down-regulation offer curves are non-increasing if the quantity qDW
is modeled as a positive variable. Note that the downward regulation offer curve
in Figure 3.10 is non-decreasing as it shows −qDW instead of qDW. In this case, the
probability of acceptance of the first block (pDW1 , q
DW
1 ) of the down-regulation offer
curve is computed as
P
[
pDW1 ≥ λ
BA > pDW2
]
=
∫ pDW1
pDW2
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.55)
while the one of the second (and last) block (pUP2 , q
UP
2 ) as
P
[
pDW2 ≥ λ
BA
]
=
∫ pDW2
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ. (3.56)
Figure 3.11 shows a graphical interpretation of the acceptance probability of the up-
ward (blue) and downward (red) regulation offer curves illustrated in Figure 3.10.
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FIGURE 3.11: Graphic representation of the probability acceptance
of the two blocks composing the offer curve for upward (blue) and
downward (red) regulation.
Let us now consider an offer curve composed of B blocks, for both up- and
down-regulation. For the up-regulation offer curve, the non-decreasing condition
is enforced by the following constraints:
qUPb+1 ≥ q
UP
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.57a)
pUPb+1 ≥ p
UP
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.57b)
while the non-increasing condition of the down-regulation offer curve as
qDWb+1 ≥ q
DW
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.58a)
pDWb+1 ≤ p
DW
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1. (3.58b)
Then, the expected market income ρˆUP associated with the up-regulation offer curve
{(pUPb , q
UP
b ), b = 1, ..., B} is given by
ρˆUP =
B∑
b=1
qUPb
∫ pUP
b+1
pUP
b
ℓ fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.59)
where pUPB+1, i.e., the upper integral limit of the last block of the curve, is equal to
∞. Similarly, the expected market revenue ρˆDW of the down-regulation offer curve
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{(pDWb , q
DW
b ), b = 1, ..., B} is evaluated as
ρˆDW =
B∑
b=1
qDWb
∫ pDW
b
pDW
b+1
ℓ fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.60)
where pDWB+1, i.e., the lower integral limit of the last block of the curve, is equal to
−∞.
When the price-taker producer submits offer curves in the balancing market (un-
der a uniform pricing scheme), the set ΠBAAct in the risk-neutral offer strategy (3.18) is
replaced by the following set of constraints:
ρˆUP =
B∑
b=1
qUPb
∫ pUP
b+1
pUP
b
ℓ fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.61a)
ρˆDW =
B∑
b=1
qDWb
∫ pDW
b
pDW
b+1
ℓ fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.61b)
qUPb+1 ≥ q
UP
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.61c)
pUPb+1 ≥ p
UP
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.61d)
qDWb+1 ≥ q
DW
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.61e)
pDWb+1 ≤ p
DW
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.61f)
qUPb , q
DW
b ≥ 0 b = 1, ..., B. (3.61g)
Constraints (3.61a) and (3.61b) compute the expected market incomes ρˆUP and ρˆDW
under a uniform pricing scheme. Constraints (3.61c) and (3.61d) enforce the non-
decreasing condition of the up-regulation offer curve. Similarly, constraints (3.61e)
and (3.61f) impose the non-increasing requirement of the down-regulation offer curve.
Finally, constraint (3.61g) imposes that the offer quantities qUPb and q
DW
b are non-
negative.
Pay-as-Bid Pricing Scheme
Figure 3.12 provides an example of offer curves for upward (blue) and downward
(red) regulation in the balancing market, which is considered settled under a pay-
as-bid pricing scheme. To model the pay-as-bid pricing scheme, we introduce the
additional variables oUP1 and o
UP
2 for the up-regulation offer curve, and o
DW
1 and
oDW2 for the down-regulation curve. They represent the additional amount of energy
offered provided that their block offer is being accepted. E.g., the first block of the
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FIGURE 3.12: Example of a 2 blocks offer curve for both upward
(blue) and downward (red) regulation in the balancing market.
up-regulation offer is (pUP1 , q
UP
1 ) and
qUP1 = o
UP
1 . (3.62)
The second block of the offer is (pUP2 , q
UP
2 ) and, if accepted, the producer is con-
tracted to produce qUP2 . We split this amount between o
UP
1 , i.e., the size of the first
block offered at pUP1 , and o
UP
2 , i.e., the additional energy sold at p
UP
2 , as those quan-
tities would be priced differently by the System Operator. Consequently, qUP2 is ob-
tained as
qUP2 = o
UP
1 + o
UP
2 , (3.63)
i.e., it is computed as the sum of the sizes of the two blocks. Similarly, for the down-
regulation offer curve {(pDW1 , q
DW
1 ), (p
DW
2 , q
DW
2 )}, the following equalities hold:
qDW1 = o
DW
1 , (3.64)
qDW2 = o
DW
1 + o
DW
2 . (3.65)
Aiming at computing the expected revenues associated with the offer curves, it is
convenient to work with the incremental sizes of the offer blocks, i.e., {(pUP1 , o
UP
1 ), (p
UP
2 ,
oUP2 )} and {(p
DW
1 , o
DW
1 ), (p
DW
2 , o
DW
2 )}. The probability of acceptance of the first step
(pUP1 , o
UP
1 ) can be computed as
P
[
pUP1 ≤ λ
BA
]
=
∫ ∞
pUP1
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.66)
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as the quantity oUP1 is scheduled also when the second block offer (p
UP
2 , q
UP
2 ) is ac-
cepted. Then, the probability of acceptance of the second step (pUP2 , o
UP
2 ) is given
by
P
[
pUP2 ≤ λ
BA
]
=
∫ ∞
pUP2
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ. (3.67)
Similarly, for the down-regulation offer curve, the probability of acceptance of the
first step (pDW1 , o
DW
1 ) is evaluated as
P
[
pDW1 ≥ λ
BA
]
=
∫ pDW1
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.68)
while the one of the second step (pUP2 , o
UP
2 ) as
P
[
pDW2 ≥ λ
BA
]
=
∫ pDW2
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.69)
The expected up-regulation income ρˆUP is accordingly given by
ρˆUP = oUP1 p
UP
1
∫ ∞
pUP1
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ + o
UP
2 p
UP
2
∫ ∞
pUP2
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.70)
while the down-regulation one, i.e., ρˆDW, by
ρˆDW = −oDW1 p
DW
1
∫ pDW1
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ − o
DW
2 p
DW
2
∫ pDW2
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ. (3.71)
Then, extending the formulation to offer curves with B blocks, where (pUPb , o
UP
b )
and (pDWb , o
DW
b ) are the steps b of the two offer curves. The quantities q
UP
b and q
DW
b
are evaluates as
qUPb =
b∑
b′=1
oUPb′ , (3.72a)
qDWb =
b∑
b′=1
oDWb′ , (3.72b)
where both b and b′ are indices of the block offers. The non-decreasing and non-
increasing requirements of the upward and downward regulation offer curves, are
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enforced through the following constraints:
pUPb+1 ≥ p
UP
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.73a)
pDWb+1 ≤ p
DW
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1. (3.73b)
In this case, it is necessary to enforce the non-decreasing (or non-increasing) condi-
tion only on the prices, as for the quantities it is inherently enforced in the way qUPb
and qDWb are computed, i.e., Equations (3.72a) and (3.72b). The expected revenues
ρˆUP and ρˆDW are computed as
ρˆUP =
B∑
b=1
oUPb p
UP
b
∫ ∞
pUP
b
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.74a)
ρˆDW = −
B∑
b=1
oDWb p
DW
b
∫ pDW
b
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.74b)
When the price-taker producer submits offer curves in the balancing market (un-
der a pay-a-bid pricing scheme), the set ΠBAAct in the risk-neutral offer strategy (3.18)
is formulated
ρˆUP =
B∑
b=1
oUPb p
UP
b
∫ ∞
pUP
b
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.75a)
ρˆDW = −
B∑
b=1
oDWb p
DW
b
∫ pDW
b
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ) dℓ, (3.75b)
qUPb =
b∑
b′=1
oUPb′ , b = 1, ..., B (3.75c)
qDWb =
b∑
b′=1
oDWb′ , b = 1, ..., B (3.75d)
pUPb+1 ≥ p
UP
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.75e)
pDWb+1 ≤ p
DW
b , b = 1, ..., B − 1, (3.75f)
oUPb , o
DW
b ≥ 0, b = 1, ..., B (3.75g)
Constraints (3.75a) and (3.75b) yield the expected market incomes ρˆUP and ρˆDW
given the up- and down-regulation offer curve in a balancing market settled under
a pay-as-bid pricing scheme. Constraint (3.75c) computes the total up-regulation
quantity qUPb scheduled when the block offer b is accepted. Similarly, constraint
(3.75d) computes the down-regulation quantity qDWb contracted when the block offer
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b is accepted. Constraints (3.75e) and (3.75f) enforce the non-decreasing and non-
increasing requirement of the up- and down-regulation offer curves, respectively.
Finally, constraint (3.75g) forces oUPb and o
DW
b to be positive.
3.4.6 Balancing Market (Active) Trading Problem via Stochastic Program-
ming
The trading problems (3.61) and (3.75) derived in Section 3.4.5 are formulated as
a non-linear problem. An alternative linear formulation can be obtained through a
stochastic programming approach. For a given realization i of the day the day-ahead
market price, i.e., λDAi , the uncertain balancing market price λ
BA
i is represented using
a discrete set J possible scenarios {λBAij , j ∈ J}, where each scenario j is associated
with a probability πBAij , such that
∑
j π
BA
ij = 1. We first develop the balancing market
trading problem using a stochastic programming approach for a balancing market
settled under a uniform pricing scheme. Subsequently, we consider a pay-as-bid
balancing market.
Uniform Pricing Scheme
Figure 3.13 shows an example of offer curves for upward (blue) and downward (red)
regulation in a balancing market settled under a uniform pricing scheme. We con-
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FIGURE 3.13: Example of a 2 blocks offer curve for both upward
(blue) and downward (red) regulation in the balancing market (uni-
form pricing scheme).
sider each price scenario λBAij as a potential offer price of the price-taker producer, for
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both upward and downward regulation. The result is a collection of price-quantity
offers, i.e., {(λBAij , q
UP
ij ), j ∈ J} and {(λ
BA
ij , q
DW
ij ), j ∈ J}, that allows to build the up-
regulation and down-regulation offer curves to be submitted in the balancing mar-
ket. We impose the non-decreasing requirement of the up-regulation offer curve as
qUPij ≥ q
UP
ij′ if λ
BA
ij ≥ λ
BA
ij′ , ∀j, j
′, (3.76a)
qUPij = q
UP
ij′ if λ
BA
ij = λ
BA
ij′ , ∀j, j
′, (3.76b)
where j and j′ are both indices of the balancing market price scenarios. Similarly,
the non-increasing condition of the down-regulation curve is enforced by
qDWij ≤ q
DW
ij′ if λ
BA
ij ≥ λ
BA
ij′ , ∀j, j
′, (3.77a)
qDWij = q
DW
ij′ if λ
BA
ij = λ
BA
ij′ , ∀j, j
′. (3.77b)
Then, we impose that the producer contracts its up-regulation offers when the sys-
tem needs upward regulation. An indicator of the status of the system imbalance is
the market price scenario λBAij compared to the day-ahead market price λ
DA
i (already
revealed at the balancing stage), i.e.,
if λBAij > λ
DA
i up-regulation required when scenario j realizes
if λBAij = λ
DA
i no regulation required when scenario j realizes
if λBAij < λ
DA
i down-regulation required when scenario j realizes
As a consequence, we impose that the variables qUPij and q
DW
ij are null when the sys-
tem does not require up-regulation and down-regulation, respectively. This writes
qUPij = 0 if λ
BA
ij ≤ λ
DA
i , ∀j, (3.79a)
qDWij = 0 if λ
BA
ij ≥ λ
DA
i , ∀j. (3.79b)
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The expected revenues ρˆUP and ρˆDW, based on the stochastic programming ap-
proach, are evaluated as
ρˆUPi =
∑
j
πBAji λ
BA
ij q
UP
ij , (3.80a)
ρˆDWi = −
∑
j
πBAij λ
BA
ij q
DW
ij , (3.80b)
Accordingly, under a stochastic programming approach, the set ΠBAAct in (3.18), for
a balancing market settled under a uniform pricing scheme, is given by the following
set of constraints:
ρˆUPi =
∑
j
πBAji λ
BA
ij q
UP
ij , (3.81a)
ρˆDWi = −
∑
j
πBAij λ
BA
ij q
DW
ij , (3.81b)
qUPij ≥ q
UP
ij′ if λ
BA
ij ≥ λ
BA
ij′ , ∀j, j
′, (3.81c)
qUPij = q
UP
ij′ if λ
BA
ij = λ
BA
ij′ , ∀j, j
′, (3.81d)
qDWij ≤ q
DW
ij′ if λ
BA
ij ≥ λ
BA
ij′ , ∀j, j
′, (3.81e)
qDWij = q
DW
ij′ if λ
BA
ij = λ
BA
ij′ , ∀j, j
′, (3.81f)
qUPij = 0 if λ
BA
ij ≤ λ
DA
i , ∀j, (3.81g)
qDWij = 0 if λ
BA
ij ≥ λ
DA
i , ∀j, (3.81h)
qUPij , q
DW
ij ≥ 0, ∀j. (3.81i)
Constraints (3.81a) and (3.81b) compute the expected market revenues from offer-
ing up-regulation and down-regulation, respectively. The non-decreasing and non-
anticipativity requirements of the up-regulation offer curve are imposed by con-
straints (3.81c) and (3.81d), while the down-regulation offer curve is forced to be
non-increasing through constraints (3.81e) and (3.81f). Constraint (3.81g) restricts
the offering of up-regulation energy to the scenarios in which it is required. Sim-
ilarly, constraint (3.81h) does for the down-regulation energy. Finally, constraint
(3.81i) forces the market offers qUPij and q
DW
ij to be non-negative.
Pay-as-Bid Pricing Scheme
Figure 3.14 provides an example of offer curves for upward (blue) and downward
(red) regulation in a balancing market settled under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme.
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We introduce the variables oUPij and o
DW
ij , representing the additional quantity to be
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FIGURE 3.14: Example of a 2 blocks offer curve for both upward
(blue) and downward (red) regulation in the balancing market (pay-
as-bid pricing scheme).
offered at price λBAij , for upward and downward regulation, respectively. Given that
the step j of the up-regulation curve is (λBAij , o
UP
ij ), the total up-regulation energy
qUPij scheduled when scenario (ij) realizes can be computed as
qUPij =
∑
j′
MUPjj′ o
UP
ij′ , ∀j, (3.82)
where j and j′ are both indices of the balancing market price scenarios. The element
(jj′) of the matrix MUP is defined as
MUPjj′ =

1, λBAij ≥ λ
BA
ij′ ,
0, otherwise.
(3.83)
Similarly, the total down-regulation energy qDWij scheduled under scenario j is
qDWij =
∑
j′
MDWjj′ o
DW
ij′ , ∀j, (3.84)
where MDW is defined as
MDWjj′ =

1, λBAij ≤ λ
BA
ij′ ,
0, otherwise.
(3.85)
Note that the way MUP and MDW are built inherently imposes the non-decreasing
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and non-increasing requirement of the upward and downward regulation curves,
respectively. However, we need to force the variables oUPj and o
DW
j to be null when
the system does not require up-regulation and down-regulation, respectively, i.e.,
oUPij′ = 0 if λ
BA
ij′ ≤ λ
DA
i , ∀j
′, (3.86a)
oDWij′ = 0 if λ
BA
ij′ ≥ λ
DA
i , ∀j
′. (3.86b)
Let ρˆUPij′ be the expected income associated to the step (λ
BA
ij′ , o
UP
ij′ ). Its probability
of acceptance can be computed as
P
[
λBAi ≥ λ
BA
ij′
]
=
∑
j
MUPjj′ π
BA
ij , (3.87)
while the expectation of the remuneration price pUP∗j′ , provided that the offer is being
accepted, as
E
[
pUP∗j′ | λ
BA
i ≥ λ
BA
ij′
]
= λBAij′ , (3.88)
thus resulting in an expected revenue ρˆUPij′ given by
ρˆUPij′ = o
UP
ij′ λ
BA
ij′
∑
j
MUPjj′ π
BA
ij . (3.89)
The expected revenue ρˆUPi of the whole offer curve is computed by summing up the
revenues ρˆUPij′ over the steps of the curve, i.e.,
ρˆUPi =
∑
j′
oUPij′ λ
BA
ij′
∑
j
MUPjj′ π
BA
ij . (3.90)
The expected revenue ρˆUPi can alternatively be seen as
∑
j ρˆ
UP
ij , being ρˆ
UP
ij the rev-
enue when scenario j realizes. This leads to
ρˆUPi =
∑
j
πBAij
∑
j′
MUPjj′ o
UP
ij′ λ
BA
ij′ . (3.91)
Note that the formulation in Equation (3.91) is equivalent to (3.90), while the terms
are rearranged in a more practical fashion. Similarly, the expected revenue ρˆDWi of
the whole down-regulation offer curve can be computed as
ρˆDWi = −
∑
j
πBAij
∑
j′
MDWjj′ o
DW
ij′ λ
BA
ij′ . (3.92)
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Consequently, under a stochastic programming approach, the set ΠBAAct in (3.18),
for a pay-as-bid balancing market, is formulated as
ρˆUPi =
∑
j
πBAij
∑
j′
MUPjj′ o
UP
ij′ λ
BA
ij′ , (3.93a)
ρˆDWi = −
∑
j
πBAij
∑
j′
MDWjj′ o
DW
ij′ λ
BA
ij′ , (3.93b)
qUPij =
∑
j′
MUPjj′ o
UP
ij′ , ∀j, (3.93c)
qDWij =
∑
j′
MDWjj′ o
DW
ij′ , ∀j, (3.93d)
oUPij′ = 0 if λ
BA
ij′ ≤ λ
DA
i , ∀j
′, (3.93e)
oDWij′ = 0 if λ
BA
ij′ ≥ λ
DA
i , ∀j
′, (3.93f)
oUPij′ , o
DW
ij′ ≥ 0, ∀j
′. (3.93g)
Constraints (3.93a) and (3.93b) yield expected market revenue from offering up-
regulation and down-regulation, respectively. Constraints (3.93c) and (3.93d) eval-
uate the total amount of energy qUPij and q
DW
ij scheduled provided that the block
offer j is being accepted. Constraint (3.93e) restricts the offering of up-regulation
energy to the scenarios in which it is required. Similarly, constraint (3.93f) does for
the down-regulation energy. Finally, constraint (3.93g) forces oUPij′ and o
DW
ij′ to be
non-negative.
3.4.7 Balancing Market (Passive) Trading Problem
A passive participant in the balancing market deviates of a quantity qBA from its
day-ahead contracted schedule qDA. Being a price-taker in the market, it models
the balancing market price λBA as a random variable with marginal distribution
fBAλ : R 7→ R
+, given the (already revealed) day-ahead market price λDA. As men-
tioned in Section 3.3.2 two main imbalance settlement schemes can be distinguished,
i.e., the single-price and the dual-price imbalance settlement scheme.
Single-Price Imbalance Settlement Scheme
Under a single-price imbalance settlement scheme, the deviation qBA is priced at
the balancing market price λBA, disregarding the mutual sign of the producer’s and
system’s imbalance. It follows that the expected revenue ρˆBA of the passive producer
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is given by
ρˆBA = λˆBA qBA, (3.94)
where the term λˆBA is computed as
λˆBA =
∫ ∞
−∞
ℓfBAλ (ℓ)dℓ. (3.95)
Consequently, the set ΠBAPas for a price-taker and risk-neutral passive participant
in a single-price balancing market can be formulated as
ρˆBA = λˆBA qBA (3.96)
Constraint (3.96) gives the the expected balancing market income ρˆBA linked to the
deviation qBA.
Dual-Price Imbalance Settlement Scheme
Differently, when a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme is used to price the de-
viations of the passive producers, qBA is priced differently, depending on the mutual
sign of the producer’s and system’s imbalance. Let us introduce the artificial prices
λ(+) and λ(−). The first, i.e., λ(+), represents the remuneration price of positive devi-
ations, i.e., when qBA > 0. The second, i.e., λ(−), is used to price negative deviations,
i.e., when qBA < 0. They are computed, starting from λDA and λBA, as
λ(+) =

λDA, if λBA > λDA
λBA, otherwise
(3.97a)
λ(−) =

λDA, if λBA < λDA
λBA, otherwise
(3.97b)
Note that a positive qBA is priced at λ(+), i.e., at the lower between λDA and λBA.
Indeed, as it is an additional quantity of energy that the passive producer is gener-
ating, it is remunerated at the less convenient price. Contrariwise, a negative qBA is
priced at λ(−), i.e., at the higher between λDA and λBA. Indeed, a negative qBA is a
quantity that the producer is "buying" back from the market, and λ(−) is the less con-
venient price for "buying" back this quantity. Accordingly, the producer’s expected
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profit ρˆBA is evaluated as
ρˆBA =

λˆ(+)qBA, if qBA > 0
λˆ(−)qBA, otherwise
(3.98)
where the expected market prices λˆ(+) and λˆ(−), according to Equations (3.97a) and
(3.97b), are given by
λˆ(+) =
∫ λDA
−∞
ℓfBAλ (ℓ)dℓ+ λ
DA
∫ ∞
λDA
fBAλ (ℓ)dℓ (3.99a)
λˆ(−) = λDA
∫ λDA
−∞
fBAλ (ℓ)dℓ+
∫ ∞
λDA
ℓfBAλ (ℓ)dℓ (3.99b)
The set ΠBAPas for a price-taker and risk-neutral passive participant in a dual-price
balancing market is formulated as
ρˆBA =

λˆ(+)qBA, if qBA > 0
λˆ(−)qBA, otherwise
(3.100)
Constraint (3.100) yields the expected balancing market income ρˆBA associated with
the deviation qBA.
3.4.8 Balancing Market (Passive) Trading Problem via Stochastic Program-
ming
Under a stochastic programming approach we represent the uncertain market price
λBAi , for a given day-ahead market price realization λ
DA
i , by mean of a set J of pos-
sible scenarios {λBAij , j ∈ J}, where each price scenario j is associated with a proba-
bility πBAij (
∑
j π
BA
ij = 1).
Single-Price Imbalance Settlement Scheme
Under a single-price imbalance settlement scheme, the expected producer’s market
income ρˆBAi linked with the deviation q
BA
i is given by
ρˆBAi =
∑
j
πBAij λ
BA
ij q
BA
i , (3.101)
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as λˆBAi =
∑
j π
BA
ij λ
BA
ij . This leads to the following formulation of the set Π
BA
Pas:
ρˆBAi =
∑
j
πBAij λ
BA
ij q
BA
i . (3.102)
Constraint (3.102) yields the the expected balancing market income ρˆBAi related to a
deviation qBAi from the day-ahead schedule.
Dual-Price Imbalance Settlement Scheme
Differently, for the dual-price imbalance settlement scheme, it is convenient to split
the deviation qBAi into its positive and negative part, i.e., q
(+)
i and q
(−)
i , respectively.
Accordingly, we impose
qBAi = q
(+)
i − q
(−)
i , (3.103)
while enforcing q(+)i ≥ 0 and q
(−)
i ≥ 0. Consequently, we compute separately the
expected revenue for the creation of a positive and negative deviation, i.e., ρˆ(+)i and
ρˆ
(−)
i , given by
ρˆ
(+)
i =
∑
j
πBAij λ
(+)
ij q
(+)
i (3.104a)
ρˆ
(−)
i = −
∑
j
πBAij λ
(−)
ij q
(−)
i (3.104b)
where λ(+)ij = min
(
λBAij , λ
DA
i
)
and λ(−)ij = max
(
λBAij , λ
DA
i
)
, according to their def-
inition in Equations (3.97a) and (3.97b). Then, the expected profit ρˆBAi is obtained
as
ρˆBAi = ρˆ
(+)
i + ρˆ
(−)
i (3.105)
This leads a formulation of the set ΠBAPas which is
ρˆBAi =
∑
j
πBAij
(
λ
(+)
ij q
(+)
i − λ
(−)
ij q
(−)
i
)
, (3.106a)
qBAi = q
(+)
i − q
(−)
i , (3.106b)
q
(+)
i , q
(−)
i ≥ 0. (3.106c)
Constraint (3.106a) evaluates the the expected balancing market income ρˆBAi , given
by the sum of the the incomes associated to a positive and a negative deviation.
Constraint (3.106b) imposes the balance between qBAi and its positive and negative
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parts q(+)i and q
(−)
i . Finally, constraint (3.106c) forces q
(+)
i and q
(−)
i to be positive.
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Chapter 4
Uncertainty Characterization
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a methodology to generate a discrete set of scenarios to be used
by a power producer building its offering strategy under a stochastic programming
approach. Section 4.2 introduces to the concept of probabilistic forecasts of wind and
solar power generation. Differently than point forecasts, the probabilistic ones give
a full representation of the marginal distribution of the random variable of inter-
est (e.g., wind power production) for each look-ahead time interval. Then, Section
4.3 presents a fundamental market model aimed at producing realistic day-ahead
and balancing market price forecasts. Section 4.4 shows a methodology to gener-
ate trajectories of a random process (e.g., market prices or renewable energy power
production) while respecting the correlation among different lead times. Finally,
Section 4.5 shows a technique to reduce the set of generated scenarios to a limited
amount of representative ones while keeping most of the information embedded in
the generated set.
4.2 Wind & Solar Power Forecasts
Stochastic energy sources, such as wind and solar power, cannot be controlled but
only predicted with limited accuracy. Such forecasts are crucial for a stochastic pro-
ducer making informed decisions when offering in an electricity market. As pre-
sented in Chapter 2, the main trading floor, i.e., the day-ahead market, is cleared
from 12 to 36 hours before the real-time operation. Having accurate information on
the future power production may have a significant impact on the profit of a power
producer, which may be penalized for deviations from its day-ahead position.
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Let t be the time when the prediction is made, and k be the lead time between
t and the real-time production of the stochastic source. Let Et+k be the measured
power production of the stochastic source during the hourly interval t + k. This
power production is considered as the realization of the random variable E˜t+k. A
simple forecast of Et+k is a point (or deterministic) forecast. We denote it as Eˆt+k|t.
The point forecast Eˆt+k|t can be considered as the conditional expectation (i.e., the
mean expected value) of the random variable E˜t+k. A point forecast is relatively
easy to handle as it summarizes the randomness into a single statistic, i.e., the mean
expected value. However, also additional information other than the center of the
distribution of E˜t+k (e.g., its variance) may be required for some analysis.
A complete way of providing forecasts of Et+k are the so-called probabilistic
forecasts. They can be obtained from meteorological ensembles (Nielsen et al., 2006),
based of physical considerations (Lange and Focken, 2006) or from one of the several
statistical models (Bremnes, 2006; Gneiting et al., 2006; Juban, Siebert, and Karinio-
takis, 2007; Møller, Nielsen, and Madsen, 2008) available within the literature. Com-
pared to point forecasts, probabilistic aim at providing a complete information of
the random variable E˜t+k, instead of the simple mean value. Probabilistic forecasts
may take different forms, e.g., quantile, interval or density forecasts. However, the
basic format is the quantile forecasts, as the interval or the density forecasts can be
expressed as a combination of at least two quantile forecasts. Let us denote with ft+k
the probability density function of the random variable E˜t+k, defined as
P[a ≤ E˜t+k ≤ b] =
∫ b
a
ft+k(ℓ) dℓ, (4.1)
where ℓ in an auxiliary integration variable. With P[a ≤ E˜t+k ≤ b] we intend the
probability that the realization of E˜t+k will lie between a and b. Then, we introduce
the cumulative distribution function Ft+k, relative to ft+k. It is defined as
Ft+k(b) =
∫ b
−∞
ft+k(ℓ) dℓ = P[E˜t+k ≤ b] (4.2)
Given that Ft+k is strictly increasing by definition, the quantile ξ
(α)
t+k of proportion
α ∈ [0, 1] is given by
P
[
E˜t+k ≤ ξ
(α)
t+k
]
= α, (4.3)
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or alternatively
ξ
(α)
t+k = F
−1
t+k(α). (4.4)
Let fˆt+k|t and ξˆ
(α)
t+k|t be the estimate of ft+k and ξ
(α)
t+k at time t, respectively. A generic
nonparametric forecast fˆt+k|t of the probability density function of E˜t+k can be rep-
resented through a set of n quantile forecasts, i.e.,
fˆt+k|t = {ξ
(αi)
t+k | 0 ≤ α1 ≤ ... ≤ αi ≤ ... ≤ αn ≤ 1}. (4.5)
These types of probabilistic forecasts are referred as predictive distributions. Figure
4.1 shows an example of a set of probabilistic forecasts that provide the prediction
of the wind power production for the following 24 hourly intervals. The blue areas
indicate the prediction intervals of increasing nominal coverage rate. E.g., the 10%
prediction interval is given by the two quantiles ξ(0.45)t+k and ξ
(0.55)
t+k , as
P
[
ξ
(0.45)
t+k ≤ E˜t+k ≤ ξ
(0.55)
t+k
]
= 0.10. (4.6)
Similarly, Figure 4.2 illustrates an example of a set of probabilistic forecasts of the
solar power production for the following 24 hourly intervals.
4 8 12 16 20 24
k (h)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
w
in
d
p
ow
er
(p
.u
.)
µ
90 %
70 %
50 %
30 %
10 %
FIGURE 4.1: Example of probabilistic forecast of wind power produc-
tion with a look ahead of 24 hours. The nominal coverage rates of the
prediction intervals (blue areas) are 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90%. The mean
expected value is shown in red.
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FIGURE 4.2: Example of probabilistic forecast of solar power produc-
tion with a look ahead of 24 hours. The nominal coverage rates of the
prediction intervals (blue areas) are 25, 50, 75, and 95%. The mean
expected value is shown in red.
4.3 Electricity Market Price Forecasts
A price-taker power producer building its offering strategy is interested in predict-
ing the outcome of the future and uncertain market price. In this case, it is essential
to have probabilistic forecasts instead of deterministic ones, mainly when the pro-
ducer is willing to submit an offer curve, as seen in Chapter 3. However, instead of
using real market price forecasts, this section presents a fundamental market model
used to generate realistic forecasts for the market prices in both the day-ahead and
balancing market stages. For fundamental model, we intend a simplified market
model which respects the essential characteristics and mechanisms of a real electric-
ity market. The proposed model is designed to be used as a tool to generate realistic
market price forecasts to test the effectiveness of an offering strategy, but not to pre-
dict real market prices. Section 4.3.1 presents the electricity market framework and
the assumptions of the fundamental model, which is subsequently described in Sec-
tion 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Market Framework and Assumptions
We consider a two-settlement electricity market framework as the one presented in
Section 2.3. The day-ahead market is cleared once a day, at noon, simultaneously
for the whole 24 hourly trading periods of the following day. Then, a balancing
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market is cleared separately per each hourly interval, one hour before the real-time
operation. We neglect the intra-day trading floor for the sake of simplicity.
We use a fundamental market model to generate realistic market price scenarios.
In the fundamental market model, we assume that the only stochastic generation
is wind power generation. We use a dataset of wind power forecasts for a wind
farm located in Denmark. The wind power forecasts are re-scaled and assumed
representative of the aggregated wind power production in the market area. At the
day-ahead stage, we assume that the demand curve is linear, known, and different
per each hourly interval. Conversely, the supply curve of conventional producers is
quadratic and uncertain. To model this uncertainty, we consider the coefficient of the
second-degree term (i.e., γk) as a random variable with known marginal distribution.
The methodology for fitting such distribution is beyond the scope of the thesis. The
coefficient of the first-degree term is also considered known to simplify the process
of scenario generation. Then, we assume that the stochastic generation is offered in
the day-ahead market at its mean forecast and zero marginal cost. At the balancing
stage, the supply curve is considered known but different from the day-ahead one.
Indeed, the participants in the balancing market may not offer their marginal cost,
since they may have to internalize the expected revenues into their market offers
(e.g., under pay-as-bid pricing scheme). Therefore, we fix a negative price floor λ0
and impose γBAk = ηγk (η > 1), where γ
BA
k is referred to the supply curve in the
balancing market. Several factors may cause the real-time power imbalance in the
system, e.g., errors in load and wind forecasts. For the sake of simplicity, we consider
the wind stochasticity as the only source of uncertainty at the balancing stage. This
simplifies the scenario generation process for the balancing market prices.
4.3.2 Market Model
The demand curve of the day-ahead market at hourly interval k is modeled as
pDA,dk = αk + δe
DA,d
k , (4.7)
where eDA,dk is the amount of energy demand at price p
DA,d
k . The parameters αk and
δ control the shape of the demand curve. For the same interval k, the supply curve
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is
pDA,sk =

0, if eDA,sk ≤W
DA
k
β
(
eDA,sk −W
DA
k
)
+ γk
(
eDA,sk −W
DA
k
)2
, otherwise
(4.8)
where pDA,sk is the price for scheduling the quantity e
DA,s
k , and W
DA
k is the amount
of wind power production offered in the day-ahead market. The first segment of
the supply curve, i.e., eDA,sk ∈
[
0,WDAk
]
, is generated by the market offers of the
wind power producers, which are assumed to offer their energy at zero marginal
cost. Then, the second segment of the curve, i.e., eDA,sk > W
DA
k represents the supply
curve of conventional generators. The shape of this supply curve is controlled by
β and γk. The quantity of wind energy WDAk offered in the day-ahead market is
computed as
WDAk = E [wk]W, (4.9)
where wk is the normalized value (wk ∈ [0, 1]) of wind power production, and W
is the total installed wind capacity. The uncertain parameter γk follows a Normal
distribution, i.e.,
γk ∼ N
(
µγ , σ
2
γ
)
, (4.10)
where µγ and σ2γ are the mean value and variance of γk, respectively. Given the
supply and demand curves, the market clearing price λDAk and quantity e
DA
k are
obtained as the intersection of the two curves. Figure 4.3 shows an example of the
clearing mechanism of the day-ahead market model.
Then, in the balancing market, the supply curve at time interval k is defined as
pBA,sk =

λ0, if e
BA,s
k ≤ e
0
k
βBAk
(
eBA,sk − e
0
k
)
+ γBAk
(
eBA,sk − e
0
k
)2
+ λ0, otherwise
(4.11)
where the variables pBA,sk and e
BA,s
k are the price and quantity of the balancing market
supply curve, respectively. The quantity e0k is the amount of energy offered at price
λ0. The term e
BA,s
k is the difference between e
DA
k and the imbalance generated by the
stochastic generation, i.e.,
eBA,sk = e
DA
k −
(
wkW −W
DA
k
)
. (4.12)
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FIGURE 4.3: Example of the day-ahead market clearing model. The
supply curve is shown in blue, while the demand curve in red. The
intersection of the two curves identifies the market clearing price λDA
and the market clearing quantity eDA.
The term γBAk is equal to ηγk and it is considered known. The parameters β
BA
k and
e0k are evaluated by imposing that p
BA,s
k = λ
DA
k when e
BA,s
k = e
DA
k . This ensures that
the day-ahead and the balancing market prices coincide when no balancing power
is required. Figure 4.4 illustrates how the balancing market supply curve (continu-
ous blue line) is derived from the day-ahead market one (dashed blue line). Then,
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the balancing market clearing mechanism in case of a neg-
ative and positive real-time imbalance, respectively. Note that the demand curve is
inflexible as the system operator has to contract the exact amount of energy to com-
pensate the deviation of the stochastic production. When the real-time production
of the wind generators is lower than the amount contracted in the day-ahead mar-
ket (see Figure 4.5), the System Operator schedules more production from the con-
ventional generators. The result is λBA ≥ λDA. Differently, when the wind power
production is higher than the contracted one (see Figure 4.6), it generates a positive
real-time imbalance in the system. This is compensated by scheduling a downward
adjustment of conventional generators, resulting in λBA ≤ λDA.
Given this fundamental market model, it is possible to generate probabilistic
forecasts of the market prices. E.g., the day-ahead market price λDAk uncertainty
is given by the uncertainty of the the supply curve (γk ∼ N
(
µγ , σ
2
γ
)
). Figure 4.7
illustrates an example of probabilistic forecasts of λDAk generated with the proposed
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FIGURE 4.4: Example of the balancing (BA) market supply (continu-
ous blue line), derived from the day-ahead (DA) one (dashed blue
line). Note that the balancing market supply curve still passes in(
eDA, λDA
)
.
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FIGURE 4.5: Example of the balancing clearing model, when the wind
power production in the real-time ((wW ) is lower than WDA. In this
case the system operator schedules more energy from the conven-
tional generators. Here, λBA ≥ λDA.
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FIGURE 4.6: Example of the balancing market clearing model, when
the wind power production in the real-time ((wW ) is higher than
WDA. In this case the system operator reduces the energy scheduled
by conventional generators. Here, λBA ≤ λDA.
fundamental model.
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FIGURE 4.7: Example of probabilistic forecast of the day-ahead mar-
ket price with a look ahead of 24 hours. The nominal coverage rates
of the prediction intervals (blue areas) are 25, 50, 75, and 95%. The
mean expected value is shown in red.
4.4 Scenario Generation
Given the probabilistic forecasts described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the power pro-
ducer is interested in sampling possible trajectories of the random processes (e.g.,
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wind or solar power production, and market prices). When offering in the day-
ahead market, the power producer has to submit the market offers for the 24 hourly
trading intervals of the following day, simultaneously. Therefore, we want to in-
clude in our scenarios the interdependence structure of the forecast errors among
different time intervals. However, probabilistic forecasts are provided as a set of
estimated density functions {fˆt+k|t | k = 1, ...,K}, without any inter-temporal cor-
relations among them. Several scenario generation algorithms can be found in the
literature, while we consider the methodology presented by Pinson et al. (2009) and
Pinson and Girard (2012). The key idea is to exploit a fundamental property of prob-
abilistic forecasts, i.e., that prediction errors can be transformed into Gaussian errors
through a suitable transformation. Then, an appropriate interdependence structure
can be represented by a single covariance matrix.
The goal is to sample a set of NI possible trajectories of the random process
{E˜t+k, k = 1, ...,K}, where
E˜t+k ∼ fˆt+k|t, k = 1, ...,K. (4.13)
However, in this format, the random process is hard to handle as the estimated den-
sity function fˆt+k|t is different for each lead time k. First, we operate a change of
variable from E˜t+k to Y˜k, defined as
Y˜k = Fˆt+k|t
(
E˜t+k
)
, k = 1, ...,K. (4.14)
A nice property of Y˜k is that it is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, i.e., Y˜k ∼
U [0, 1], k = 1, ...,K. Then, we apply a second transformation and define the random
variable X˜k as
X˜k = Φ
−1
(
Y˜k
)
, k = 1, ...,K, (4.15)
where Φ−1 is the probit function. The new random variable X˜k follows a Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and unitary standard deviation, i.e., X˜k ∼ N (0, 1), k =
1, ...,K. Now, we want to sample possible trajectories of the random process X˜ =
{X˜k, k = 1, ...,K}, which is assumed to follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution,
i.e.,
X˜ ∼ N (µ0,Σ), (4.16)
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where µ0 is a vector of zeros and Σ is the covariance matrix. The matrix Σ sum-
marizes the information about the variance-covariance among the random variables
X˜t+k, k = 1, ...,K. Such covariance matrix Σ could be recursively estimated by
past forecasts and observations (Pinson et al., 2009), if available. For our purpose
we use a simplified version of Σ, assuming that we do not have historical data to
estimate it. A proposal is given by Pinson and Girard (2012), which suggest to use
an exponential covariance function to model Σ, i.e.,
Σk1,k2 = cov
(
X˜k1 , X˜k2
)
= exp
(
−
|k1 − k2|
v
)
, 1 ≤ k1, k2 ≤ K, (4.17)
where the parameter v controls the correlation among different lead times. As an
example, Pinson and Girard (2012) indicate to use v = 7 for on-shore wind power
forecasts.
Now, we can describe the scenario generation algorithm. Starting from {fˆt+k|t | k =
1, ...,K} we want to generate a set of NI possible trajectories of the random process
{E˜t+k, k = 1, ...,K}.
• We randomly sampleNI realizations of the random variable X˜
(
X˜ ∼ N (µ0,Σ)
)
.
Let X˜(i) be the ith of the NI realizations.
• We apply the inverse probit function Φ to perform a change of variable from X˜
to Y˜, i.e.,
Y˜
(i)
k = Φ
(
X˜
(i)
k
)
, ∀i, k. (4.18)
• We apply an additional change of variable, from Y˜ to E˜, i.e., the random vari-
able of interest. To do so, we use the set of cumulative distribution functions
{Fˆt+k|t | k = 1, ...,K} that can be fit starting from the quantile probabilistic
forecasts available. This leads to
E˜
(i)
t+k|t = Fˆ
−1
t+k|t
(
Y˜
(i)
k
)
, ∀i, k. (4.19)
This algorithm allows generating a set of NI trajectories of the random process of
interest when a set of predictive distributions (one per lead time) is available. Such
set of scenarios is now suitable to be used as input to decision-making tools based
on stochastic programming, where continuous random variables or processes are
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approximated (and linearized) by making them into a discrete set of possible real-
izations, each of one is associated with a probability of occurrence.
Figure 4.8 shows an example of 100 trajectories of wind power production, given
the probability forecasts shown in Figure 4.1.
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FIGURE 4.8: Example of 100 time trajectories of wind power produc-
tion, with a look ahead of 24 hours.
4.5 Scenario Reduction
Section 4.4 presented a methodology to generate statistically correlated trajectories
of stochastic processes, such as wind power production and electricity market prices.
The size of the discrete set of scenarios necessary to accurately represent the contin-
uous random variables or stochastic processes is usually large, which may render
the stochastic programming problem intractable. Therefore, this section presents a
technique to reduce the number of scenarios while maintaining the stochastic infor-
mation enclosed in such scenarios.
Several scenario reduction techniques are available within the literature. This
section presents a forward selection algorithm (Growe-Kuska, Heitsch, and Romisch,
2003). Let {E˜(i), i ∈ I} be a set of NI scenarios of the stochastic process {E˜t+k, k =
1, ...,K}, where E˜(i) = {E˜(i)t+k, k = 1, ...,K}. Each scenario i of the set I is associated
with a discrete probability πi of occurrence, such that
∑
i∈I πi = 1. Note that if
the NI scenarios are generated with the technique presented in Section 4.4, then
4.5. Scenario Reduction 75
πi = 1/NI , ∀i ∈ I . We define the cost function c(·) as
c(i, i′) = ‖E˜(i) − E˜(i
′)‖, ∀i, i′ ∈ I. (4.20)
The goal is to perform an iterative selection of the NS (NS ≤ NI ) more representative
scenarios. The algorithm can be described as follows:
• Let IS be the set of the selected scenarios, while IO is the set of the non selected
ones. At the beginning of the process (i.e., n = 0) they are defined as I [0]S = ∅
and I [0]O = I . Then, compute the cost function c(i, i
′) per each pair of i, i′ ∈ I .
• Compute the starting scenario i1 to be included in IS . It is given by
i1 = arg
{
min
i′∈I
∑
i∈I
πi c(i, i
′)
}
. (4.21)
The scenario i1 can be seen as the average scenario of the set I . Then, we
impose I [1]S = {i1} and I
[1]
O = I \ {i1}.
• For n = 2, ..., NS , compute
in = arg
 mini′∈I[n−1]
O
∑
i∈I
[n−1]
O
\{i′}
πi min
i′′∈I
[n−1]
S
∪ {i}
c(i, i′′)
 . (4.22)
Impose I [n]S = I
[n−1]
S ∪ {in} and I
[n]
O = I
[n−1]
O \ {in}.
The result of the scenario reduction algorithm are the sets I∗S and I
∗
O of the selected
and non selected scenarios, respectively. Note that I∗S ∪ I
∗
O = I . Now, we want
to properly distribute the probabilities of the non-selected scenario to the selected
ones. For each selected scenario i ∈ I∗S , let Γi be the set of the non-selected scenarios
i′ ∈ I∗O for which i is the closest selected scenario, according to the cost function c. It
is evaluated as
Γi =
{
i′ ∈ I∗O | i = arg min
i′′∈I∗
S
c(i′, i′′)
}
, ∀i ∈ I∗S . (4.23)
Then, the updated probabilities π∗i of the selected scenarios can be computed as
π∗i = πi +
∑
i′∈Γi
πi′ , ∀i ∈ I
∗
S . (4.24)
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A more extensive description of the forward selection algorithm is presented by Growe-
Kuska, Heitsch, and Romisch (2003) and Morales et al. (2009).
Figure 4.8 shows an example of 100 scenarios of wind power production (gray)
reduced to the 15 more representative ones (blue). The 100 trajectories are the ones
shown previously in Figure 4.8.
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FIGURE 4.9: Example of 100 time trajectories (gray) of wind power
production reduced to the 15 significant ones (blue).
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Chapter 5
Trading of Renewable Energy
Sources
5.1 Introduction
The deployment of renewable energy sources has constantly increased over the last
decade. Many of these renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar power,
have a stochastic nature. Their power production can only be predicted with a lim-
ited accuracy, which degrades as the time horizon of the forecast increases. Initially,
stochastic energy sources were supported through feed-in tariffs to facilitate their
deployment. By receiving a fixed price for the energy generated, stochastic power
producers were exempt from their balancing responsibility. As their penetration has
continuously increased, these producers are asked to participate in the electricity
market under similar rules as conventional generators. It translates to being finan-
cially responsible for the creation of real-time imbalances. This, together with uncer-
tain market prices, yield to uncertain market profits. Renewable energy producers
can tackle this high level of uncertainty by exploiting the information enclosed in
their forecasts.
The problem of participation of renewable energy producers in electricity mar-
kets has received an increasing interest over the last years. One of the first work on
this topic is that of Bathurst, Weatherill, and Strbac (2002). The authors show how,
through risk-analysis, expected profits can be increased by exploiting the informa-
tion of a point forecast model of wind power production. Subsequently, several al-
ternative participation models were proposed, highlighting the value of probabilistic
forecasts in increasing the expected wind power producer’s profit. Assuming a sim-
plified market setup, i.e., no intra-day market, reference (Bremnes, 2004) shows that
78 Chapter 5. Trading of Renewable Energy Sources
the optimal market quantity to be submitted in the day-ahead market is a quantile
of the power production forecasts. Then, Pinson, Chevallier, and Kariniotakis (2007)
give analytical expressions for the optimal day-ahead quantity to contract in the mar-
ket, based on probabilistic forecasts. The authors focus on the utility function of the
wind power producer, considering both profit maximization and risk management.
An extensive analysis on the topic is the one of Bitar et al. (2012). The authors high-
light the link between the accuracy of the probabilistic wind power forecasts and the
expected producer’s profit. The intra-day trading floor is introduced by Morales,
Conejo, and Pérez-Ruiz, 2010 within a stochastic programming framework, as well
as a risk-aversion trough the conditional value at risk. Finally, some authors (Zugno
et al., 2013; Baringo and Conejo, 2013) relax the price-taker assumption by comput-
ing market prices endogenously in the trading problem.
The optimal offering strategy of a stochastic producer is strongly influenced by
the imbalance settlement scheme used to price the real-time deviations from the day-
ahead contracted schedule. Naturally, a rational stochastic producer is only seeking
at maximizing its profit while deriving its optimal market offers. However, the ag-
gregate of the stochastic producers’ imbalance needs to be compensated by schedul-
ing upward or downward adjustments from conventional generators at the balanc-
ing stage. Therefore, different imbalance settlement schemes may lead to a differ-
ent balancing cost for the System Operator. Some works (Vandezande et al., 2010;
Batlle, Pérez-Arriaga, and Zambrano-Barragán, 2012; Chaves-Ávila, Hakvoort, and
Ramos, 2014) compare the effectiveness of different pricing and support schemes for
renewable energy generation. They highlight the importance of an accurate market
signal in encouraging stochastic producers to reduce their real-time imbalance. In
this context, Bueno-Lorenzo, Moreno, and Usaola (2013) propose a new imbalance
settlement scheme that may promote the participation in the intra-day market stage.
Other works (Winkler et al., 2016; Batalla-Bejerano and Trujillo-Baute, 2016) motivate
further research in this field, highlighting the impact of renewable energy sources on
the balancing cost of the system. The definition of an optimal imbalance settlement
structure is a complicated issue. On one side, stochastic producers should not be
excessively penalized for their real-time imbalances, as they are inherent in their
nature and high penalties may discourage new investments in renewable energy
generation. On the other side, stochastic producers should be pushed in improving
their forecasting skills and reduce their real-time imbalances.
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With the purpose of mitigating the imbalance responsibility of stochastic pro-
ducers, some electricity markets, e.g., Belgium (De Vos and Driesen, 2009) and Italy
(Giannitrapani et al., 2013), introduced imbalance settlement schemes with tolerance
margins. Under such pricing schemes, the stochastic producer is penalized differ-
ently if its imbalance exceeds a specified tolerance band, which is proportional to the
market quantity offer. Some works (De Vos, Driesen, and Belmans, 2011; Chaves-
Ávila, Hakvoort, and Ramos, 2014) suggest that the tolerance margins may lead to
possible market distortions, and therefore are not beneficial from a system perspec-
tive. However, these conclusions are drawn after numerical simulations, without
analytically proving why those tolerance margins may distort the market offers. On
this topic, it is interesting the work of Giannitrapani et al. (2013), which investigates
how a wind power producer can maximize its expected profits when bidding in a
soft penalized market (i.e., with tolerance margins). They prove the uniqueness of
the optimal solution, under the price-taker producer assumption and no intra-day
trading. Nevertheless, the work focuses on maximizing the expected producer’s
profit of the producer, without analyzing eventual market distortions.
The Italian Electricity Market presents two alternative imbalance settlement schemes
within the market structure. Different than the single- and the dual-price imbalance
settlement scheme seen in Section 3.3.2, they consider tolerance margins. The res-
olution of Italian Regulatory Authority for Electricity Gas and Water, 2014 presents
the imbalance settlement schemes in the Italian electricity market. One, denoted in
the chapter as band-dual, includes a tolerance band proportional to the energy quan-
tity contracted in the day-ahead market. Imbalances within the tolerance band are
priced at the day-ahead market price, while the amount of the imbalance that ex-
ceeds the band is priced at the less convenient between the day-ahead market price
and balancing market price (i.e., as the dual-price settlement scheme). The relative
width of the band is different per each renewable energy source, e.g., 45% and 25%
for wind and solar power, respectively. Subsequently, the resolution of Italian Regu-
latory Authority for Electricity Gas and Water, 2016 introduces an additional imbal-
ance settlement scheme, called single-dual pricing scheme. Similarly to the band-dual
pricing scheme, a dual-pricing is used for the amount of the imbalance that exceeds
the tolerance band. Differently, the imbalances within the band are priced at the bal-
ancing market price (i.e., as the single-price settlement scheme). This scheme is ini-
tially tested on units different than renewable energy ones (e.g., consumption units).
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However, it may be extended to renewable energy producers in the next years.
This chapter shows how a stochastic producer, starting from the general model of
Chapter 3, can derive its optimal offering strategy. Moreover, we extend the analysis
by considering the optimal offering strategies under the band-dual and the single-
dual imbalance pricing scheme of the Italian electricity market. We show that the
market quantity that maximizes the producer’s expected profit is unique and we
provide a formulation to evaluate such optimal quantity. To our best knowledge, the
formulation of the optimal offering strategy under the single-dual imbalance settle-
ment scheme is not available in the literature. Then, we investigate how this optimal
market quantity influences the expected real-time imbalance of the stochastic power
producer, distinguishing between imbalances that are expected to "help" the system
(i.e., they reduce the imbalance of the system) from the ones that are expected to
"hurt" the system (i.e., they increase the imbalance of the system). A detailed analy-
sis on the expected real-time imbalances of a stochastic producer under the band-dual
and the single-dual imbalance pricing scheme in novel in the field. This brings infor-
mation about possible market distortions introduced by the tolerance band of the
band-dual and the single-dual imbalance pricing scheme.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the
electricity market framework and the assumptions needed to derive the analytical
formulation of the optimal market offers. Section 5.3 presents the optimal offering
models under conventional imbalance settlement schemes, i.e., the single- and the
dual-price settlement scheme. Section 5.4 derives optimal offering strategies for the
band-dual and single-dual imbalance pricing schemes. Moreover, it shows how to link
the optimal offering strategy to the expected real-time imbalance of the stochastic
producer. A summary of the chapter is given in Section 5.5.
5.2 Electricity Market Framework and Assumptions
We consider an electricity market similar to the one presented in Section 2.3. Such
market includes a day-ahead and a balancing stage, while the intra-day adjustment
market is neglected for the sake of simplicity. The day-ahead market closes at noon
of the day before energy delivery and hosts transaction the whole 24 hourly intervals
of the following day. Then, closer to the real-time operation, a separate balancing
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market is cleared for each hourly interval. Stochastic producers access the balanc-
ing market to contract their deviations from the day-ahead market schedule. These
imbalances are priced differently depending on the imbalance settlement scheme
adopted. The most common imbalance settlement schemes are the single-price and
the dual-price scheme, as discussed in Section 3.3.2. A schematic representation of
electricity market submission process is shown in Figure 5.1.
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FIGURE 5.1: Schematic representation of the electricity market frame-
work. The stochastic producer submits the quantity offer qDA in the
day-ahead (DA) market, while settling its deviation qBA in the bal-
ancing (BA) market.
This chapter takes the perspective of a renewable energy producer that has to
contract its position in the day-ahead market. The producer is assumed to be price-
taker in both the day-ahead and the balancing market. Let λDAk and λ
BA
k be the day-
ahead and the balancing market price of the hourly interval k. Under the price-taker
assumption, the day-ahead market price λDAk is considered as a random variable
following the density function fDAλk : R
+ 7→ R+. Then, let φBAk be the differential
price between the balancing and the day-ahead market price, i.e.,
φBAk = λ
BA
k − λ
DA
k . (5.1)
Given that the producer is considered a price-taker also in the balancing market, φBAk
is modeled as a random variable of marginal distribution fBAφk : R 7→ R
+. We also
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assume that the producer is risk-neutral and that it offers its energy production at
zero marginal cost. It is provided with probabilistic forecasts of the future power
production Ek of the stochastic source (e.g., wind power), i.e., the producer knows
the marginal distribution fEk : R
+ 7→ R+ of Ek at interval k.
This chapter uses a wind power producer as an example. However, the proposed
models are all valid for the trading of stochastic energy sources different than wind,
e.g., solar power. We assume that the random variable Ek follows a Beta distribution
(Morales et al., 2014; Liu, 2011) of mean expected value µEk and variance σ
2
Ek
. We
consider that σ2Ek and µEk are linked together by
σ2Ek = 4 µ
ν
Ek
(
1− µνEk
)
σ2, (5.2)
where ν and σ2 are parameters that control the correlation between µEk and σ
2
Ek
.
Thanks to that, the marginal distribution fEk(·) is uniquely defined by knowing its
mean expected value µEk . Consequently, with f(ℓ, µEk) we intend the probability
that the level of production ℓ realizes, given that the mean expected value of Ek is
µEk . Lastly, we assume that µEk follows as well a Beta distribution Ek, i.e.,
µEk ∼ Beta(αµ, βµ), (5.3)
and we denote with fµ(·) the probability density function of µEk .
5.3 Optimal Day-ahead Offering Strategy
This section derives the optimal offering strategy that a stochastic power producer
may use to obtain its best day-ahead market offer. Starting from the general price-
taker and risk-neutral offering strategy shown in Section 3.4, Section 5.3.1 adapts it
to the characteristics of the wind power producer. Then, Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 focus
on the single- and the dual-price settlement scheme, respectively.
5.3.1 Problem Formulation
At the day-ahead stage, the stochastic producer submits its market offers for the
whole 24 trading hours of the following day. To derive its optimal offering strat-
egy, we start from the general formulation (3.18) for the price-taker and risk-neutral
producer, extended to account the 24 trading intervals, i.e.,
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Max
Γ
∑
k
ρˆDAk + ρˆ
UP
k + ρˆ
DW
k + ρˆ
BA
k − cˆk (5.4a)
s.t. qDAk + q
UP
k − q
DW
k + q
BA
k = q
A
k , ∀k, (5.4b)
qDAk , ρˆ
DA
k ∈ Π
DA, ∀k, (5.4c)
qUPk , q
DW
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k ∈ Π
BA
Act, ∀k, (5.4d)
qBAk , ρˆ
BA
k ∈ Π
BA
Pas, ∀k, (5.4e)
cˆk = h
(
qAk
)
, ∀k, (5.4f)
qAk ∈ Ω, ∀k, (5.4g)
where
Γ = {qAk , q
DA
k , q
UP
k , q
DW
k , q
BA
k , ρˆ
DA
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k , ρˆ
BA
k , cˆk}. (5.5)
First, we remove all the variables and constraints associated with an active partic-
ipation in the balancing market. To that purpose, we eliminate the variables ρˆUPk and
ρˆDWk from the objective function (5.4a) and q
UP
k and q
DW
k from constraint (5.4b), and
we remove constraint (5.4d). Similarly, as we assume that the wind power producer
has a production cost of 0 e/MWh, we eliminate constraint (5.4f) and we remove
the variable cˆk from the objective function (5.4a). Then, the set Ω of constraint (5.4g),
describing the feasible region of the production unit, can be replaced by
qAk = Ek, ∀k, (5.6)
and we reformulate constraint (5.4b) by replacing qAk with its formulation in (5.6),
i.e.,
qBAk = Ek − q
DA
k (5.7)
Finally, we replace the set ΠDA of constraint (5.4c) with the formulation provided
in Equations (3.27), which considers the submission of single price-quantity offers
(pDAk , q
DA
k ) in the day-ahead market. Note that we assume to offer the quantity q
DA
k
at pDAk = 0 e/MWh, thus leading to the following formulation of constraint (5.4c):
ρˆDAk = q
DA
k
∫ ∞
0
ℓ fDAλk (ℓ) dℓ = λˆ
DA
k q
DA
k , (5.8a)
Q ≤ qDA ≤ Q. (5.8b)
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where Q = 0 and Q = E (i.e., the capacity of the wind farm). Accordingly, the
general offering strategy tailored to the wind power producer is
Max
Γ
∑
k
λˆDAk q
DA
k + ρˆ
BA
k (5.9a)
s.t. qBAk = Ek − q
DA
k , ∀k, (5.9b)
qBAk , ρˆ
BA
k ∈ Π
BA
Pas, ∀k, (5.9c)
0 ≤ qDAk ≤ E, ∀k, (5.9d)
where
Γ = {qDAk , q
BA
k , ρˆ
BA
k }. (5.10)
The formulation in (5.9) can be decomposed in 24 optimization problems, as there
are no inter-temporal constraints linking the decision variables of different trading
intervals. Consequently, we solve the offering strategy for a single hourly interval
k, without loss of generality. For the clarity of the notation, in the remaining of the
chapter we skip the subscript k. Finally, we need to reformulate the set ΠBAPas in con-
straint (5.9c), which is conditional to the imbalance settlement scheme considered.
Therefore, we develop a different offering model for the single- and the dual-price
imbalance settlement scheme.
5.3.2 Optimal Offering under a Single-Price Settlement Scheme
Under a single-price imbalance settlement scheme, the deviation qBA is priced at the
balancing market price λBA, disregarding the sign of the imbalance. We replace the
set ΠBAPas in constraint (5.9c) with its formulation in Equation (3.96), i.e.,
ρˆBA = λˆBA qBA, (5.11)
and we reformulate the objective function (5.9a) as follows:
µˆ = E
[
λˆDAqDA + λˆBA
(
E − qDA
)]
, (5.12)
where qBA is replaced by E − qDA, according to the equality constraint (5.9b). By
rearranging the terms in (5.12) we obtain
µˆ = E
[
λˆDAE + φˆBA
(
E − qDA
)]
. (5.13)
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The first term in Equation (5.13) is the product between the day-ahead market price
and the future value of wind power production. It represents the market profit in
case the producer would submit the quantity qDA = E in the day-ahead market.
Besides, as it is the product of two parameters, it can be removed from the objective
function. The second term, i.e., φˆBA
(
E − qDA
)
, is the income due to the creation of
the real-time imbalance. We denote it with L. Note that also φˆBAE is the product of
two parameters, and can be removed from the objective function.
Therefore, the optimal offering strategy under a single-price imbalance settle-
ment scheme is
Max
qDA
− φˆBAqDA (5.14a)
s.t. 0 ≤ qDA ≤ E (5.14b)
The optimization problem (5.14) has a trivial solution, i.e.,
• if φˆBA > 0, the optimal day-ahead market offer qDA∗ is equal to 0,
• if φˆBA < 0, the optimal day-ahead market offer qDA∗ is equal to the unit’s
capacity E,
• if φˆBA = 0, each market offer qDA ∈ [0, E] brings the same expected revenue.
Under a single-price imbalance settlement scheme, the producer is willing to offer
0 or the full capacity E, depending on the expectation of φBA, i.e., if it is expecting
a balancing market price higher or lower than the day-ahead one. Note that the
forecasts of the future power production E do not influence the optimal solution
of (5.14). Indeed, the power producer bases its decision on the expectation of the
difference between the balancing market price and the day-ahead market one.
5.3.3 Optimal Offering under a Dual-price Settlement Scheme
Under a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme, the deviation qBA is priced differ-
ently, depending on the mutual sign of the producer’s and system’s imbalance. For
this pricing scheme, we replace the set ΠBAPas in constraint (5.9c) with its formulation
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in Equation (3.100), i.e.,
ρˆBA =

λˆ(+)qBA, if qBA > 0,
λˆ(−)qBA, otherwise.
(5.15)
Similarly to Section 5.3.2, we replace qBA with E − qDA and we reformulate the ob-
jective function (5.9a) as
µˆ = E
[
λˆDAE + L
]
, (5.16)
where
L =

(
λˆ(+) − λˆDA
) (
E − qDA
)
if E ≥ qDA,(
λˆ(−) − λˆDA
) (
E − qDA
)
otherwise.
(5.17)
Let us now introduce the artificial penalties φ(+) and φ(+), defined as λˆ(+)− λˆDA and
λˆ(−) − λˆDA, respectively. They are computed as
φ(+) =

φBA, if φBA ≤ 0
0, otherwise
(5.18)
φ(−) =

φBA, if φBA ≥ 0
0, otherwise
(5.19)
From the producer’s perspective, φ(+) is the penalty for the creation of a positive
imbalance, and φ(−) is the penalty for the creation of a negative imbalance. The of-
fering strategy of the wind power producer under a dual-price imbalance settlement
scheme can consequently be formulated as
Max
qDA
E[L] (5.20a)
s.t. L =

φˆ(+)
(
E − qDA
)
if E ≥ qDA,
φˆ(−)
(
E − qDA
)
otherwise.
(5.20b)
0 ≤ qDA ≤ E. (5.20c)
Hence, the aim of the wind power producer is to maximize the expectation of L,
while imposing that 0 ≤ qDA ≤ E. The expected values of the imbalance penal-
ties φ(+) and φ(−), according to their definition in Equations (5.18) and (5.19), are
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computed as
φˆ(+) =
∫ 0
−∞
ℓfBAφ (ℓ)dℓ, (5.21)
φˆ(−) =
∫ ∞
0
ℓfBAφ (ℓ)dℓ. (5.22)
In the remaining of the chapter, we assume that φˆ(+) < 0 and φˆ(−) > 0, which is a
condition usually respected in real electricity markets. It translates to not being sure
of the sign of future differential price φBA. Moreover, differently, the optimization
problem in (5.20) becomes trivial. Additionally, from here to the remaining of the
chapter, the formulation is developed in per unit (p.u.), e.g.,E → 1 p.u. The expected
imbalance revenue Lˆ is evaluated as
Lˆ = φˆ(−)
∫ qDA
0
(
ℓ− qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ+ φˆ(+)
∫ 1
qDA
(
ℓ− qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ
= φˆ(−)
(∫ qDA
0
ℓ fE(ℓ) dℓ− qDAFE
(
qDA
))
+
φˆ(+)
(∫ 1
qDA
ℓ fE(ℓ) dℓ− qDA
(
1− FE
(
qDA
)))
,
(5.23)
In order to prove that the optimization problem (5.20) has a unique solution for
qDA ∈ [0, 1], we demonstrate that its second derivative with respect to qDA is always
negative. The first derivative Lˆ′ is given by
Lˆ′ = φˆ(−)
(
qDAfE(q
DA)− FE(q
DA)− qDAfE(q
DA)
)
+
φˆ(+)
(
−qDAfE(q
DA)−
(
1− FE(q
DA)
)
+ qDAfE(q
DA)
)
= − φˆ(−)FE(q
DA)− φˆ(+)
(
1− FE(q
DA)
)
.
(5.24)
Then, its second derivative Lˆ′′ is
Lˆ′′ = −φˆ(−)fE(q
DA) + φˆ(+)fE(q
DA). (5.25)
Since φˆ(−) > 0 and φˆ(+) < 0, it can be inferred that Lˆ′′ < 0 for qDA ∈ [0, 1]. Hence,
we prove that the value of qDA that maximizes L is unique. Then, the values of the
first derivative Lˆ′ at the limits, i.e., in 0 and in 1 p.u., are the followings:
Lˆ′ =

−φˆ(+) ≥ 0 if qDA = 0,
−φˆ(−) ≤ 0 if qDA = 1.
(5.26)
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It implies that the optimal solution qDA∗ lies between 0 and 1 p.u. Such optimal
solution can be obtain by imposing Lˆ′ = 0, thus leading to
FE(q
DA∗) =
−φˆ(+)
−φˆ(+) + φˆ(−)
=
|φˆ(+)|
|φˆ(+)|+ φˆ(−)
, (5.27)
and consequently,
qDA∗ = F−1E
(
|φˆ(+)|
|φˆ(+)|+ φˆ(−)
)
. (5.28)
The optimal solution qDA∗ is a quantile of the cumulative distribution function of the
wind power production E. The nominal level of this optimal quantile only depends
on the expectation of the imbalance penalties. In particular, if φˆ(−) > |φˆ(+)| the
producer wants to underestimate its future power production, as it is expected to be
more penalized for the creation of negative imbalances. Conversely, if φˆ(−) < |φˆ(+)| it
overestimates the future production as positive imbalances are expected to be more
penalized than the negative ones. Finally, if φˆ(−) = |φˆ(+)| it offers the median of the
distribution of E, as it is expected to be equally penalized for positive and negative
imbalances. For a broader analysis on this topic, we refer the interested reader to the
work of Bitar et al. (2012).
5.4 Alternative Imbalance Settlement Schemes with Toler-
ance Band
This section considers two alternative imbalance settlement schemes introduced in
the Italian electricity market structure, i.e., the band-dual and the single-dual imbal-
ance settlement scheme. These schemes introduce a tolerance band anchored to the
day-ahead market quantity offer qDA. The part of the imbalance that lies within
the band is priced differently than the part outside the band. The band-dual and the
single-dual imbalance settlement scheme are presented in Section 5.4.1. Subsequently,
Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 derive the optimal offering strategy under the band-dual and
the single-dual scheme, respectively. Finally, Section 5.4.4 links the optimal offering
strategy with the expected real-time imbalances of the wind power producer.
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5.4.1 Band-dual & Single-dual Imbalance Settlement Schemes
Two different imbalance settlement schemes are considered in the Italian regulation,
and both of them introduce a tolerance band of width 2τqDA around the level of
energy scheduled in the day-ahead market. The part of the imbalance that exceeds
such band is priced under a dual-price settlement scheme, for both the settlement
schemes. However, in the band-dual scheme, the portion of the imbalance within the
band is priced at the day-ahead market price. Differently, in the single-dual scheme,
the balancing market price is used to price the part of the imbalance within the band.
Let τ = 1 + τ and τ = 1 − τ be the upper and lower relative margins of the band,
respectively. Consequently, the balancing market revenue associated with the real-
time deviation qBA under the band-dual settlement scheme, i.e., ρBD, is evaluated as
ρBD =

λ(+)
(
E − τ qDA
)
+ λDA
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
, if E ≥ τ qDA,
λ(−)
(
E − τqDA
)
+ λDA
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
, if E ≤ τ qDA,
λDA
(
E − qDA
)
, otherwise.
(5.29)
Indeed, when the imbalance E − qDA lies within the tolerance band
[
τ qDA, τ qDA
]
, it
is priced at λDA. Differently, when it exceeds the band (e.g., when E > τ qDA), the
portion of the imbalance within the band (τ qDA − qDA) is priced at λDA, while the
exceeding part (E − τ qDA) under a dual-price settlement scheme (i.e., λ(+) in this
example). Conversely, under the single-dual scheme, the balancing market revenue,
denoted with ρSD, is given by
ρSD =

λ(+)
(
E − τ qDA
)
+ λBA
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
, if E ≥ τ qDA,
λ(−)
(
E − τqDA
)
+ λBA
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
, if E ≤ τ qDA,
λBA
(
E − qDA
)
, otherwise,
(5.30)
as in this case the portion of the imbalance E − qDA that falls outside the tolerance
band
[
τ qDA, τ qDA
]
is priced as λBA.
Similar to Section 5.3.3, we want to formulate the optimal offering strategy by
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rearranging the profit formulation and removing the profit in case of perfect infor-
mation, i.e., λDAE. This leads to
Max
qDA
E[L] (5.31a)
s.t. 0 ≤ qDA ≤ 1, (5.31b)
where the imbalance revenue under a band-dual settlement scheme, denoted as LBD,
is evaluated as
LBD =

φ(+)
(
E − τ qDA
)
, if E ≥ τqDA,
φ(−)
(
E − τ qDA
)
, if E ≤ τqDA,
0, otherwise.
(5.32)
Differently, under the single-dual pricing scheme, the imbalance revenue LSD is com-
puted as
LSD =

φ(+)
(
E − τ qDA
)
+ φBA
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
, if E ≥ τqDA,
φ(−)
(
E − τqDA
)
+ φBA
(
τqDA − qDA
)
, if E ≤ τqDA,
φBA
(
E − qDA
)
, otherwise.
(5.33)
Given the expected values of the imbalance penalties, i.e., φˆ(+), φˆ(−), and φˆBA, and
for a fixed value of qDA, the power producer can compute the expected imbalance
revenue Lˆ as function of the future wind power production E. Figure 5.2 shows the
expected imbalance revenue as function ofE for three different imbalance settlement
schemes, i.e., the dual-price (red), the band-dual (blue), and the single-dual (green)
scheme. It is worth mentioning that the value of L in both the dual-price and band-
dual scheme is always lower or equal to 0. Therefore, it decreases the total profit of
the producer. Conversely, under the single-dual scheme the term L can be positive
and increase the profit of the producer.
5.4.2 Optimal Offering under a Band-dual Settlement Scheme
This section derives the optimal offering strategy under the band-dual imbalance set-
tlement scheme. We will proceed similarly to what we did for the dual-price im-
balance settlement scheme in Section 5.3.3. First, we prove the uniqueness of the
solution by showing that
(
LˆBD
)′′
< 0 for qDA ∈ [0, 1]. The expected imbalance
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FIGURE 5.2: Example of the expected imbalance cost as function of
the real-time wind power production E for different imbalance set-
tlement schemes.
revenue LˆBD can be computed, following Equation (5.32), as
LˆBD = φˆ(−)
∫ τ qDA
0
(
ℓ− τ qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ+ φˆ(+)
∫ 1
τ qDA
(
ℓ− τ qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ
= φˆ(−)
(∫ τ qDA
0
ℓ fE(ℓ) dℓ− τ qDAFE(τ qDA)
)
+
φˆ(+)
(∫ 1
τ qDA
ℓ fE(ℓ) dℓ− τ qDA
(
1− FE(τ q
DA)
))
.
(5.34)
Then, the first derivative
(
LˆBD
)′
with respect to qDA is given by
(
LˆBD
)′
= φˆ(−)
(
τ2 qDAfE(τ q
DA)− τFE(τ q
DA)− τ2 qDAfE(τ q
DA)
)
+
φˆ(+)
(
−τ2 qDAfE(τ q
DA)− τ
(
1− FE(τ q
DA)
)
+ τ2 qDAfE(τ q
DA)
)
= − φˆ(−) τFE(τ q
DA)− φˆ(+) τ
(
1− FE(τ q
DA)
)
,
(5.35)
and its second derivative
(
LˆBD
)′′
by
(
LˆBD
)′′
= −φˆ(−) τ2fE(τ q
DA) + φˆ(+) τ2fE(τ q
DA). (5.36)
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Since φˆ(−) > 0 and φˆ(+) < 0, it follows that
(
LˆBD
)′′
< 0, i.e., the objective function
LˆBD to be maximized is concave. Then, we prove that the optimal solution lies in
[0, 1] as the following border conditions hold:
(
LˆBD
)′
=

−τ φˆ(+) ≥ 0 if qDA = 0
−τ φˆ(−) ≤ 0 if qDA = 1
(5.37)
In this case, we can even restrict this region to [0, 1/τ ]. Indeed, when qDA = 1/τ , the
upper limit of the unpenalized band of width 2τ qDA is the unit’s capacity, i.e., 1 p.u.
Offering at qDA > 1/τ would result in "losing" the part of the unpenalized band that
exceeds the unit’s capacity. This can be proved by showing that
(
LˆBD
)′
= −τ φˆ(−)FE
(τ
τ
)
≤ 0 if qDA =
1
τ
. (5.38)
The optimal solution qDA∗ ∈ [0, 1/τ ] is obtained by imposing
(
LˆBD
)′
= 0. This leads
to
− φˆ(−)τFE(τ q
DA∗)− φˆ(+)τ
(
1− FE(τ q
DA∗)
)
= 0. (5.39)
By solving the non-linear Equation (5.39) the wind power producer evaluates its
optimal quantity offer qDA∗ to be submitted in the day-ahead market.
5.4.3 Optimal Offering under a Single-Dual Settlement Scheme
This section derives the optimal offering strategy under the single-dual imbalance
settlement scheme. First, we prove that the market quantity that maximizes the
producer’s imbalance revenue is unique. To do so, we show that
(
LˆSD
)′′
< 0 for
qDA ∈ [0, 1]. The expected imbalance revenue LˆSD can be evaluated, in accordance
with Equation (5.33), as
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LˆSD = φˆ(−)
∫ τ qDA
0
(
ℓ− τ qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ+ φˆ(+)
∫ 1
τ qDA
(
ℓ− τ qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ+
φˆBA
(∫ τ qDA
0
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ+
∫ τ qDA
τ qDA
(
ℓ− qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ+∫ 1
τ qDA
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
fE(ℓ) dℓ
)
= LˆBD + φˆBA
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
FE(τ q
DA) + φˆBA
(
τ qDA − qDA
) (
1− FE(τ q
DA)
)
+
φˆBA
(∫ τ qDA
τ qDA
ℓ fE(ℓ) dℓ− qDA
(
FE(τ q
DA)− FE(τ q
DA)
))
= LˆBD + φˆBA
(
τ qDAFE(τ q
DA)− τ qDAFE(τ q
DA) +
(
τ qDA − qDA
)
+∫ τ qDA
τ qDA
ℓ fE(ℓ) dℓ
)
(5.40)
Its first derivative
(
LˆSD
)′
with respect to qDA is computed as
(
LˆSD
)′
=
(
LˆBD
)′
+ φˆBA
(
τFE(τ q
DA) + τ2 qDAfE(τ q
DA)− τ FE(τ q
DA)−
τ2 qDAfE(τ q
DA) + τ − 1 + τ2 qDAfE(τ q
DA)− τ2 qDAfE(τ q
DA)
)
=
(
LˆBD
)′
+ φˆBA
(
− 1 + τ − τ FE(τ q
DA) + τ FE(τ q
DA)
) (5.41)
Then, we replace the term
(
LˆBD
)′
in Equation (5.41) with the formulation provided
in Equation (5.35). Moreover, according to the definition of φˆ(+) and φˆ(−) in Equa-
tions (5.21) and (5.22), the following equality holds:
φˆBA = φˆ(+) + φˆ(−). (5.42)
This leads to(
LˆSD
)′
= − φˆ(−)τFE(τ q
DA)− φˆ(+)τ
(
1− FE(τ q
DA)
)
− φˆBA+(
φˆ(−) + φˆ(+)
) (
τ − τ FE(τ q
DA) + τ FE(τ q
DA)
)
= − φˆBA + φˆ(−) τ
(
1− FE(τ q
DA)
)
+ φˆ(+) τFE(τ q
DA)
(5.43)
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The second derivative
(
LˆSD
)′′
can be evaluated as
(
LˆSD
)′′
= −φˆ(−) τ2fE(τ q
DA) + φˆ(+) τ2fE(τ q
DA). (5.44)
Also under the single-dual settlement scheme, the objective function (i.e., the imbal-
ance revenue) is concave, thus proving the uniqueness of the optimal solution qDA∗.
Then, we investigate if such optimal solution lies in the feasibility region [0, 1]. To
do so, we check the sign of the first derivative at the borders. For the lower bound,
i.e., qDA = 0, we obtain
(
LˆSD
)′
= −φˆ(+) + φˆ(−) (τ − 1) ≥ 0 if qDA = 0. (5.45)
Consequently, the optimal solution qDA∗ is greater or equal to 0. Conversely, for the
upper bound, i.e., qDA = 1, the value of the first derivative
(
LˆSD
)′
is
(
LˆSD
)′
= −φˆ(−) − φˆ(+) (τ + 1) if qDA = 1. (5.46)
In this case,
(
LˆSD
)′
≤ 0 if and only if φˆ(−) ≥ −φˆ(+) (τ + 1). So, if φˆ(−) ≥ −φˆ(+) (τ + 1)
the optimal solution qDA∗ lies in [0, 1]. Differently, if φˆ(−) < −φˆ(+) (τ + 1), the opti-
mal solution qDA∗ is greater than 1 p.u. However, the feasibility region [0, 1] can be
artificially imposed, thus obtaining the optimal market offer qDA∗ as
qDA∗ =

qDA |
(
LˆSD
)′
= 0, if φˆ(−) ≥ −φˆ(+) (τ + 1)
1, otherwise
(5.47)
The idea is to check if the solution lies or not in [0, 1]. If this is true, we solve the
following equation to compute the optimal market offer qDA∗:
− φˆBA + φˆ(−) τ
(
1− FE(τ q
DA∗)
)
+ φˆ(+) τ FE(τ q
DA∗) = 0. (5.48)
Differently, we impose qDA∗ = 1 p.u.
5.4.4 Effect on the Expected Imbalances
Decisions on the quantities offered in the day-ahead market do not only affect the
imbalance revenues of the wind producers. Indeed, as the deviation qBA is obtained
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from the difference of the real-time production E and the day-ahead market offer
qDA, the producers’ real-time imbalances are influenced by their day-ahead offer-
ing strategy. Decisions that are optimal for the producers, who are only seeking in
maximizing their profit, may not be optimal from a system perspective. Given the
optimal quantity qDA∗ contracted in the day-ahead market, we can indeed evaluate
the deviation that the stochastic power producer is expecting to create in the real-
time. Let us denote with ∆ˆ the expected size of the real-time imbalance and with ψˆ
the ratio between the expected imbalance penalties, i.e.,
ψˆ =
φˆ(−)
|φˆ(+)|
. (5.49)
Moreover, we introduce the function θ(τ, ψˆ, µE) which gives the optimal day-ahead
market offer qDA∗, depending on the imbalance settlement scheme considered. For
given τ , ψˆ and µE , the expected size of the real-time imbalance ∆ˆ can be computed
as
∆ˆ
∣∣
τ,ψˆ,µE
=
∫ 1
0
∣∣ ℓ− θ(τ, ψˆ, µE) ∣∣ f(ℓ, µE) dℓ. (5.50)
where f(ℓ, µE) has been defined in Section 5.2, together with the probability density
function of µE , i.e., fµ. Given the probability distribution of µE , we evaluate ∆ˆ for
given values of τ and ψˆ as
∆ˆ
∣∣
τ,ψˆ
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∣∣ ℓ− θ(τ, ψˆ, y) ∣∣ f(ℓ, y) fµ(y) dℓ dy. (5.51)
where y is an additional integration variable. The value of ∆ˆ for different values
of the tolerance margin τ and different imbalance settlement schemes can be a use-
ful indicator to evaluate the effect of the tolerance band on the real-time imbalances
of the producers. However, Equation (5.51) computes the expected size of the pro-
ducer’s imbalance, disregarding its sign. Besides, it does not distinguish imbalances
that may "help" in restoring the system’s imbalance from imbalances that may con-
tribute to increasing it. Indeed, a market structure that pushes stochastic producers
in having higher expected sizes of their imbalances but more likely to be in opposite
sign with the system’s one, may be acceptable from a system perspective. Therefore,
it is interesting to distinguish between imbalances that are expected to reduce or to
increase the imbalance of the system. To do so, we initially evaluate the expected
size of the positive and the negative imbalance, i.e., ∆ˆ(+) and ∆ˆ(−), respectively. For
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given τ and ψˆ, they are computed as
∆ˆ(+)
∣∣
τ,ψˆ
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ(τ,ψˆ,y)
(
ℓ− θ(τ, ψˆ, y)
)
f(ℓ, y) fµ(y) dℓ dy, (5.52)
∆ˆ(−)
∣∣
τ,ψˆ
=
∫ 1
0
∫ θ(τ,ψˆ,y)
0
(
θ(τ, ψˆ, y)− ℓ
)
f(ℓ, y) fµ(y) dℓ dy. (5.53)
Then, let ∆ˆ(↑) and ∆ˆ(↓) be the sizes of imbalances that are expected to "help" and
"hurt" the system, respectively. Helping the system means that the producer’s devi-
ation is of opposite sign to the system’s one, thus reducing it. Differently, a deviation
that is expected to hurt the system has the same sign of the system’s imbalance and
consequently increases it. To evaluate such expected imbalances we need additional
information regarding the probability of the system to require upward or downward
regulation. This information is partly enclosed in the expected imbalance penalties
φˆ(+) and φˆ(−). Indeed, the penalty φˆ(+) can be evaluated as the product of the proba-
bility of the system to be in up-regulation (i.e., πˆ(+)), and the expected penalty given
that the system is in up-regulation (i.e., φˆ(+|+)). The imbalance penalty φˆ(−) is esti-
mated similarly. This writes
φˆ(+) = πˆ(+) φˆ(+|+) (5.54)
φˆ(−) = πˆ(−) φˆ(−|−) (5.55)
Therefore, if we assume that φˆ(+|+) = −φˆ(−|−), asymmetries in the imbalance penal-
ties can be directly linked to asymmetries in the system’s probability to require up-
ward or downward regulation. For instance, if φˆ(−) = 10 e/MWh and φˆ(+) = −20
e/MWh (i.e., ψˆ = 0.5 ), the probability πˆ(−) and πˆ(+) would be 33.3% and 66.7%,
respectively. The expected values ∆ˆ(↑) and ∆ˆ(↓) are computed as
∆ˆ(↑) = πˆ(−)∆ˆ(+) + πˆ(+)∆ˆ(−), (5.56)
∆ˆ(↓) = πˆ(+)∆ˆ(+) + πˆ(−)∆ˆ(−). (5.57)
5.5 Analysis
This section presents the results of the optimal offering strategy for different toler-
ance margin τ and the associated expected real-time imbalances. All the results are
provided in p.u. The parameters defining the wind forecast model, i.e., Equations
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(5.2) and (5.3), are shown in Table 5.1. Figure 5.3a illustrates the probability density
function of µE and Figure 5.3b the value of σ2E as function of µE .
TABLE 5.1: Parameters of wind power forecasts
αµ βµ σ2 ν
1.22 3.86 0.05 0.8
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
µE (pu)
0
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f
µ
µE ∼ Beta(αµ, βµ)
(A) Illustration of the probability distribution
of µE .
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ν
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2
(B) Illustration of the correlation between σ2
E
and µE , controlled by the parameter ν.
FIGURE 5.3: Images related to the wind forecast modeling.
The remaining of the section is organized as follows. Section 5.5.1 provides an
analysis of the optimal offering strategies under the band-dual and the single-dual im-
balance pricing scheme. These optimal market quantities are linked to the expected
real-time imbalance of the price-taker producer in Section 5.5.2.
5.5.1 Analysis of the Optimal Offering Strategies
Section 5.3.3 presented the optimization problem that the wind power producer
would solve for deriving its best day-ahead market offer when the balancing stage is
settled under a dual-pricing scheme. We showed that the optimal quantity qDA∗ is a
quantile of the probability distribution of the future power production E. Moreover,
we showed that the nominal level of such optimal quantile only depends on the ex-
pected imbalance penalties φˆ(+) and φˆ(−). Figure 5.4 illustrates the nominal level of
the optimal quantile, i.e., FE
(
qDA∗
)
, as function of µE , for values of the imbalance
penalty ratio ψˆ of 0.5, 1, and 2, respectively. The case without tolerance band (i.e.,
τ = 0) is represented with red squares. In accordance with Equation (5.27), FE
(
qDA∗
)
is constant for µE ∈ [0, 1], since its optimal value is uniquely determined by the
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penalty ratio ψˆ. Differently, when a tolerance band of width 2τqDA is introduced
within the penalty scheme, FE
(
qDA∗
)
is influenced by the shape of the probability
density function fE . The optimal values of FE
(
qDA∗
)
under the band-dual settlement
scheme are shown in Figure 5.4 with blue dots, from light blue for τ = 0.1 to dark
blue for τ = 0.5. Notice that the tolerance band incentives the power producer to
overestimate its future power production, for low values of µE , compared to the
case with τ = 0. Indeed, since the width of the tolerance band is proportional to
qDA, it is convenient to overestimate the power production in order to gain a wider
tolerance band. Conversely, as µE gets closer to 1 p.u., the optimal trading strategy
suggests to underestimate the power production, compared to the dual-price set-
tlement scheme. Indeed, we showed that, under the band-dual settlement scheme,
the optimal solution qDA∗ lies in the interval [0, 1/τ ], since when qDA∗ = 1/τ the up-
per limit of the band τ qDA∗ is 1 p.u. (i.e., the capacity of the unit) and there is no
advantage in offering higher values of qDA∗.
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FIGURE 5.4: Nominal level of the optimal quantile, i.e., FE
(
qDA∗
)
, as
function of µE . We consider a band-dual scheme for different values
of τ and ψˆ.
Figure 5.5 shows the difference between the optimal market quantity qDA∗ and
the expected value µE as function of µE , for values of the imbalance penalty ratio ψˆ
of 0.5, 1, and 2, respectively. The case of τ = 0 is illustrated with red squares, while
the cases with tolerance band (i.e., τ > 0) are shown with blue dots, darker as the
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value of τ increases. The figure shows how the producer is over/underestimating
its future power production in terms of quantity. Positive values in the ordinate
indicate that the producer is willing to offer more than the expected value µE in the
day-ahead market. Conversely, negative values show that the optimal day-ahead
market offer qDA∗ is lower than µE . Also in Figure 5.5 we can notice that the tolerance
band pushes the stochastic producer to increase its market offer qDA∗ when µE → 0
p.u. and to decrease it when µE → 1 p.u.
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FIGURE 5.5: Difference between the optimal market quantity qDA∗
and the expected value µE , as function of µE . We consider a band-
dual scheme for different values of τ and of ψˆ.
Now, we consider the single-dual imbalance settlement scheme. Figure 5.6 shows
the difference between the optimal market quantity qDA∗ and the expected value µE ,
as function of µE , for values of the imbalance penalty ratio ψˆ of 0.5, 1, and 2, re-
spectively. The red squares represent the case with τ = 0, while the blue dots the
cases with the tolerance band, from light blue for τ = 0.1 to dark blue for τ = 0.5.
When ψˆ = 1, i.e., φˆ(−) = |φˆ(+)|, the expected value of φBA is 0. In such condition,
the single-dual and the dual-band schemes are equivalent and bring the same optimal
solution qDA∗. Conversely, when ψˆ = 0.5, i.e., |φˆ(+)| = 2φˆ(−), the expected value of
φBA is negative. In a single-price settlement scheme, the power producer would of-
fer the full capacity in the market (see Section 5.3.2), since it is expected to receive an
extra-profit for the creation of a negative imbalance (i.e., when E ≤ qDA). Under the
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single-dual scheme its offering strategy is more conservative as outside the band the
deviations are priced under a dual-price settlement scheme. However, the power
producer is encouraged to overestimate its future power production for increasing
the width of the tolerance band and for being more likely to create a negative im-
balance. The optimal quantity offer is indeed often the full capacity, i.e., qDA∗ = 1
p.u., even if it means to "lose" half of the width of the tolerance band. It is still more
convenient to be sure to create a negative imbalance, even at the price of "losing" a
portion of the tolerance band. When ψˆ = 2, i.e., when φˆ(−) = 2|φˆ(+)|, the expected
value of φBA is positive. The power producer would offer 0 p.u. in a single-price
settlement scheme since it is expected to receive an extra-profit for the creation of a
positive imbalance. Nevertheless, under the single-dual scheme, offering at qDA = 0
p.u. would result in shrinking the tolerance band to 0 and losing the extra-profit of
the single-price scheme. On one side, the producer is encouraged to underestimate
its production for being more likely to create a positive imbalance. On the other
side, it wants to increase its market offer to gain a wider tolerance band. These two
conflicting interests prevent the power producer from offering at qDA∗ = 0 p.u. as
suggested in a single-price settlement scheme.
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FIGURE 5.6: Difference between the optimal market quantity qDA∗
and the expected value µE , as function of µE . We consider a single-
dual scheme for different values of τ and of ψˆ.
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Similar conclusions can be drawn by analyzing Figure 5.7, which shows the nom-
inal level of the optimal quantile, i.e., FE
(
qDA∗
)
, as function of µEk , for values of the
imbalance penalty ratio ψˆ of 0.5, 1, and 2, respectively.
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FIGURE 5.7: Nominal level of the optimal quantile, i.e., FE
(
qDA∗
)
as
function of µE . We consider a single-dual scheme for different values
of τ and of ψˆ.
5.5.2 Analysis on the Expected Imbalances
This section analyses how the results of the optimal trading strategies shown in Sec-
tion 5.5.1 affect the expected real-time imbalances of the stochastic producers. Fig-
ure 5.8 shows the value of ∆ˆ, defined in Equation (5.51), under the band-dual settle-
ment scheme as function of τ , for values of the imbalance penalty ratio ψˆ of 0.5, 1,
and 2, respectively. Similarly, Figure 5.9 does for the single-dual settlement scheme.
When ψˆ = 0.5, the expected imbalance ∆ˆ increases as the relative width of the toler-
ance band increases, for both the imbalance settlement schemes. For instance, under
the band-dual settlement scheme ∆ˆ is 5.8% higher for τ = 0.2 and 15.8% higher for
τ = 0.5 with respect to a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme (i.e., τ = 0). This
increment is strongly emphasized when considering a single-dual settlement scheme.
Indeed, for such settlement scheme ∆ˆ is 317.3% higher for τ = 0.5 with respect to
τ = 0. This huge growth is mainly due to strong a overestimation of the future
power production when ψˆ < 0. When ψˆ = 1, ∆ˆ increases as τ grows, in the same
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manner for both the settlement schemes. As mentioned in Section 5.5.1, when ψˆ = 1,
the two settlement schemes can be considered equivalent. The expected value of ∆
grows of 3.9% and of 9.95% compared to τ = 0, for τ equal to 0.3 and 0.5, respec-
tively. Conversely, when ψˆ = 2, ∆ˆ is lower when τ > 0, for both band-dual and
single-dual settlement schemes. Under the band-dual settlement scheme, ∆ˆ decreases
of 7.6% for τ = 0.3 and 6.3% for τ = 0.5, compared to τ = 0.
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FIGURE 5.8: Expected value of the imbalance ∆ˆ as function of τ ,
for different values of the ψˆ and considering a band-dual settlement
scheme.
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FIGURE 5.9: Expected value of the imbalance ∆ˆ as function of τ ,
for different values of the ψˆ and considering a single-dual settlement
scheme.
As mentioned in Section 5.4.4, we are also interested in understanding if the
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imbalance ∆ˆ is expected to help in restoring the whole system imbalance or to con-
tribute to it. First, we distinguish between imbalances of different sign, i.e., ∆ˆ(+) and
∆ˆ(−), evaluated with Equations (5.52) and (5.53), respectively. Figure 5.10 shows the
expected values ∆ˆ(+) and ∆ˆ(−), for the dual-band settlement scheme, as function of
τ . Similarly, Figure 5.11 does for the single-dual settlement scheme.
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FIGURE 5.10: Expected value of the positive imbalance ∆ˆ(+) and the
negative imbalance ∆ˆ(−) as function of τ , for different values of the ψˆ
and considering a band-dual settlement scheme.
Then, the size of the imbalances that are expected to "help" the system, i.e., ∆ˆ(↑),
and to "hurt" the system, i.e., ∆ˆ(↓), are computed with Equations (5.56) and (5.57),
respectively. Figure 5.12 shows the values of ∆ˆ(↑) and ∆ˆ(↓) as function of τ , for
different values of the ψˆ, for the dual-band settlement scheme. Figure 5.13 does the
same for the single-dual settlement scheme. The expected imbalance ∆ˆ(↑) for ψˆ = 0.5
increases of 26% for the band-dual scheme and of 420% for the single-dual when τ =
0.5 compared to the case with τ = 0. Conversely, for ψˆ = 0.5 and for τ = 0.5, ∆ˆ(↓)
grows of 4% for the band-dual scheme and of 200% for the single-dual, with respect to
τ = 0. It is interesting to compare Figures 5.8 and 5.9 with Figures 5.12 and 5.13.
As a matter of fact, we mentioned that when ψˆ = 0.5, the expected imbalance ∆ˆ
increases as τ grows, for both the imbalance schemes. From Figures 5.12 and 5.13 it
can be noticed that both ∆ˆ(↑) and ∆ˆ(↓) increase with τ , even if ∆ˆ(↑) shows a higher
grow rate. Moving to the case of ψˆ = 2, we highlighted before that ∆ˆ first decreases
up to τ = 0.3, while start growing for τ greater than 0.3. However, analyzing Figures
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FIGURE 5.11: Expected value of the positive imbalance ∆ˆ(+) and the
negative imbalance ∆ˆ(−) as function of τ , for different values of the ψˆ
and considering a single-dual settlement scheme.
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FIGURE 5.12: Expected value of the helping imbalance ∆ˆ(↑) and the
hurting imbalance ∆ˆ(↓) as function of τ , for different values of the ψˆ
and considering a band-dual settlement scheme.
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FIGURE 5.13: Expected value of the helping imbalance ∆ˆ(↑) and the
hurting imbalance ∆ˆ(↓) as function of τ , for different values of the ψˆ
and considering a single-dual settlement scheme.
5.12 and 5.13 it can be noticed that ∆ˆ(↑) decreases as τ increases, while ∆ˆ(↓) increases
with τ . Thus, the slight decrease of the expected imbalance up to τ = 0.3 is due to
a decrease of the expected beneficial imbalance and a lower increase of the harmful
imbalance, for both the imbalance settlement schemes.
5.6 Summary
This chapter takes the perspective of a price-taker and risk-neutral stochastic power
producer offering in a two-settlement electricity market. Starting from the general
offering strategy of Section 3.4 we tailor it to the characteristics of the stochastic pro-
ducer. We show how, under a single-price imbalance settlement scheme, the quan-
tity offered by the power producer in the day-ahead market is only influenced by the
expectation on the balancing market penalties, while the power production forecasts
do not influence its optimal decision. Indeed, the producer decides to offer 0 or the
full capacity depending on the market price forecasts. Differently, we prove that un-
der a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme the optimal market offer is a quantile
of the cumulative distribution function of the future renewable energy production.
The nominal level of such optimal quantile is influenced by the expected balancing
market penalties. This translates in overestimating the future power production if
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it is expected to be more penalized for the creation of a positive imbalance, while to
underestimate it if the penalty for the creation of a negative imbalance is higher than
the positive one, in expectation.
The chapter also investigates the effects of imbalance settlement schemes with
tolerance margins on the optimal offering strategy of the stochastic producers. We
prove that also under the band-dual and the single-dual imbalance settlement scheme
the market quantity offer that maximizes the producer’s expected profit is unique.
Then, we analyze the effects of the tolerance margins from a system perspective. We
formulate the expected real-time imbalance of a stochastic producer seeking at max-
imizing its expected market profit, for both the band-dual and the single-dual scheme.
We also differentiate between imbalances that are expecting to "hurt" or to "help" in
restoring the system’s imbalance.
Through parametrized curves, we show the effect of the tolerance margins on
the optimal amount of energy to be contracted in the day-ahead market for the two
schemes. We demonstrate that under the single-dual scheme the power producer is
encouraged to strongly overestimate its power production when it is expecting a
balancing market price lower than the day-ahead one. Then, we also show that the
tolerance margins within the penalty scheme may generate larger real-time imbal-
ances for the stochastic producers, mainly for the single-dual scheme.
As a result of this analysis, the imbalance pricing scheme introduced in the Italian
electricity market to mitigate the balancing responsibility of the stochastic producers
may not be optimal from a system perspective. Our analysis suggests that they may
bring more significant real-time imbalances of the stochastic producer and, suppos-
edly, a higher balancing cost for the system. It is worth mentioning that this analysis
is based on a price-taker producer who is not supposed to influence the whole sys-
tem imbalance with its deviation. However, a producer may offer as a price-taker
producer while affecting the system imbalance.
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Trading of Conventional
Generators
6.1 Introduction
This chapter takes the perspective of a conventional power producer. Differently
than stochastic producers, conventional ones have control of the power output of
their production units. However, the operation of a conventional production unit
(e.g., coal- or gas-fired power plant) is constrained by technical limitations, e.g.,
ramping constraints. Those ramping restrictions, which constraint the capability
of the unit to vary its power production over time, are of particular interest in the
context of optimal participation in the electricity market. Indeed, in Chapter 2 we
show that market participants submit a separate offer curve per each trading in-
terval. Therefore, such intertemporal constraints cannot be explicitly included in
the market offers. The power producer has to internalize them in its offering strat-
egy, together with non-convex costs, such as start-up and shut-down costs. Tradi-
tionally, this was not a prominent issue, as "slow" technologies (e.g., coal-fired or
nuclear power plant), which are the more constrained ones in their operation, had
marginal costs below the day-ahead market price and were operated to cover the
base loads. Differently, the pick-loads were covered by "fast" technologies (e.g., gas-
fired or diesel units), which flexibility almost allows to neglect intertemporal con-
straints when considering hourly trading intervals. However, in recent years the
power sector has experienced a significant increase in the deployment of renewable
energy sources, such as wind and solar power. These sources are usually traded
at zero marginal cost and their growing penetration is leading to a decrease of the
prices in the day-ahead market (Sensfuss, Ragwitz, and Genoese, 2008; Clò, Cataldi,
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and Zoppoli, 2015). Moreover, they can only be predicted with a limited accuracy,
thus leading to real-time imbalances and increasing the need for balancing energy.
These changes may affect the strategy of the conventional producers in both the day-
ahead and the balancing market. E.g., a "slow" production unit may not be able to
solely rely on the revenues of the day-ahead market, due to the decrease of its prices,
but may have to be more strategic and considering possible additional profits from
selling regulating power in the balancing market.
The optimal offering strategy and self-scheduling of conventional thermal units
have already been widely studied in the literature. Arroyo and Conejo (2000) ad-
dress the optimal response of a thermal generator to a given set of electricity market
prices in terms of both energy and reserve. A MILP problem is developed con-
sidering a non-convex cost function, as well as its start-up costs, ramp rates and
minimum-up and -down constraints. The same authors (Arroyo and Conejo, 2004)
propose a detailed formulation to model start-up and shut-down characteristics of
a thermal generator. Other works, such as (Conejo et al., 2004; Jabr, 2005), include
risk measures while optimizing the self-scheduling problem of thermal units. Refer-
ences (Arroyo and Conejo, 2000; Arroyo and Conejo, 2004; Conejo et al., 2004; Jabr,
2005) demonstrate that a detailed modeling of the generator feasibility region and its
production cost function may be essential for deriving its optimal self-scheduling.
Indeed, the inter-temporal constraints (e.g., ramping constraints) and non-convex
costs (e.g., start-up and shut-down costs) may affect the optimal solution. In this
context, the pioneering paper (Conejo, Nogales, and Arroyo, 2002) presents an offer-
ing strategy for a price-taker producer under price uncertainty. It develops a set of
rules that aim to translate the results of a self-scheduling problem into market offers.
Ni, Luh, and Rourke (2004) present an algorithm for offering and self-scheduling
of a unit including risk management. Maenhoudt and Deconinck (2014) derive an
offering strategy for a price-taker power producer that aims to maximize profit ex-
pectation while hedging against possible infeasible schedules. Other works relax
the price-taker assumption and develop tools for strategic offering considering the
impact of power producer’s decisions on market prices. This can be done through a
residual demand model (Baillo et al., 2004) or a bilevel optimization setup (Gountis
and Bakirtzis, 2004; Bakirtzis et al., 2007).
By analyzing the optimization models mentioned above, we can identify two dif-
ferent sets of variables and constraints. The first set defines the feasibility region and
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the cost function of the production unit. For instance, references (Arroyo and Conejo,
2000; Arroyo and Conejo, 2004) show how to successfully model it as a MILP prob-
lem. The second set simulates the trading problem, i.e., how the power producer
participates in the market (e.g., through non-decreasing step-wise offering curves),
while considering the market clearing mechanism (endogenously or exogenously)
and the pricing scheme (e.g., uniform or pay-as-bid). The trading problem can be
modeled using a LP approach (Conejo, Carrión, and Morales, 2010), under price-
taker assumptions and uniform pricing scheme. However, even though European
day-ahead electricity markets are mostly settled under a uniform pricing scheme,
several balancing markets, e.g., in Germany and Italy (Wang et al., 2015), are settled
under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme.
The topic of trading under a pay-as-bid scheme and price uncertainty has not
been extensively addressed in the literature. References (Ren and Galiana, 2004a;
Ren and Galiana, 2004b; Swider and Weber, 2007; Swider, 2007; Khorasani and
Mashhadi, 2012; Sadeh, Mashhadi, and Latifi, 2009) show how to model the trading
problem under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme using a non-linear programming (NLP)
approach. However, they do not consider an accurate modeling of production unit’s
operational constraints. Introducing the feasibility region would result in a MINLP
model, which may have high computational cost and, generally, do not guarantee
the optimality of the solution. Differently, Chapter 3 provides a novel approach that
allows casting the optimal price-taker trading problem in pay-as-bid markets under
price uncertainty as an LP problem. For that purpose, continuous random variables
(i.e., the market-clearing prices) are represented as discrete variables. We refer the
interested reader to Chapter 3 for a more extensive literature review on the topic of
trading in pay-as-bid electricity markets.
We use the proposed LP approach to build a multi-stage stochastic programming
problem with recourse. This efficient decision-making tool could be used by a price-
taker conventional producer to derive its best day-ahead market offer curves. In line
with current practice in several European electricity markets, we consider a two-
settlement market framework, in which the day-ahead market is cleared based on a
uniform pricing scheme, while a pay-as-bid pricing scheme is used in the balancing
stage. The market prices in both stages are given but uncertain. This uncertainty
is properly characterized by generating a set of foreseen scenarios. The resulting
model is a stochastic MILP problem, where non-convexities (i.e., binary variables)
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arise from the unit commitment constraints. To the best of our knowledge, this
kind of stochastic MILP optimization model for obtaining the offering strategy of
a price-taker thermal producer in a two-settlement electricity market with a pay-
as-bid pricing scheme in the balancing stage is not available in the literature. It is
worth mentioning that Bakirtzis et al. (2007) provide a formulation for obtaining
optimal offering curves in markets settled under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme for
a price-maker producer. However, market problems with equilibrium constraints
may have high computational cost and rely on strong assumptions on opponents’
behavior. Hence, when the production unit has a negligible impact on the market, a
price-maker setup may not be the preferable choice.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the
electricity market framework and a set of assumptions used to formulate the offering
strategies. Section 6.3 shows a general MILP formulation to represent the feasible
operating region and the non-convex cost function of the thermal unit. Section 6.4
presents two offering strategies to be used by a conventional power producer to
derive its optimal day-ahead offer curves. A case study is presented in Section 6.5,
while Section 6.6 summarizes the contents of the chapter.
6.2 Electricity Market Framework and Assumptions
We consider a single conventional producer that trades in a two-settlement electric-
ity market framework, similar to the one introduced in Section 2.3. The day-ahead
market is cleared once a day, at noon, simultaneously for the whole 24 hourly trad-
ing intervals of the following day. Generators are remunerated under a uniform
pricing scheme in the day-ahead market. Then, a balancing market is cleared sep-
arately per each hourly interval, one hour before the real-time operation. The pro-
vision of balancing energy is remunerated under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme. Both
the day-ahead and balancing market give the possibility to submit non-decreasing
offer curves. The intra-day trading floor is neglected for the sake of simplicity. A
schematic representation of the electricity market submission process is illustrated
in Figure 6.1.
The power producer is assumed to be price-taker in both the day-ahead and the
balancing market. Hence, the market prices within the offering strategy problem of
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FIGURE 6.1: Schematic representation of the electricity market frame-
work. The conventional producer submits the quantity offer qDA
in the day-ahead (DA) market, while submitting upward qUP and
downward qDW regulation offers in the balancing (BA) market.
the producer are exogenous, but still uncertain. We model those uncertainties us-
ing a set of scenarios. Uncertainty characterization is a critical input to stochastic
optimization. The quality of the solution of a stochastic optimization model is in-
deed strongly influenced by the quality of the scenarios provided as input. Given
that the purpose is to analyze and test an optimization model, we exploit the funda-
mental model presented in Section 4.3 for generating market prices, instead of using
real market data. This fundamental model generates a set of electricity market price
forecasts, which is required as an input to our proposed offering strategy.
The scenario generation and reduction algorithm in Chapter 4 provides a set of
day-ahead market price trajectories {λDAik : ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K}, being i the index of
the day-ahead market price scenarios and k the index of the time intervals. Each
scenario i is associated with a probability πDAi of occurrence. Then, for each possible
day-ahead realization i, it provides a set of balancing market price trajectories {λBAijk :
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀k ∈ K}, being j the index of the balancing market price scenarios.
The scenario (ij) has a probability πDAi π
BA
ij of occurrence.
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6.3 Thermal Unit Model
This section derives an approximate model of the feasibility region and the cost func-
tion of a conventional production unit (e.g., coal- or gas-fired power plant) through
a MILP formulation. The operation of conventional production units is constrained
by several technical limitations. It is important to properly model them through a set
of constraints to replace constraint (3.18e) (i.e., the set Ω) and constraint (3.18f) (i.e.,
the function h(·)) of the general offering strategy formulation (3.18) in Section 3.4. It
is also important to evaluate an appropriate trade-off between the complexity and
accuracy of such model. On the one hand, a too accurate model may be too complex,
thus leading to an intractable optimization problem when merged with the offering
strategy. On the other hand, a too simple model may not be able to represent the
fundamental characteristics of the production unit. This problem has already been
widely explored within the literature (Arroyo and Conejo, 2000; Arroyo and Conejo,
2004). They show how a MILP formulation can approximate such feasible region
with an acceptable level of accuracy.
6.3.1 Feasible Operating Region of the Unit
This section provides a formulation to represent the feasible region of a thermal unit,
used to replace constrain (3.18e) in the general offering strategy (3.18), i.e.,
qAk ∈ Ω, ∀k, (6.1)
where qAk is the total amount of energy generated by the power producer. Let dk
(MWh) be the quantity of energy produced in the real-time by the thermal unit.
Since we consider a single production unit, we impose
qAk = dk, ∀k, (6.2)
In case the power producer manages a set H of units, where dhk is the power output
of unit h at time k, it would impose qAk =
∑
h dhk. Consequently, even if this chapter
considers a single production unit, it is easily adaptable to multiple production units.
Let us define with D and D the minimum power output and the capacity of the unit,
respectively. This means that when the unit is on, its production dk has to lie between
D (MWh) and D (MWh), i.e., dk ∈ [D,D]. Differently, when the unit is not operating,
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its power output is 0, i.e., dk = 0. The result is a non convex operating region, as the
power production dk can either be 0 or in [D,D]. Let uk be the binary variable, i.e.,
uk ∈ {0, 1}, representing the commitment status of the production unit. A value of
uk equal to 0 means that the unit is not operating. Differently, uk is equal to 1 when
the unit is on. Accordingly, the operating region of dk can be formulated as
ukD ≤ dk ≤ ukD, ∀k. (6.3)
Notice that when uk is 0, i.e., the unit is off, constraint (6.3) becomes 0 ≤ dk ≤ 0,
which is equivalent to impose dk = 0. Then, if uk = 1, i.e., the unit is on, constraint
(6.3) is equivalent to D ≤ dk ≤ D. Figure 6.2 shows an illustrative representation of
the feasibility region imposed by constraint (6.3), which is shown in red.
uk = 0 uk = 1
0 D D
dk (MWh)
FIGURE 6.2: Graphic representation of the non-convex feasibility con-
straint (6.3).
Then, thermal units also have inter-temporal limitations. Indeed, they have
ramping constraints, which limit the capability of the unit to change its power pro-
duction over short time intervals. Let RUP (MW/h) be the upward ramping limit
of the unit. As an example, if RUP = 10 MW/h and the unit is producing 20 MW,
in one hour it can increase its power production up to 30 MW and 40 MW in two
hours, and so on. However, as we only consider hourly intervals, we define RUP as
the maximum upward variation of energy production in one hour, i.e., in MWh. The
upward ramping limitation of dk is expressed as
dk − d(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀k ∈ K − {k1}, (6.4a)
dk1 − d0 ≤ R
UP, (6.4b)
where d0 is the initial production level, while k1 is the first hourly interval of K.
Similarly, we define RDW (MWh) as the maximum downward variation in one hour.
E.g., if RDW = 5 MWh and d(k−1) = 30 MWh, then dk cannot be lower than 25 MWh.
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The downward ramping limitation of dk can be imposed as
d(k−1) − dk ≤ R
DW, ∀k ∈ K − {k1}, (6.5a)
d0 − dk1 ≤ R
DW, (6.5b)
A graphic representation of the ramping limits of a conventional unit is given in
Figure 6.3. Indeed, if the amount of production d(k−1) at k − 1 is known, then dk is
limited between d(k−1) +RUP and d(k−1) −RDW.
k − 1 k
time
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o
w
er
d(k−1)
d(k−1) +R
UP
d(k−1) −R
DW
dk
FIGURE 6.3: Illustration of upward and downward limitations of the
conventional unit.
Consequently, the set Ω representing the feasible region of the unit can be re-
placed by
qAk = dk, ∀k, (6.6a)
ukD ≤ dk ≤ ukD, ∀k, (6.6b)
dk − d(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀k, (6.6c)
d(k−1) − dk ≤ R
DW, ∀k. (6.6d)
uk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k. (6.6e)
Constraint (6.6a) imposes the balance between qAk and dk. Constraint (6.6b) forces dk
to operate in its feasible region, i.e., between D and D when on, and to be equal to
0 when off. Constraints (6.6c) and (6.6d) impose the ramp up and down limitations
of the production unit. Finally, constraint (6.6e) imposes that uk is binary. Notice
thatconstraints (6.6c) and (6.6d) are a compact formulation of the ramping limits.
Indeed, they require the initial production level d0 of the unit.
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It is worth mentioning that (6.6) is simplified feasibility region, which usually
includes additional constraints, e.g., the minimum up- and down-time of the unit.
We refer the interested reader to references (Arroyo and Conejo, 2000; Arroyo and
Conejo, 2004) for a more detailed representation of such feasible operating region.
6.3.2 Cost Function of the Thermal Unit
This section deals with the cost function of a thermal unit. We derive a formulation
to replace constrain (3.18f) in the general offering strategy formulation (3.18), i.e.,
cˆk = h
(
qAk
)
, ∀k (6.7)
where qAk = dk. We initially consider that such cost only depends on the actual
amount of energy production dk. Such curve can usually be approximated with a
quadratic cost curve, i.e.,
h(dk) = E + F dk +G (dk)
2 , ∀k ∈ K, (6.8)
where the parameters E , F , and G, control the shape of the curve. The formulation
of h(dk) in Equation (6.8) is quadratic, meanwhile we would like a MILP model of the
unit. To obtain an alternative linear formulation of Equation (6.8) we use a piecewise
linear interpolation. This approximation can be applied only if the marginal cost
h′(dk) is non decreasing. The marginal cost is the cost for selling an additional unit
of energy, while from a mathematical point of view, it is evaluated as the derivative
of h(dk) with respect to dk. Therefore, h′(dk) can be computed as
h′(dk) = F + 2Gdk, ∀k ∈ K. (6.9)
It is straightforward to prove that h′(dk) is non decreasing, for dk ∈
[
D,D
]
, if G ≥ 0.
Such condition is usually verified for real cost curves. The idea of the piecewise lin-
ear approximation is subdividing the interval
[
D,D
]
into NS intervals and consid-
ering a constant marginal cost within each block. We define with s the index identi-
fying a production block, while S is the set of those blocks. We introduce xsk (MWh)
as the amount of energy produced with the block s. Then, being Cs (e/MWh) the
marginal cost of the block s and C0 (e) the production cost at the minimum output
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level of the unit, the cost function h(dk) can be approximated as
h(dk) = C0uk +
∑
s
Csxsk, ∀k (6.10a)
dk = Duk +
∑
s
xsk, ∀k (6.10b)
0 ≤ xsk ≤ Xs, ∀s, ∀k (6.10c)
where Xs (MWh) is the size of the production block s. When the objective function
is to minimize the production cost (or to maximize the profit) the formulation (6.10)
provides a successful approximation to the quadratic cost function in Equation (6.8).
Figure 6.4 illustrates an example of piecewise linear approximation of a quadratic
cost curve. The quadratic curve is shown in blue, while its piecewise linear approx-
imation with four production blocks in red. Then, the marginal cost function of the
two curves is illustrated in Figure 6.5. Note that, as mentioned before, the marginal
cost is constant over each of the four production blocks. Finally, we also show the
average production cost of the real cost curve (blue) and the piecewise linear ap-
proximation (in red) in Figure 6.6.
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FIGURE 6.4: Example of a quadratic cost function (blue) and its piece-
wise linear approximation (red) with 4 production blocks.
Now, we introduce other costs, non-proportional to dk, that contribute to the
total production cost of the unit. An example is the start-up cost. To model it, we
introduce the binary variable yk, representing the start-up status of the unit during
the interval k. yk = 1 if the unit is turned on during the interval k, and 0 otherwise.
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FIGURE 6.5: Marginal cost function of the cost curves in Figure 6.4.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
dk (MWh)
40
50
60
70
80
av
er
ag
e
co
st
(e
/M
W
h
)
x1k x2k x3k x4k
D D
quadratic cost
piecewise approximation
FIGURE 6.6: Average cost function of the cost curves in Figure 6.4.
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The value of yk can be evaluated by imposing
uk − u(k−1) ≤ yk, ∀k ∈ K − {k1}, (6.11a)
uk1 − u0 ≤ y(k1), (6.11b)
where u0 is the initial commitment status of the unit. Note that the term uk−u(k−1) is
equal to 1 if and only if uk = 1 and u(k−1) = 0, which represents a start-up situation
associated with a cost CUP (e). In this case, yk is forced to be equal to 1. For the
other 3 combinations, uk − u(k−1) is equal to either 0 or -1, thus allowing yk to be 0.
Similarly, we can include the shut-down cost. The binary variable zk represents
the shut-down status of the unit during the interval k, while CDW (e) is the cost for
turning off the unit. The shut-down cost can be evaluated as CDWzk, while the value
of zk can be computed by imposing
u(k−1) − uk ≤ zk, ∀k ∈ K − {k1}, (6.12a)
u0 − uk1 ≤ z(k1), (6.12b)
The term u(k−1) − uk is equal to 1 if and only if uk = 0 and u(k−1) = 1, which repre-
sents a shut-down situation at k. Combining all those costs in a unique formulation
results in the following set of constraints, which can be used to replace h
(
qAk
)
in the
offering strategy:
cˆk = E[ck] , ∀k, (6.13a)
ck = C0uk +
∑
s
Csxsk + C
UPyk + C
DWzk, ∀k, (6.13b)
dk = Duk +
∑
s
xsk, ∀k, (6.13c)
0 ≤ xsk ≤ Xs, ∀s, ∀k, (6.13d)
uk − u(k−1) ≤ yk, ∀k, (6.13e)
u(k−1) − uk ≤ zk, ∀k, (6.13f)
yk, zk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k. (6.13g)
Constraint (6.13b) yields the total production cost ck of the unit. Constraints (6.13c)
and (6.13d) are auxiliary constraints to the piecewise linear formulation of the quadratic
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cost function. Constraints (6.13e) and (6.13f) compute the start-up (yk) and shut-
down (zk) status of the unit. Finally, constraint (6.13g) imposes yk and zk to be binary
variables.
6.4 Optimal Offering Strategy
This section formulates the offering strategy that the power producer may use to
derive its best day-ahead market offers. We start from the generic formulation for the
price-taker and risk-neutral producer in Equations (3.18), extended to the 24 trading
intervals. First, we remove the variables and constraints associated with a passive
participation in the balancing market. Indeed, we eliminate constraint (3.18e) and
we remove the variables ρˆBAk and q
BA
k from the objective function (3.18a) and from
constraint (3.18b), respectively. Finally, we replace qAk with dk, in accordance with
Equation (6.2). This leads to
Max
Γ
∑
k
ρˆDAk + ρˆ
UP
k + ρˆ
DW
k − cˆk (6.14a)
s.t. qDAk + q
UP
k − q
DW
k = dk, ∀k, (6.14b)
qDAk , ρˆ
DA
k ∈ Π
DA, ∀k, (6.14c)
qUPk , q
DW
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k ∈ Π
BA
Act, ∀k, (6.14d)
cˆk = h(dk) , ∀k, (6.14e)
dk ∈ Ω, ∀k, (6.14f)
where
Γ = {dk, q
DA
k , q
UP
k , q
DW
k , ρˆ
DA
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k , cˆk}. (6.15)
Section 6.4.1 presents a sequential offering strategy. It describes the case in which
the producer is only considering the day-ahead stage while offering in the day-ahead
market, without considering eventual profits from the balancing stage. Differently,
Section 6.4.2 presents a co-optimized offering strategy, where the conventional pro-
ducer co-optimizes the offering strategy in the day-ahead and the balancing market.
6.4.1 Sequential Offering Strategy
Under the sequential offering strategy, the power producer only considers the day-
ahead stage while deriving its optimal offer curves. To that purpose, it is provided
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with a set I of day-ahead market price scenarios {λDAik : ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K}. As the
producer does not consider the future revenues from the balancing stage, we remove
from the offering model (6.14) the variables and constraints associated with the bal-
ancing market. Indeed, we eliminate constraint (6.14d) and we remove variables qUPk
and qDWk from constraint (6.14b). Moreover, we eliminate ρˆ
UP
k and ρˆ
DW
k from the ob-
jective function (6.14a). Figure 6.7 illustrates the stochastic programming framework
of the sequential offering strategy, where qDAk is modeled as a fist-stage decision. Fi-
qDA
λDA
i
λDA
i
first
stage
decisions
uncertainty
disclosure
FIGURE 6.7: Schematic illustration of the stochastic programming
framework of the sequential offering strategy.
nally, we introduce the subscript i in accordance with the stochastic programming
approach, i.e, dk → dik and qDAk → q
DA
ik . Note that q
DA
ik is made scenario dependent
for building the offer curve (see Section 3.4.3). This leads to
Max
Γseq
∑
k
ρˆDAk − cˆk (6.16a)
s.t. qDAik = dik, ∀k, ∀i (6.16b)
qDAik , ρˆ
DA
k ∈ Π
DA, ∀k, ∀i (6.16c)
cˆk = h(dik) , ∀k, (6.16d)
dik ∈ Ω, ∀k, (6.16e)
where
Γseq = {dik, q
DA
ik , ρˆ
DA
k , cˆk}. (6.17)
The objective function (6.16a) maximizes the expected profit of the producer for sell-
ing energy in the day-ahead market. Constraint (6.16b) balances the total energy
exchanged with the market, i.e., qDAik , with the production dik. Constraint (6.16c) is
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a set of constraints associated with the day-ahead market offer curves. Constraint
(6.16d) computes the production cost of the power unit. Finally, constraint (6.16e)
forces the unit to operate in its feasible region.
Linear Formulation of ΠDA
The set ΠDA in (6.16) is a set of constraints related to the day-ahead market offer
curves. The formulation of ΠDA is presented in Equations (3.44) in Section 3.4.3. Its
formulation, adapted to the conventional producer (i.e., Q = 0 and Q = D ) and
extended to the set K of the trading intervals is
ρˆDAk =
∑
i
πDAi λ
DA
ik q
DA
ik , ∀k, (6.18a)
qDAik ≥ q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik ≥ λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (6.18b)
qDAik = q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik = λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (6.18c)
0 ≤ qDAik ≤ D, ∀i, ∀k (6.18d)
Constraint (6.18a) yields the expected day-ahead market income of the power pro-
ducer. Constraints (6.18b) and (6.18c) impose the non-decreasing and non-anticipativity
conditions, respectively. Lastly, constraint (6.18d) forces the day-ahead market offers
qDAik to lie between 0 and the unit’s capacity D.
Linear Formulation of the Cost Function
Constraint (6.16d) yielding the production cost, can be replaced with the formula-
tion provided in Section 6.3.2, i.e., Equations (6.13). Its formulation, adapted to the
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stochastic programming framework, is the following:
cˆk =
∑
i
πDAi cik, ∀k, (6.19a)
cik = C0uik +
∑
s
Csxisk + C
UPyik + C
DWzik, ∀i, ∀k, (6.19b)
dik = Duik +
∑
s
xisk, ∀i, ∀k, (6.19c)
0 ≤ xisk ≤ Xs, ∀i, ∀s, ∀k, (6.19d)
uik − ui(k−1) ≤ yik, ∀i, ∀k, (6.19e)
ui(k−1) − uik ≤ zik, ∀i, ∀k, (6.19f)
yik, zik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀k. (6.19g)
Constraint (6.19a) computes the expected total cost cˆk per each interval k. Constraint
(6.19b) yields the total production cost cik of the unit when scenario i realizes at k.
Constraints (6.19c) and (6.19d) are auxiliary constraints to the piecewise linear for-
mulation of the quadratic cost function. Constraints (6.19e) and (6.19f) compute the
start-up (yik) and shut-down (zik) status of the unit. Finally, constraint (6.19g) im-
poses yik and zik to be binary variables.
Linear Formulation of Ω
The set Ω in constraint (6.16e) imposes the feasible operation of the unit. We replace
it with the set of constraints (6.6) presented in Section 6.3.1, though adapted to the
stochastic programming formulation. This writes:
uikD ≤ dik ≤ uikD, ∀i, ∀k, (6.20a)
dik − di(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀i, ∀k, (6.20b)
di(k−1) − dik ≤ R
DW, ∀i, ∀k, (6.20c)
uik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀k. (6.20d)
Constraint (6.20a) forces dik to operate between D and D when on-line, and to be
equal to 0 when off-line. Constraints (6.20b) and (6.20c) enforce the ramp up and
down limitations of the production unit. Finally, constraint (6.20d) imposes that uik
is binary.
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6.4.2 Co-optimized Offering Strategy
This section considers a co-optimized offering strategy for building the day-ahead
and the balancing marker offer curves. Consequently, the power producer is pro-
vided, together with the set I of day-ahead market price scenarios {λDAik : ∀i ∈
I, ∀k ∈ K}, with a set J of balancing market price scenarios per each day-ahead
possible realization i, i.e., {λBAijk : ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀k ∈ K}. Of course, at the moment
of offering in the day-ahead market, it does not have to submit the balancing market
offers, but only the day-ahead ones. However, it includes the balancing market deci-
sions within its optimization problem as recourse variables. The result is a two-stage
stochastic optimization problem, where the producer simultaneously maximizes the
profit from the two market stages, in the sense that it endogenously determines its
future balancing actions while deriving its optimal day-ahead offers. Accordingly,
we model the day-ahead production level qDAk as a first-stage decision, and the up-
ward and the downward production adjustment, i.e., qUPik and q
DW
ik , as second-stage
decisions. Figure 6.7 illustrates the stochastic programming framework of the co-
optimized offering strategy.
qDA
λDAi q
UP
i
, qDW
i
λBAij
λBAij
λDAi q
UP
i
, qDW
i
λBAij
λBAij
first
stage
second
stage
decisions
uncertainty
disclosure
FIGURE 6.8: Schematic illustration of the stochastic programming
framework of the co-optimized offering strategy.
Then, we make the day-ahead production variable qDAk scenario-dependent (i.e.,
qDAk → q
DA
ik ) to model the offer curve, as seen in Section 3.4.3. Similarly, the real-time
adjustments qUPik and q
DW
ik are made scenario-dependent (i.e., q
UP
ik → q
UP
ijk and q
DW
ik →
qDWijk ) for obtaining the offer curves in the balancing stage, as seen in Section 3.4.4.
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Finally, we also adapt the operational variables to the stochastic programming setup,
e.g., dk → dijk. The offering strategy in (6.14) is accordingly adapted as follows:
Max
Γcoop
∑
k
ρˆDAk + ρˆ
UP
k + ρˆ
DW
k − cˆk (6.21a)
s.t. qDAik + q
UP
ijk − q
DW
ijk = dijk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.21b)
qDAik , ρˆ
DA
k ∈ Π
DA, ∀i, ∀k, (6.21c)
qUPijk , q
DW
ijk , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k ∈ Π
BA
Act, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.21d)
cˆk = h(dijk) , ∀k, (6.21e)
dijk ∈ Ω, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.21f)
where
Γcoop = {dijk, q
DA
ik , q
UP
ijk , q
DW
ijk , ρˆ
DA
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k , cˆk}. (6.22)
The objective function (6.21a) maximizes the expected producer’s profit, mod-
eling the participation in both the day-ahead and the balancing market. Constraint
(6.21b) imposes the balance between the total energy exchanged with the market, i.e.,
qDAik +q
UP
ijk−q
DW
ijk , and the energy production of the power unit dijk. Constraint (6.21c)
is a set of constraints associated with the day-ahead market offer curves, while con-
straint (6.21d) a set related to the balancing market offer curves. Constraint (6.21e)
yields the expected production cost of the power unit, while constraint (6.21f) forces
the power unit to operate in its feasible region Ω.
Linear Formulation of ΠDA
The set ΠDA is a set of constraints associated with the day-ahead market offer curves,
which is presented in Equations (3.44), i.e.,
ρˆDAk =
∑
i
πDAi λ
DA
ik q
DA
ik , ∀k, (6.23a)
qDAik ≥ q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik ≥ λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (6.23b)
qDAik = q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik = λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (6.23c)
0 ≤ qDAik ≤ D, ∀i, ∀k (6.23d)
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Constraint (6.23a) computes the expectation of the day-ahead market income. Con-
straints (6.23b) and (6.23c) impose the non-decreasing and non-anticipativity con-
ditions of the offer curves, respectively. Finally, constraint (6.23d) bounds the day-
ahead market offer qDAik between 0 and D.
Linear Formulation of ΠBAAct
The set ΠBAAct in (6.21) is a set of constraints associated with the balancing market
offer curves. The formulation for a price-taker and risk-neutral producer submitting
offer curves in a pay-as-bid balancing market via stochastic programming is shown
in Equations (3.93), Section 3.4.6. Adapting it to the present stochastic programming
framework leads to:
ρˆUPk =
∑
ij
πDAi π
BA
ij
∑
j′
MUPijj′ o
UP
ij′k λ
BA
ij′k, ∀k, (6.24a)
ρˆDWk = −
∑
ij
πDAi π
BA
ij
∑
j′
MDWijj′ o
DW
ij′k λ
BA
ij′k, ∀k, (6.24b)
qUPijk =
∑
j′
MUPijj′o
UP
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.24c)
qDWijk =
∑
j′
MDWijj′ o
DW
ij′k , ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.24d)
oUPij′k = 0 if λ
BA
ij′k ≤ λ
DA
ik , ∀i, ∀j
′, ∀k, (6.24e)
oDWij′k = 0 if λ
BA
ij′k ≥ λ
DA
ik , ∀i, ∀j
′, ∀k, (6.24f)
oUPij′k, o
DW
ij′k ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀j
′, ∀k. (6.24g)
where the matrices MUP and MDW are defined as:
MUPijj′ =

1, λBAij ≥ λ
BA
ij′
0, otherwise.
(6.25)
MDWijj′ =

1, λBAij ≤ λ
BA
ij′
0, otherwise.
(6.26)
Constraints (6.24a) and (6.24b) compute the expected market revenues from sub-
mitting up-regulation and down-regulation offer curves in a pay-as-bid balancing
market, respectively. Constraints (6.24c) and (6.24d) yield the total amount of en-
ergy qUPij and q
DW
ij scheduled provided that scenario (ij) realizes at k. Constraint
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(6.24e) restricts the offering of up-regulation energy to the scenarios in which it is
required. Similarly, constraint (6.24f) does for the down-regulation offers. Finally,
constraint (6.24g) forces oUPij′ and o
DW
ij′ to be non-negative.
Linear Formulation of the Cost Function
Constraint (6.21e) is replaced with the formulation provided in Section 6.3.2, i.e.,
cˆk =
∑
ij
πDAi π
BA
ij cijk, ∀k, (6.27a)
cijk = C0uijk +
∑
s
Csxijsk + C
UPyijk + C
DWzijk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.27b)
dijk = Duijk +
∑
s
xijsk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.27c)
0 ≤ xijsk ≤ Xs, ∀i, ∀j, ∀s, ∀k, (6.27d)
uijk − uij(k−1) ≤ yijk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.27e)
uij(k−1) − uijk ≤ zijk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.27f)
yijk, zijk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k. (6.27g)
Constraint (6.27a) yields the expected total cost cˆk per each interval k. Constraint
(6.27b) evaluates the total production cost cijk of the unit when scenario (ij) occurs
at k. Constraints (6.27c) and (6.27d) are auxiliary constraints to the piecewise linear
formulation of the quadratic cost function. Constraints (6.27e) and (6.27f) compute
the start-up (yijk) and shut-down (zijk) status of the unit. Finally, constraint (6.27g)
imposes yijk and zijk to be binary variables.
Linear Formulation of Ω
The set Ω in constraint (6.21f) forces the power unit to operate in its feasible region.
We replace it with the set of constraints (6.6) presented in Section 6.3.1. Its formula-
tion adapted to the actual stochastic programming framework leads to
uijkD ≤ dijk ≤ uijkD, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.28a)
dijk − di(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.28b)
di(k−1) − dijk ≤ R
DW, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (6.28c)
uijk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k. (6.28d)
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Constraint (6.28a) forces dijk to operate between D and D when on-line, and to be
equal to 0 when off-line. Constraints (6.28b) and (6.28c) limits the ramp up and
down of the production unit. Finally, constraint (6.28d) imposes that uijk is a binary
variable.
6.5 Case Study
We test the two offering models (6.16) and (6.21) in a realistic case study. We gen-
erate market price scenarios according to the methodology presented in Chapter 4.
The input parameters of the fundamental market model of Section 4.3 are shown in
Tables 6.1 and 6.2. First, we generate 300 scenarios for λDAik and we select the 20 most
representative ones. Then, for each scenario λDAik , we generate 300 scenarios of λ
BA
ijk
and keep the 20 most representative ones. This procedure results in a scenario tree
with 400 branches.
TABLE 6.1: Parameters of the market price generation model
δ β µγ σ
2
γ λ
0
(e/MWh2) (e/MWh2) (e/MWh3) (e/MWh3) (e/MWh)
-6.67×10−3 1×10−4 2×10−8 3×10−9 -20
TABLE 6.2: Values of parameter αk
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
αk (e/MWh) 322 312 315 317 340 349 353 369
k 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
αk (e/MWh) 394 424 444 445 440 429 437 458
k 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
αk (e/MWh) 446 423 408 383 373 346 331 332
We consider a thermal unit of capacity D = 120 MWh and a minimum produc-
tion level of D = 40 MWh. Ramping limits are 40 MWh for both RUP and RDW. The
quadratic cost function is approximated by a piecewise linear function of four gen-
eration blocks of equal size, i.e. Xs = 20 MWh ∀s. Table 6.3 shows the marginal cost
Cs of each block, the cost C0, the start-up cost CUP and the shut-down cost CDW. The
optimization model is implemented using GUROBI in PYTHON environment.
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TABLE 6.3: Parameters of the cost function
C0 Cs1 Cs2 Cs3 Cs4 C
UP CDW
(e) (e/MWh) (e/MWh) (e/MWh) (e/MWh) (e) (e)
2860 23.5 31.5 45.6 72.3 800 100
We compare the two-stage co-optimization model with a sequential offering ap-
proach. As the sequential offering model only considers the day-ahead market of-
fers, the results of the two models can not be compared. However, we use the co-
optimized model to estimate the future balancing revenues when offering in the
day-ahead with the sequential one. Given the optimal day-ahead offers Q˜DA∗ik ob-
tained with the sequential model (6.16), we solve the co-optimized model (6.21) by
replacing constraint (6.21c) with
ρˆDAk =
∑
i
πDAi λ
DA
ik q
DA
ik , ∀k, (6.29a)
qDAik = Q˜
DA∗
ik , ∀i, ∀k. (6.29b)
This translates in imposing that the day-ahead offer curves are the ones obtained
with the sequential approach. By solving such model, we evaluate the total ex-
pected profit (day-ahead and balancing) when offering in the day-ahead market
with a sequential approach. The remaining of the section is organized as follows.
Sections 6.5.1, 6.5.2, and 6.5.3, analyze the optimal offering strategies (i.e., sequen-
tial and co-optimized) of the conventional power producer in an electricity market
where the installed renewable energy capacity is 10, 20, and 30 GW, respectively. Fi-
nally, Section 6.5.4 compares the producer’s profit based on the sequential and the
co-optimized approach for increasing values of the installed wind capacity in the
electricity market model.
6.5.1 Simulation with 10 GW of installed wind
Figure 6.9 illustrates the 20 selected trajectories λDAik when the installed wind power
W in the market model is 10 GW. Similarly Figure 6.10 does for the 20 scenarios λBAijk,
for a given realization λDAk . These scenarios are used to derive the optimal day-ahead
market offer curves.
As an example, Table 6.4 shows the result of the day-ahead production variables
qDAik for k = 7 obtained with the co-optimized and the sequential approach. Note that
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FIGURE 6.9: Day-ahead market price scenarios for W = 10 GW in the
market model.
4 8 12 16 20 24
k (h)
0
20
40
60
80
100
(e
/M
W
h
)
λ
DA
λ
BA scenarios
FIGURE 6.10: Balancing market price scenarios for W = 10 GW in the
market model, for a given realization of λDA
k
(red).
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{λDAi7 , i ∈ I}, is the set of the day-ahead price scenarios, and each member of this set
is viewed as a potential price offer. The results of Table 6.4 can be summarized, for
TABLE 6.4: Optimal values of qDA
i7 for the sequential and the co-
optimized approach (W = 10 GW).
i
λDAi7 q
DA
i7 i
λDAi7 q
DA
i7
(e/MWh) (MWh) (e/MWh) (MWh)
coop seq coop seq
1 47.6 120 120 11 39.2 40 80
2 35.6 0 40 12 48.0 120 120
3 48.7 120 120 13 48.2 120 120
4 49.2 120 120 14 46.9 120 120
5 42.8 80 120 15 56.8 120 120
6 40.1 40 120 16 48.2 120 120
7 52.1 120 120 17 45.4 120 120
8 48.5 120 120 18 44.4 120 120
9 55.8 1120 120 19 47.9 120 120
10 46.5 120 120 20 50.6 120 120
the sequential approach, as
q
DA,seq
7 =

0, if λDA7 < 35.6,
40, if 35.6 ≤ λDA7 < 39.2,
80, if 39.2 ≤ λDA7 < 40.1,
120, if λDA7 ≥ 40.1,
(6.30)
while for the co-optimized offering strategy as
q
DA,coop
7 =

0, if λDA7 < 39.2,
40, if 39.2 ≤ λDA7 < 42.8,
80, if 42.8 ≤ λDA7 < 44.4,
120, if λDA7 ≥ 44.4.
(6.31)
Notice that qDA7 is expressed in MWh and λ
DA
7 in e/MWh.
Following (6.30), a scenario-independent offer curve, using the sequential ap-
proach, can be built using three price-quantity offer points, i.e., (e35.6/MWh, 40
MWh), (e39.2/MWh, 80 MWh) and (e40.1/MWh, 120 MWh). Similarly, using the
co-optimized approach, the day-ahead offer curve is created using three price-quantity
offer points, i.e., (e39.2/MWh, 40 MWh), (e42.8/MWh, 80 MWh) and (e44.4/MWh,
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120 MWh).
Figure 6.12 illustrates the two offer curves, the co-optimized curve in blue and
the sequential one in red. Note that, based on the sequential approach, the producer
is not willing to produce if λDA7 ≤ 35.6, while it wants to produce at full capacity
if λDA7 ≥ 40.1. Differently, under the co-optimized strategy, the producer desires to
produce 40 MWh if 39.2 ≤ λDA7 < 42.8. For the same price interval, the sequential
approach suggests operating at 80 MWh or even 120 MWh.
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FIGURE 6.11: Illustration of the day-ahead market offer curves ob-
tained with the sequential (red) and the co-optimized (blue) ap-
proach, for the time interval k = 7 (W = 10 GW).
For k = 7, we also compute the balancing market offer curves. When the day-
ahead market price λDA7 realization is e42.1/MWh, the offer curves in the balancing
market under the co-optimized approach are
q
BA,coop
7 =

0, if λBA7 < 48.1
40, if λBA7 ≥ 48.1,
(6.32)
Based on the co-optimized approach, the producer schedules to produce 80 MWh in
the day-ahead market, following Equation (6.31). Then, it offers to increase its pro-
duction of additional 40 MWh, provided that λBA7 ≥ 48.1. Differently, the sequential
approach schedules 120 MWh for the same day-ahead market realization. In this
case, the producer does not offer any regulating energy in the balancing market.
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Figure 6.12 illustrates the offer curves submitted in the balancing market.
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FIGURE 6.12: Illustration of the balancing market offer curves ob-
tained with the sequential (red) and the co-optimized (blue) ap-
proach, for the time interval k = 7 (W = 10 GW).
6.5.2 Simulation with 20 GW of installed wind
Figure 6.13 shows the 20 scenarios of λDAik when W is set to 20 GW. Then, Figure 6.14
shows to 20 scenarios λBAijk, for a given realization λ
DA
k .
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FIGURE 6.13: Day-ahead market price scenarios for W = 20 GW in
the market model.
Table 6.5 reports the optimal value of the day-ahead production variables qDAik at
k = 7 obtained from both the co-optimized and the sequential approach. For the two
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FIGURE 6.14: Balancing market price scenarios for W = 20 GW in the
market model, for a given realization of λDA
k
(red).
TABLE 6.5: Optimal values of qDA
i7 for the sequential and the co-
optimized approach (W = 20 GW).
i
λDAi7 q
DA
i7 i
λDAi7 q
DA
i7
(e/MWh) (MWh) (e/MWh) (MWh)
coop seq coop seq
1 44.1 80 40 11 36.3 0 0
2 33.0 0 0 12 44.4 80 40
3 45.1 80 40 13 44.6 80 40
4 45.6 80 40 14 43.4 80 40
5 39.7 40 40 15 52.7 120 120
6 37.1 0 0 16 44.7 80 40
7 48.2 80 80 17 42.0 80 40
8 44.9 80 40 18 41.1 40 40
9 51.7 120 120 19 44.3 80 40
10 43.0 80 40 20 46.9 80 40
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approaches, the results of Table 6.5 are summarized in Equations (6.33) (sequential)
and (6.34) (co-optimized) below:
q
DA,seq
7 =

0, if λDA7 < 39.7
40, if 39.7 ≤ λDA7 < 48.2
80, if 48.2 ≤ λDA7 < 51.7
120, if λDA7 ≥ 51.7,
(6.33)
q
DA,coop
7 =

0, if λDA7 < 39.7
40, if 39.7 ≤ λDA7 < 42.0
80, if 42.0 ≤ λDA7 < 51.7
120, if λDA7 ≥ 51.7,
(6.34)
where qDA7 is expressed in MWh and λ
DA
7 in e/MWh. Following Equation (6.33),
the day-ahead offer curve, using the sequential approach, is built with three price-
quantity offer points, i.e., (e39.7/MWh, 40 MWh), (e48.2/MWh, 80 MWh) and
(e51.7/MWh, 120 MWh). Similarly, using the co-optimized approach, the day-
ahead offer curve is identified by three price-quantity offer points, i.e., (e39.7/MWh,
40 MWh), (e42.0/MWh, 80 MWh) and (e51.7/MWh, 120 MWh). A graphic repre-
sentation of the offer curves is given in Figure 6.15, where the co-optimized approach
is shown in blue and the sequential one in red. Note that, in both cases, the producer
is not willing to produce if λDA7 ≤ 39.7 while desires to operate at its full capacity if
λDA7 ≥ 51.7. However, when 42.0 ≤ λ
DA
7 ≤ 48.2, the co-optimized approach suggests
to produce 80 MWh, while the sequential approach does 40 MWh only.
For the same time interval, i.e., k = 7, we also derive the possible offer curves
in the balancing market, for a given day-ahead market realization. E.g., provided
that the realized day-ahead market price λDA7 is e44.1/MWh, the offer curve in the
balancing market under the sequential approach is
q
BA,seq
7 =

0, if λBA7 < 56.0
40, if 56.0 ≤ λBA7 < 58.7
120, if λBA7 ≥ 58.7,
(6.35)
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FIGURE 6.15: Illustration of the day-ahead market offer curves ob-
tained with the sequential (red) and the co-optimized (blue) ap-
proach, for the time interval k = 7 (W = 20 GW).
while based on the co-optimized one is
q
BA,coop
7 =

−40, if λBA7 ≤ 35.6
0, if 35.6 < λBA7 < 55.7
40, if λBA7 ≥ 55.7,
(6.36)
Figure 6.16 illustrates the offer curves in the balancing market for the sequential
(red) and the co-optimized approach (blue). Based on the co-optimized strategy,
the producer schedules to produce 80 MWh (in the day-ahead market) and then
reduces its production level to 40 MWh if λBA7 ≤ 35.6, or increases it to 120 MWh
in case λBA7 ≥ 55.7, in the balancing market. Unlike the co-optimized approach, the
sequential one schedules 40 MWh in the day-ahead market and then offers for up-
regulation only in the balancing market. For instance, its production increases of 40
MWh if λBA7 ≥ 56.0 while the increase is even more (80 MWh) in case λ
BA
7 ≥ 58.7.
6.5.3 Simulation with 30 GW of installed wind
Figure 6.17 shows the 20 scenarios of λDAik for W of 30 GW. Then, Figure 6.18 shows
to 20 scenarios λBAijk, for a given realization λ
DA
k . Those scenarios are provided as
input to the offering models to derive the optimal day-ahead market offers.
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FIGURE 6.16: Illustration of the balancing market offer curves ob-
tained with the sequential (red) and the co-optimized (blue) ap-
proach, for the time interval k = 7 (W = 20 GW).
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FIGURE 6.17: Day-ahead market price scenarios for W = 30 GW in
the market model.
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FIGURE 6.18: Balancing market price scenarios for W = 30 GW in the
market model, for a given realization of λDA
k
(red).
Table 6.6 reports the optimal value of the day-ahead production variables qDAik for
k = 7 obtained with both the co-optimized and the sequential approach. Based on
TABLE 6.6: Optimal values of qDA
i7 for the sequential and the co-
optimized approach (W = 30 GW).
i
λDAi7 q
DA
i7 i
λDAi7 q
DA
i7
(e/MWh) (MWh) (e/MWh) (MWh)
coop seq coop seq
1 40.6 80 0 11 33.5 0 0
2 30.4 0 0 12 41.0 80 0
3 41.6 80 0 13 41.2 80 0
4 42.0 80 0 14 40.1 80 0
5 36.6 40 0 15 48.6 80 0
6 34.2 0 0 16 41.2 80 0
7 44.5 80 0 17 38.8 40 0
8 41.5 80 0 18 38.0 40 0
9 47.7 80 0 19 40.9 80 0
10 39.7 40 0 20 43.4 80 0
the co-optimized approach, the results of Table 6.6 are summarized as
q
DA,coop
7 =

0, if λDA7 < 36.6
40, if 36.6 ≤ λDA7 < 40.1
80, if λDA7 ≥ 40.1,
(6.37)
where qDA7 is expressed in MWh and λ
DA
7 in e/MWh. Following (6.37), the day-
ahead offer curve is built with two price-quantity offer points, i.e., (e36.6/MWh, 40
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MWh) and (e40.1/MWh, 80 MWh). Differently, using the sequential approach, the
producer does not submit any offer in the day-ahead market. Figure 6.15 shows a
graphic representation of the offer curve of the co-optimized approach (blue). The
producer, based on the co-optimized approach, is not willing to produce if λDA7 ≤
36.6 while desires to operate at 80 MWh if λDA7 ≥ 40.1.
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FIGURE 6.19: Illustration of the day-ahead market offer curves ob-
tained with the sequential (red) and the co-optimized (blue) ap-
proach, for the time interval k = 7 (W = 30 GW).
For the same time interval, i.e., k = 7, we also derive the offer curves in the
balancing market, for a given day-ahead market outcome. When the realized day-
ahead market price λDA7 is e40.7/MWh, the offer curve in the balancing market un-
der the sequential approach is
q
BA,seq
7 =

0, if λBA7 < 62.7
40, if 62.7 ≤ λBA7 < 76.4
80, if λBA7 ≥ 76.4,
(6.38)
6.5. Case Study 139
while under the co-optimized one is
q
BA,coop
7 =

−80, if λBA7 ≤ 28.5
−40, if 28.5 < λBA7 ≤ 32.6
0, if 32.6 < λBA7 < 58.0
40, if λBA7 ≥ 58.0.
(6.39)
Based on the sequential approach, the producer is not scheduled to produce in the
day-ahead market. Then, it is willing to produce 40 MWh if λBA7 ≥ 62.6, and 80
MWh if λBA7 ≥ 76.4. Of course, it cannot offer down-regulation as it is not scheduled
to operate in the day-ahead market. Differently, under the co-optimized approach,
the producer operates at 80 MWh after the day-ahead market clearing. Then, it offers
to adjust its production of additional 40 MWh upward (i.e., to produce 120 MWh)
if λBA7 ≥ 58.0. In this case, the producer can offer down-regulation energy in the
balancing market. Indeed, it decreases its production to 40 MWh if λBA7 ≤ 32.6, and
to 0 MWh if λBA7 ≤ 28.5. Figure 6.20 illustrates the offer curves in the balancing
market for the two approaches.
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FIGURE 6.20: Illustration of the balancing market offer curves ob-
tained with the sequential (red) and the co-optimized (blue) ap-
proach, for the time interval k = 7 (W = 30 GW).
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6.5.4 Comparative Analysis
This section compares the expected profits obtained by the sequential and the co-
optimized offering strategy. The expected producer’s profit gained based on the two
alternative approaches under different conditions is shown in Table 6.7. In the case
with W = 10 GW, the expected profit loss of the sequential approach is around 2%.
The power producer obtains a lower expected profit in the day-ahead market while
earning more in the balancing stage, such that its total expected profit (including
both markets) increases as well. This behavior is more observable in the simulations
with higher values of installed wind capacity. For instance, the loss of profit is 22%
and 91% in cases in which W is equal to 20 and 30 GW, respectively. The last case
(W=30 GW) gives more insight: based on the sequential approach, the producer
does not participate in the day-ahead market and earns a low profit in the balancing
stage only. In contrast, the producer gains a significant profit in the co-optimized
approach, though it loses money in the day-ahead stage. In fact, it takes such a
losing position in the day-ahead market to be able to produce profitable regulation
services at the balancing stage.
TABLE 6.7: Expected profit of the producer
W Approach Profit in DA Profit in BA Total profit
(GW) (103e) (103e) (103e)
10
co-optimized 16.82 3.25 20.09
sequential 18.08 1.59 19.68
20
co-optimized 4.45 8.27 12.27
sequential 7.68 2.27 9.95
30
co-optimized -8.45 18.44 9.99
sequential 0.00 0.87 0.87
Figures 6.21 illustrates the results of Table 6.7, where the sequential approach is
shown in red and the co-optimized one in blue. Note how the difference between the
expected profits grows as the share of renewable energy generation increases. The
figure clarifies the strategy of the co-optimized approach of accepting producing in
the day-ahead market even if the prices are below the marginal cost of the producer.
This leads the producer in a profitable position for offering regulating energy in the
balancing market and compensate the losses in the day-ahead market. Differently,
based on the sequential approach, the producer does not include the future balanc-
ing market revenue in its objective function and accordingly does not schedule the
unit if the day-ahead market prices are lower than its marginal cost.
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FIGURE 6.21: Day-ahead market, balancing market, and total ex-
pected profits of the co-optimized and the sequential approach.
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6.6 Summary
This chapter takes the perspective of a price-taker and risk-neutral conventional
power producer offering in a two-settlement electricity market having the balancing
market settled under a pay-as-bid pricing scheme. First, we present a MILP formu-
lation to approximate the non-convex feasible region and the non-convex cost func-
tion of the production unit. Then, we adapt the general offering strategy proposed
in Section 3.4 to the case of the conventional producer. We develop two alternative
offering strategies. The first is a sequential offering model, where the producer only
looks at the upcoming trading floor when offering in the electricity market, without
considering the following stages. The second co-optimizes the producer’s offers in
the day-ahead and the balancing market, these as recourse decisions as they do not
need to be taken at the day-ahead stage. In this context, it is essential the LP formu-
lation for the trading problem in pay-as-bid electricity market presented in Section
3.4.6. Indeed, this innovative formulation allows building the two-stage stochas-
tic programming problem (co-optimized approach) as a MILP problem, where the
non-linearities (i.e., the binary variables) arise from the operating region of the unit.
Differently, using the NLP models available in the literature would have resulted in
a MINLP problem, which may have high computational cost and, usually, does not
ensure the optimality of the solution obtained.
We test the two offering approaches in a case study, using the electricity mar-
ket model of Section 4.3 to generate the day-ahead and the balancing market price
scenarios. Thanks to the fundamental market model, we simulate the effect of an
increasing penetration of renewable energy generation on the day-ahead and the
balancing market prices. Accordingly, we test the two approaches for 10, 20, and
30 GW of renewable generation capacity installed in the market model, analyzing
both the optimal offer curves and the expected profits obtained with the two offer-
ing strategies. We show that for a low penetration of renewable energy generation,
the difference between the two approaches is minimal. Indeed, the high prices in
the day-ahead market lead the producer’s to schedule most of its capacity in the
day-ahead stage while having few possibilities of offering in the balancing stage.
Differently, in the case with 30 GW of renewable energy generation installed, the
day-ahead market prices are below the marginal cost of the producer which would
not schedule its unit in the day-ahead market based on a sequential offering strategy.
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Subsequently, even if the prices are profitable at the balancing stage (due to potential
significant imbalances in the real-time), the producer is not in the position of offering
regulating energy efficiently. Differently, co-optimizing the offering strategy in the
two market stages, the producer decides to operate in the day-ahead market even if
the prices are below its marginal cost. However, it knows that it will be in a conve-
nient position for the balancing market where the large imbalances of the stochastic
generation may lead to very lucrative prices. Co-optimizing its offering strategy, the
producer can, at least partially, compensate the decrease of profit in the day-ahead
market due to the increasing share of renewable energy generation in the electricity
market.
The proposed test case shows that a co-optimized approach (where our innova-
tive LP trading problem formulation is essential) may be increasingly important as
the penetration of renewable capacity in the electricity market increases. Differently,
the power producer would not schedule its unit in the day-ahead market due to the
low market prices. However, this affects the producer, which incur in lower mar-
ket profits, as well as the System Operator who has less available flexibility in the
balancing stage.
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Trading of Virtual Power Plants
7.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the optimal offering strategy a Virtual Power Plant (VPP). A
VPP is defined as a cluster of combined generating units (either stochastic or control-
lable), storage systems and flexible loads (Morales et al., 2013), which together act as
a single participant in the electricity market. The key idea is to exploit the character-
istics of the different technologies within the cluster and being more competitive in
the electricity market. E.g., the real-time deviations of a stochastic production unit,
such as wind and solar power unit, could be handled internally to a VPP thanks to
the flexibility of other controllable technologies, such as an electric storage system
or a conventional generation unit.
The optimal offering strategy of a renewable energy source has already been
widely studied in the literature. Pinson, Chevallier, and Kariniotakis (2007) derive
the optimal day-ahead market offer that maximizes the expected profit of a price-
taker wind power producer provided with probabilistic forecasts of its future power
production. They show that the optimal day-ahead market offer is a quantile of the
probability distribution of the wind power production of the unit. Then, Morales,
Conejo, and Pérez-Ruiz (2010) attach a similar problem through a stochastic pro-
gramming approach. They consider an electricity market that includes a day-ahead,
an intra-day, and a balancing market. They formulate the optimal offering strategy
as a LP problem, while accurately modeling the future decisions of the producer in
the intra-day and the balancing market within the optimization problem as recourse
decisions. These studies model the stochastic producer as a passive actor in the bal-
ancing market. Indeed, it accesses the balancing stage for compensating its real-time
deviations from the day-ahead contracted schedule. We refer the interested reader
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to Chapter 5 for a more extensive literature review on the topic of optimal trading of
renewable energy generation.
Similarly, several optimal offering strategies for a conventional power genera-
tor are available in the literature. References (Arroyo and Conejo, 2000; Arroyo and
Conejo, 2004; Conejo et al., 2004; Jabr, 2005) show how the feasibility region of a
conventional production unit, e.g., coal- or gas-fired power unit, can be successfully
modeled through a MILP formulation. Then, the trading problem in an electric-
ity market settled under a uniform pricing scheme can be cast as an LP problem
(Conejo, Carrión, and Morales, 2010), under the assumption of a price-taker pro-
ducer. Differently than a stochastic producer, a conventional one is modeled as an
active participant in the balancing market. Indeed, it accesses the balancing stage to
offer its available regulating energy to the System Operator. We refer the interested
reader to Chapter 6 for a broader coverage of this topic.
The optimal market participation of a VPP is less investigated in the literature.
Ruiz, Cobelo, and Oyarzabal (2009) present an optimization algorithm to manage
an aggregate of controllable loads, based on a direct load control. References (Mash-
hour and Moghaddas-Tafreshi, 2011a; Mashhour and Moghaddas-Tafreshi, 2011b)
consider the bidding problem of a VPP in a joint electricity market for energy and
reserve. In a deterministic environment, the authors provide a MINLP problem,
solved by a genetic algorithm. Morales et al. (2013) analyze different combinations
of generating units, flexible loads and storage systems while showing a general mod-
eling approach of VPPs. Peik-Herfeh, Seifi, and Sheikh-El-Eslami (2013) formulate
a price-based unit commitment aimed at obtaining the optimal day-ahead market
offering of a VPP. They use a point estimate method to represent the uncertainty
in the market prices and the generation sources. Differently, Pandžic´, Kuzle, and
Capuder (2013) analyze the optimal self-scheduling of a VPP, considering a weekly
time horizon. They include long-term bilateral contracts and technical constraints
of the units while deriving the optimal dispatch as a MILP stochastic optimization
problem. Reference (Pandžic´ et al., 2013) proposes a decision-making tool for the
optimal offering of a VPP under price and production uncertainty. The authors de-
velop a two-stage stochastic offering model that aims at maximizing the expectation
of the profit using a MILP approach. Other works, e.g., (Kardakos, Simoglou, and
Bakirtzis, 2016), include the electricity market clearing process within the offering
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model, resulting in a bi-level stochastic optimization model. By doing that, the au-
thors can endogenously model the effect of the VPP decisions on the market price
formation.
The offering models for a VPP participating in an electricity market mentioned
above, consider the VPP as a passive actor in the balancing market. They assume that
the VPP uses the balancing stage to compensate the deviations from the day-ahead
schedule that it can not handle within the cluster. However, the VPP, being a mix
of stochastic and controllable technologies, may have some flexibility to offer in the
balancing market in some trading intervals while needing to deviate from its sched-
ule in other intervals. State-of-art electricity markets, usually, allow the offering of
regulating energy in the balancing market only to production units that can always
(except for unpredictable unit’s failure) guarantee to respect their day-ahead sched-
ule and being able to offer additional regulating energy to the System Operator. In
this context, a VPP that includes stochastic generation units can hardly fulfill such
requirements. This chapter introduces an innovative balancing market regulation
that allows a more flexible participation of the VPP, denoted as Active/Passive partic-
ipation. Indeed, the VPP can actively offer its flexibility in some trading intervals,
while passively deviate in the remaining ones. However, in the trading intervals in
which the VPP is an active participant, it cannot create uncontracted imbalances.
We consider two VPPs, composed of a stochastic generation unit, a conventional
production unit, and an electric energy storage system. The first includes a wind
farm and the second a PV solar unit. We formulate the optimal offering model of
a VPP participating in an electricity market where the balancing stage allows an
Active/Passive participation. A multi-stage stochastic optimization problem with re-
course is formulated as a MILP problem. We analyze when the VPP may prefer to
be an active participant and when a passive one. Active participation means more
convenient prices in the balancing market, as well as a more constrained operation
of the units. Indeed, the VPP needs to handle the wind (or solar) power fluctuations
internally and cannot settle them in the balancing market. Differently, a passive par-
ticipation translates into penalized balancing market prices but more flexibility of
operation, as the VPP can deviate from its day-ahead production schedule. We com-
pare the proposed Passive/Active participation strategy against a passive-only (i.e.,
Passive) and an active-only (i.e., Active) strategy. We investigate the increment in the
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expected VPP profit adopting the Passive/Active, with respect to the Active and Pas-
sive ones, for increasing values of the stochastic generation unit (either wind or PV
solar) capacity.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the
electricity market framework and the assumptions needed to formulate the offer-
ing model. Section 7.3 presents the structure of the VPP and formulates the feasible
operating region of the different units in the cluster. Then, Section 7.4 derives the
offering models that the VPP can decide to use while trading in the day-ahead mar-
ket. Section 7.5 presents a case study, while Section 7.6 concludes the chapter with a
summary.
7.2 Electricity Market Framework and Assumptions
We take the perspective a VPP offering in a two-settlement electricity market, similar
to the one presented in Section 2.3. The day-ahead market is cleared once a day, at
noon, simultaneously for the whole 24 hourly trading periods of the following day.
The day-ahead market is settled under a uniform pricing scheme. Then, a balancing
market is cleared separately per each hourly interval, one hour before the real-time
operation. The provision of balancing energy is remunerated under a uniform pric-
ing scheme. Both the day-ahead and balancing market give the possibility to submit
non-decreasing offer curves. Then, deviations from the day-ahead schedule are set-
tled in the balancing market under a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme. The
VPP can offer its regulating energy as an active actor in the balancing market for
some trading intervals, while "passively" deviating in remaining ones. However, in
the intervals in which it decides to operate "actively," it cannot deviate from its pro-
duction schedule. The intra-day trading floor is neglected for the sake of simplicity.
Figure 7.1 shows a schematic representation of the electricity market submission
process.
The power producer is assumed to be price-taker in both day-ahead and the
balancing market. Hence, the market prices within the offering strategy of that pro-
ducer are exogenous and uncertain. A set of scenarios models those uncertainties.
The fundamental market model presented in Section 4.3 generates the market price
scenarios, instead of using real market data.
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FIGURE 7.1: Schematic representation of the electricity market frame-
work. The VPP submits the quantity offer qDA in the day-ahead (DA)
market, while actively submitting regulation offers (qUP, qDW) or pas-
sively deviating from its day-ahead schedule (q(+), q(−)) in the bal-
ancing (BA) market.
The scenario generation and reduction algorithm of Chapter 4 gives a a set of
day-ahead market price trajectories {λDAik : ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K}, where i is the index
of the day-ahead market price scenarios and k the index of the time intervals. Each
scenario i is associated with a probability πDAi of occurrence. Then, for each possi-
ble day-ahead realization i, it generates a set of balancing market price trajectories
{λBAijk : ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, ∀k ∈ K}, where j is the index of the balancing market price
scenarios. The scenario (ij) occurs with a probability πDAi π
BA
ij . Finally, the VPP has
a set W of forecasts of the power production of the stochastic source (either solar or
wind) {Eωk : ∀ω ∈W, ∀k ∈ K}. Each scenario ω realizes with a probability πEω .
7.3 Virtual Power Plant model
This section presents the approach for modeling the feasible operating region and
the production cost function of the VPP. Section 7.3.1 presents the structure of the
VPP. Section 7.3.2 models the feasible operating region of the VPP. It replaces con-
straint (3.18e) (i.e., the set Ω) in the general offering strategy formulation (3.18) in
Section 3.4. Finally, Section 7.3.3 provides a mathematical formulation of the cost
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function of the VPP. Such formulation substitutes constraint (3.18f) (i.e., the function
h(·)) in the general offering strategy (3.18).
7.3.1 Virtual Power Plant description
The VPP is composed of a conventional production unit, a stochastic power unit,
and an electric energy storage. Let dk (MWh) be the power production of the con-
ventional unit, while Ek (MWh) is the power output of the stochastic energy source
at k. Then, we denote with p(↑)k (MWh) and p
(↓)
k (MWh) the charging and discharging
power of the electric energy storage. Accordingly, the total power production qAk of
the VPP is given by
qAk = dk + p
(↓)
k − p
(↑)
k + Ek, ∀k. (7.1)
Notice that the term p(↑)k in Equation (7.1) is negative, since when the electric storage
is charging it consumes electricity. We consider two alternative VPP structures. The
first includes a wind turbine as the stochastic energy source. Figure 7.2 shows a
schematic representation of the VPP. In the second the wind turbine is replaced by
a PV solar unit. Figure 7.3 gives a representation of the composition of the second
structure of the VPP.
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FIGURE 7.2: Schematic representation of the VPP1. It includes a wind
farm, a conventional unit, and an electric storage.
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FIGURE 7.3: Schematic representation of the VPP2. It includes a PV
solar unit, a conventional unit, and an electric storage.
7.3.2 Feasible Operating Region
The aim of this section is to obtain a set of constraints to replace constraint (3.18e) in
the general offering strategy formulation (3.18), i.e.,
qAk ∈ Ω, ∀k, (7.2)
The VPP is composed of three production units, i.e., a conventional unit, a stochas-
tic energy source, and an electric storage. The uncertain power production Ek of the
stochastic energy source is represented using a set W of scenarios. Consequently,
it is seen as an input parameter and not as a variable. Differently, the conventional
and storage units (dispatchable units) have a feasible region associated with their
operational variables dk, p
(↑)
k and p
(↓)
k .
Storage Unit
Let denote with lk the level of the energy stored in the battery at k. The energy
balance within the storage is imposed as
lk = l(k−1) + ηp
(↑)
k −
1
η
p
(↓)
k , ∀k, (7.3)
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where η ∈ [0, 1] is the charging/discharging efficiency of the storage unit. Note that
Equation (7.3) needs the initial level L0 of the storage to be implemented. Then,
additional constraints model the feasible operation of the battery. Indeed, the level
lk of the storage has to lie between its minimum L (MWh) and maximum L (MWh)
level. This leads to
L ≤ lk ≤ L, ∀k, (7.4)
Also the charging/discharging powers are limited by their maximum capacity, de-
noted as P (↑) (MWh) and P (↓) (MWh), respectively. This writes
0 ≤ p
(↑)
k ≤ P
(↑)
, ∀k, (7.5)
0 ≤ p
(↑)
k ≤ P
(↓)
, ∀k, (7.6)
Note that P (↑) and P (↓) are expressed in MWh as we consider hourly intervals.
Lastly, we impose the level of the storage in the last interval of the time horizon
considered, i.e.,
lK = Lk, (7.7)
where Lk is expressed in MWh.
Conventional Unit
The feasible operating region of the conventional unit can be modeled using the
following set of constraints:
ukD ≤ dk ≤ ukD, ∀k, (7.8a)
dk − d(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀k, (7.8b)
d(k−1) − dk ≤ R
DW, ∀k, (7.8c)
uk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k, (7.8d)
where D (MWh) and D (MWh) are the minimum and the maximum power output
of the unit, respectively. RUP (MWh) and RDW (MWh) are the upward and down-
ward ramping limits of the unit, while uk is the commitment (binary) status of the
unit. Note that D, D, RUP, and RDW are all expressed in MWh as we consider hourly
intervals. Constraint (7.8a) forces dk to lie between D and D when the unit is on-line,
i.e., when uk = 1. Constraints (7.8b) and (7.8c) impose the ramping limitations, in
upward and downward direction, respectively. Finally, constraint (7.8d) imposes
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that uk is a binary variable.
Formulation of Ω
The set Ω representing the feasible region of the VPP can be replaced by
qAk = dk + p
(↓)
k − p
(↑)
k + Ek, ∀k, (7.9a)
lk = l(k−1) + ηp
(↑)
k −
1
η
p
(↓)
k , ∀k, (7.9b)
L ≤ lk ≤ L, ∀k, (7.9c)
0 ≤ p
(↑)
k ≤ P
(↑)
, ∀k, (7.9d)
0 ≤ p
(↓)
k ≤ P
(↓)
, ∀k, (7.9e)
ukD ≤ dk ≤ ukD, ∀k, (7.9f)
dk − d(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀k, (7.9g)
d(k−1) − dk ≤ R
DW, ∀k, (7.9h)
uk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k, (7.9i)
Constraint (7.9a) imposes the energy balance between the total energy produced
by the VPP, i.e., qAk , and the sum of the power injection of each component of the
cluster. Constraints from (7.9b) to (7.9e) are associated with the storage unit, while
constraints from (7.9f) to (7.9i) with the conventional production unit.
7.3.3 Production Cost Function
This section gives a formulation to compute the production cost function of the VPP.
We derive a formulation aimed at replacing constrain (3.18f) in the general offering
strategy formulation (3.18), i.e.,
cˆk = h
(
qAk
)
, ∀k (7.10)
The stochastic energy source, i.e., wind or solar power, is assumed to produce en-
ergy at zero marginal cost. Similarly, the battery does not have a production cost
associated with its charging and discharging power. Therefore, the production cost
of the VPP is solely linked to the conventional unit power production dk. In this case,
we consider a linear cost function, neglecting non-convex costs such as start-up and
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shut-down costs. Accordingly, the cost ck for producing the energy dk at interval k
can be evaluated as
ck = C0uk + Cdk, ∀k, (7.11)
where C0 (e) and C (e/MWh) control the cost function. Finally, Equation (7.10) can
be reformulated as
cˆk = E[ck] ∀k, (7.12a)
ck = C0uk + Cdk, ∀k, (7.12b)
7.4 Optimal Offering Strategy
This section derives different offering strategies that the VPP may use to obtain its
best day-ahead market offers. We start from the generic formulation for the price-
taker and risk-neutral producer in Equations (3.18), extended to the 24 trading inter-
vals. We replace qAk with its formulation in Equation (7.1), thus leading to
Max
Γ
∑
k
ρˆDAk + ρˆ
UP
k + ρˆ
DW
k + ρˆ
BA
k − cˆk (7.13a)
s.t. qDAk + q
UP
k − q
DW
k + q
(+)
k − q
(−)
k = dk + p
(↓)
k − p
(↑)
k + Ek, ∀k, (7.13b)
qDAk , ρˆ
DA
k ∈ Π
DA, ∀k, (7.13c)
qUPk , q
DW
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k ∈ Π
BA
Act, ∀k, (7.13d)
q
(+)
k , q
(−)
k , ρˆ
BA
k ∈ Π
BA
Pas, ∀k, (7.13e)
cˆ = h(dk) , ∀k, (7.13f)
dk, p
(↓)
k , p
(↑)
k ∈ Ω, ∀k, (7.13g)
where
Γ = {dk, p
(↓)
k , p
(↑)
k , q
DA
k , q
UP
k , q
DW
k , q
(+)
k , q
(−)
k , ρˆ
DA
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k , ρˆ
BA
k , cˆk}. (7.14)
Section 7.4.1 presents a Passive offering strategy, i.e., when the VPP passively de-
viates from its schedule in the balancing market. Then, Section 7.4.2 formulates an
Active offering strategy, i.e., when the producer actively offers the available regulat-
ing energy in the balancing market. Finally, Section 7.4.3 presents a Active/Passive
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strategy, where the VPP is allowed to actively offer regulating energy in some trad-
ing intervals and passively deviate from its schedule in the remaining ones.
7.4.1 Passive-only Offering Strategy
This section considers the VPP as a passive actor in the balancing market. Accord-
ingly, we remove from model (7.13) the variables and constraints associated with an
active participation. We eliminate constraint (7.13d), we remove the variables qUPk
and qDWk from constraint (7.13b), and we remove ρˆ
UP
k and ρˆ
DW
k from the objective
function (7.13a). The day-ahead market offers qDAk are modeled as first stage deci-
sions, while the real time deviations q(+)k and q
(−)
k as recourse decisions. Accordingly,
we make them scenario-dependent, i.e., q(+)k → q
(+)
iωk and q
(−)
k → q
(−)
iωk . Note that they
are independent from the scenario j, as their value is fixed before that the balanc-
ing market prices are revealed. Figure 6.7 illustrates the stochastic programming
framework of the Passive offering strategy. Besides, we render scenario-dependent
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FIGURE 7.4: Schematic illustration of the stochastic programming
framework of the Passive offering strategy.
the operational variables of the VPP, e.g., dk → diωk. Finally, we make the day-ahead
market offer scenario-dependent to derive the offer curves, i.e., qDAk → q
DA
ik . This
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leads to the following formulation:
Max
ΓPas
∑
k
ρˆDAk + ρˆ
BA
k − cˆk (7.15a)
s.t. qDAik + q
(+)
iωk − q
(−)
iωk = diωk + p
(↓)
iωk − p
(↑)
iωk + Eωk, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k (7.15b)
qDAik , ρˆ
DA
k ∈ Π
DA, ∀i, ∀k (7.15c)
q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk , ρˆ
BA
k ∈ Π
BA
Pas, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k (7.15d)
cˆ = h(diωk) , ∀k (7.15e)
diωk, p
(↓)
iωk, p
(↑)
iωk ∈ Ω. ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k (7.15f)
where
ΓPas = {diωk, p
(↓)
iωk, p
(↑)
iωk, q
DA
ik , q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk , ρˆ
DA
k , ρˆ
BA
k , cˆk}. (7.16)
The objective function (7.15a) maximizes the producer’s expected profit, including
both the day-ahead market revenue and the one linked to a passive balancing mar-
ket participation. Constraint (7.15b) imposes the energy balance between the en-
ergy produced by the VPP and the energy exchanged with the electricity market.
Constraint (7.15c) is a set of constraints associated with the day-ahead market offer
curves. Similarly, constraint (7.32e) is a set of constraints related to the passive par-
ticipation in the balancing market. Constraint (7.15e) yields the expected production
cost of the VPP, while constraint (7.15f) imposes the feasible operating region of the
VPP.
Linear Formulation of ΠDA
The set ΠDA in Equation (7.15c) is a set of constraints associated with the day-ahead
market offer curves. The formulation of the set ΠDA is presented in Equations (3.44)
in Section 3.4.3. Its formulation is adapted to the VPP, i.e.,
Q = −P
(↑)
, (7.17)
Q = D + E + P
(↓)
, (7.18)
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where E (MW) is the capacity of the stochastic energy source. This leads to
ρˆDAk =
∑
i
πDAi λ
DA
ik q
DA
ik , ∀k, (7.19a)
qDAik ≥ q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik ≥ λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (7.19b)
qDAik = q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik = λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (7.19c)
− P
(↑)
≤ qDAik ≤ D + E + P
(↓)
, ∀i, ∀k (7.19d)
Constraint (7.25a) yields the expected day-ahead market income of the power pro-
ducer. Constraints (7.25b) and (7.25c) impose the non-decreasing and non-anticipativity
conditions of the offer curves, respectively. Finally, constraint (7.25d) limits the day-
ahead market offers qDAik .
Linear Formulation of ΠBAPas
The set ΠBAPas in Equation (7.32e) is a set of constraint associated with the passive par-
ticipation in the balancing market. Section 3.4.8 provides a formulation of ΠBAPas for
a price-taker and risk-neutral producer participating in a balancing market settled
under a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme, i.e., Equations (3.106). Adapting it
the VPP leads to
ρˆBAk =
∑
ijω
πDAi π
BA
ij π
E
ω
(
λ
(+)
ij q
(+)
ijω − λ
(−)
ij q
(−)
ijω
)
, ∀k (7.20a)
q
(+)
ijω , q
(−)
ijω ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω. (7.20b)
where λ(+)ij = min
(
λDAi , λ
BA
ij
)
and λ(−)ij = max
(
λDAi , λ
BA
ij
)
. Constraint (7.20a) yields
the expected balancing market income ρˆBAk , while constraint (7.20b) forces q
(+)
ijω and
q
(−)
ijω to be non negative.
Linear Formulation of the Cost Function
The formulation of the cost function presented in Section 7.3.3 is used to replace
constraint (7.15e), i.e.,
cˆk =
∑
iω
πDAi π
E
ωciωk, ∀k, (7.21a)
ciωk = C0uiωk + Cdiωk, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.21b)
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Linear Formulation of Ω
The formulation of the Ω shown in Section 7.3.2. Readjusting it according to the
stochastic programming framework, constraint (7.15f) ca be replaced by
liωk = liω(k−1) + ηp
(↑)
iωk −
1
η
p
(↓)
iωk, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.22a)
L ≤ liωk ≤ L, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.22b)
0 ≤ p
(↑)
iωk ≤ P
(↑)
, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.22c)
0 ≤ p
(↓)
iωk ≤ P
(↓)
, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.22d)
uiωkD ≤ diωk ≤ uiωkD, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.22e)
diωk − diω(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.22f)
diω(k−1) − diωk ≤ R
DW, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.22g)
uiωk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k. (7.22h)
7.4.2 Active-only Offering Strategy
This section considers the VPP as an active participant in the balancing market. Con-
sequently, we remove from model (7.13) the variables and constraints associated
with a passive behavior. Indeed, we eliminate constraint (7.13e), we remove the vari-
ables q(+)k and q
(−)
k from the energy balance in constraint (7.13b), and we remove ρˆ
BA
k
from the objective function (7.13a). The day-ahead market offers qDAk are modeled as
first stage decisions, while the upward and downward regulation adjustments qUPk
and qDWk as recourse decisions. Accordingly, they are made dependent to the day-
ahead market realization, i.e., qUPk → q
UP
ik and q
DW
k → q
DW
ik . Figure 6.7 illustrates the
stochastic programming framework of the Active offering strategy. Then, we make
the day-ahead market offers scenario-dependent in order to obtain non-decreasing
offering curves, i.e., qDAk → q
DA
ik . We do the same for the balancing market offers,
i.e., qUPik → q
UP
ijk and q
DW
ik → q
DW
ijk . Additionally, we render scenario-dependent the
operational variables of the VPP, e.g., dk → dijωk. This leads to the following offering
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FIGURE 7.5: Schematic illustration of the stochastic programming
framework of the Active offering strategy.
strategy:
Max
ΓAct
∑
k
ρˆDAk + ρˆ
UP
k + ρˆ
DW
k − cˆk (7.23a)
s.t. qDAik + q
UP
ijk − q
DW
ijk = dijωk + p
(↓)
ijωk − p
(↑)
ijωk + Eωk, ∀k, (7.23b)
qDAik , ρˆ
DA
k ∈ Π
DA, ∀k, (7.23c)
qUPijk , q
DW
ijk , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k ∈ Π
BA
Act, ∀k, (7.23d)
cˆ = h(dijωk) , ∀k, (7.23e)
dijωk, p
(↓)
ijωk, p
(↑)
ijωk ∈ Ω, ∀k, (7.23f)
where
ΓAct = {dijωk, p
(↓)
ijωk, p
(↑)
ijωk, q
DA
ik , q
UP
ijk , q
DW
ijk , ρˆ
DA
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k , cˆk}. (7.24)
The objective function maximizes the expected producer’s profit, including the rev-
enues from both the day-ahead and the balancing market. Constraint (7.23b) im-
poses the energy balance between the energy production of the VPP and the amount
of energy exchanged with the electricity market platform. Constraints (7.23c) and
(7.23d) are two set of constraints associated with the day-ahead and balancing mar-
ket offer curves, respectively. Finally, constraint (7.23e) yields the expected produc-
tion cost of the VPP, while constraint (7.23f) imposes the feasible operating region of
the units composing the VPP. Notice that the Active offering strategy may be infea-
sible. It occurs when the VPP cannot compensate the imbalances of the stochastic
energy source with the dispatchable units.
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Linear Formulation of ΠDA
The set ΠDA in Equation (7.15c) is the same one seen in Section 7.4.1, i.e.,
ρˆDAk =
∑
i
πDAi λ
DA
ik q
DA
ik , ∀k, (7.25a)
qDAik ≥ q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik ≥ λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (7.25b)
qDAik = q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik = λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (7.25c)
− P
(↑)
≤ qDAik ≤ D + E + P
(↓)
, ∀i, ∀k (7.25d)
Linear Formulation of ΠBAAct
The set ΠBAAct imposing a set of constraints associated with the balancing market of-
fer curves is presented in Section 3.4.6. As the balancing market is settled under a
uniform pricing scheme, we use the formulation in Equations (3.81). Adapting it the
stochastic framework leads to:
ρˆUPk =
∑
ij
πDAi π
BA
ji λ
BA
ijk q
UP
ijk , ∀k, (7.26a)
ρˆDWk = −
∑
ij
πDAi π
BA
ij λ
BA
ijk q
DW
ijk , ∀k, (7.26b)
qUPijk ≥ q
UP
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk ≥ λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀j
′, ∀k (7.26c)
qUPijk = q
UP
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk = λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀j
′, ∀k (7.26d)
qDWijk ≤ q
DW
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk ≥ λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀j
′, ∀k (7.26e)
qDWijk = q
DW
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk = λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀j
′, ∀k (7.26f)
qUPijk = 0 if λ
BA
ijk ≤ λ
DA
ik , ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (7.26g)
qDWijk = 0 if λ
BA
ijk ≥ λ
DA
ik , ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (7.26h)
qUPijk , q
DW
ijk ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k. (7.26i)
Constraints (7.26a) and (7.26b) yield the expected revenue from submitting offer
curves in the balancing market for up- and down-regulation, respectively. Con-
straints (7.26c) and (7.26e) impose the non-decreasing and non-increasing require-
ments of the up- and down-regulation offer curves, respectively. Constraints (7.26d)
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and (7.26f) enforce the non-anticipativity condition of the offer curves, while con-
straints (7.26g) and (7.26h) prevent from offering of up- and down-regulation energy
when not required by the system. Finally, constraint (7.26i) sets qUPijk and q
DW
ijk as non-
negative variables.
Linear Formulation of the Cost Function
The formulation of the cost function presented in Section 7.3.3 replaces constraint
(7.15e), i.e.,
cˆk =
∑
ijω
πDAi π
BA
ij π
E
ωcijωk, ∀k, (7.27a)
cijωk = C0uijωk + Cdijωk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.27b)
Linear Formulation of Ω
The formulation of Ω given in Section 7.3.2 substitutes constraint (7.15f) as
lijωk = lijω(k−1) + ηp
(↑)
ijωk −
1
η
p
(↓)
ijωk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.28a)
L ≤ lijωk ≤ L, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.28b)
0 ≤ p
(↑)
ijωk ≤ P
(↑)
, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.28c)
0 ≤ p
(↓)
ijωk ≤ P
(↓)
, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.28d)
uijωkD ≤ dijωk ≤ uijωkD, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.28e)
dijωk − dijω(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.28f)
dijω(k−1) − dijωk ≤ R
DW, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.28g)
uijωk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k. (7.28h)
7.4.3 Active-Passive Offering Strategy
This section considers the novel Active/Passive participation in the balancing market.
This offering strategy is a trade-off between the Passive strategy shown in Section
7.4.1 and the Active one of Section 7.4.2. The day-ahead market offers qDAk are mod-
eled as first stage decisions, while the upward and downward regulation adjust-
ments qUPk and q
DW
k and the real-time deviations q
(+)
k and q
(−)
k as recourse decisions.
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Accordingly, the regulation adjustments are made dependent on the day-ahead sce-
narios, i.e., qUPk → q
UP
ik and q
DW
k → q
DW
ik , while the real time deviations dependent
on the scenario (iω), as their value is conditional to the realization of the stochastic
energy source production, i.e., q(+)k → q
(+)
iωk and q
(−)
k → q
(−)
iωk . Figure 6.7 illustrates
the stochastic programming framework of the Active/Passive offering strategy. Then,
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FIGURE 7.6: Schematic illustration of the stochastic programming
framework of the Active/Passive offering strategy.
we make the day-ahead market offers scenario-dependent to obtain offer curves,
i.e., qDAk → q
DA
ik . We do the same for the balancing market regulation offers, i.e.,
qUPik → q
UP
ijk and q
DW
ik → q
DW
ijk . Additionally, we prevent the VPP from operating ac-
tively and passively simultaneously in the same trading interval k. Accordingly, for
each k, we impose
(
qUPijk + q
DW
ijk
)
⊥
(
q
(+)
iωk + q
(−)
iωk
)
, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω. (7.29)
Equation (7.29) imposes that, at k, if qUPijk and q
DW
ijk are greater than 0, then q
(+)
iωk and
q
(−)
iωk are forced to be null. This translates in being active at k. Conversely, if q
(+)
iωk
and q(−)iωk are greater than 0, then q
UP
ijk and q
DW
ijk are constrained to be null. Indeed,
the VPP is a passive participant for that interval. However, the formulation (7.29)
is not suitable to be implemented in conventional optimization solver as GAMS or
GUROBI. To reformulate it, we use the so-called big-M approach, generally used for
complementarity constraints as Equation (7.29). To do so, we introduce the binary
variable ǫik ∈ {0, 1}, and the parameter M . Then, the complementarity between the
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active and the passive participation is imposed by
qUPijk + q
DW
ijk ≤ ǫikM, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k,
q
(+)
iωk + q
(−)
iωk ≤ (1− ǫik)M, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k,
ǫik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀k.
Note that if ǫik = 1, then qUPijk + q
DW
ijk ≤ M and q
(+)
iωk + q
(−)
iωk ≤ 0, i.e., the VPP is active
at k, provided that scenario i realizes. Conversely, if ǫik = 0, then qUPijk +q
DW
ijk ≤ 0 and
q
(+)
iωk+q
(−)
iωk ≤M , i.e., the VPP is passive at k. An appropriate choice ofM is important
as a small value of M may impose an undesired bound to the balancing market
decisions. Differently, a too high value of M may lead to approximation errors in
the optimization solver. In this case, qUPijk , q
DW
ijk , q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk are naturally bounded by
the VPP capacity. Indeed, we set
M = E +D + P
(↑)
+ P
(↓) (7.31)
The Active/Passive offering strategy is formulated as
Max
ΓActPas
∑
k
ρˆDAk + ρˆ
UP
k + ρˆ
DW
k + ρˆ
BA
k − cˆk (7.32a)
s.t. qDAik + q
UP
ijk − q
DW
ijk + q
(+)
iωk − q
(−)
iωk = dijωk + p
(↓)
ijωk − p
(↑)
ijωk + Eωk, ∀k,
(7.32b)
qDAik , ρˆ
DA
k ∈ Π
DA, ∀k, (7.32c)
qUPijk , q
DW
ijk , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k ∈ Π
BA
ActPass, ∀k, (7.32d)
q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk , ρˆ
BA
k ∈ Π
BA
Pas, ∀i, ∀ω, ∀k (7.32e)
cˆ = h(dijωk) , ∀k, (7.32f)
dijωk, p
(↓)
ijωk, p
(↑)
ijωk ∈ Ω, ∀k, (7.32g)
qUPijk + q
DW
ijk ≤ ǫikM, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.32h)
q
(+)
iωk + q
(−)
iωk ≤ (1− ǫik)M, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.32i)
ǫik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀k. (7.32j)
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where
ΓActPas = {dijωk, p
(↓)
ijωk, p
(↑)
ijωk, q
DA
ik , q
UP
ijk , q
DW
ijk , q
(+)
iωk , q
(−)
iωk , ǫik, ρˆ
DA
k , ρˆ
UP
k , ρˆ
DW
k , ρˆ
BA
k , cˆk}.
(7.33)
The objective function (7.32a) maximizes the producer’s expected profit, including
both an active and a passive balancing market participation. The energy balance
between the VPP power production and the amount of energy exchanged with the
market is enforced by constraint (7.32b). Constraints (7.23c) and (7.23d) are two set
of constraints associated with the day-ahead and balancing market offer curves, re-
spectively. Similarly, constraint (7.32e) is a set of constraints related to the passive
participation in the balancing market. Constraint (7.32f) yields the expected produc-
tion cost of the VPP, while constraint (7.32g) imposes the feasible operating region of
the VPP. Finally, constraints (7.32h), (7.32i) and (7.32j) impose the complementarity
between the active and passive participation in the balancing market.
Linear Formulation of ΠDA
The set ΠDA in Equation (7.15c) is the same of Section 7.4.1, i.e.,
ρˆDAk =
∑
i
πDAi λ
DA
ik q
DA
ik , ∀k, (7.34a)
qDAik ≥ q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik ≥ λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (7.34b)
qDAik = q
DA
i′k if λ
DA
ik = λ
DA
i′k , ∀i, i
′, ∀k (7.34c)
− P
(↑)
≤ qDAik ≤ D + E + P
(↓)
, ∀i, ∀k (7.34d)
Linear Formulation of ΠBAAct
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The set ΠBAAct is the same of the Active offering strategy in Section 7.4.2, i.e.,
ρˆUPk =
∑
ij
πDAi π
BA
ji λ
BA
ijk q
UP
ijk , ∀k, (7.35a)
ρˆDWk = −
∑
ij
πDAi π
BA
ij λ
BA
ijk q
DW
ijk , ∀k, (7.35b)
qUPijk ≥ q
UP
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk ≥ λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀j
′, ∀k (7.35c)
qUPijk = q
UP
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk = λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀j
′, ∀k (7.35d)
qDWijk ≤ q
DW
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk ≥ λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀j
′, ∀k (7.35e)
qDWijk = q
DW
ij′k if λ
BA
ijk = λ
BA
ij′k, ∀i, ∀j, ∀j
′, ∀k (7.35f)
qUPijk = 0 if λ
BA
ijk ≤ λ
DA
ik , ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (7.35g)
qDWijk = 0 if λ
BA
ijk ≥ λ
DA
ik , ∀i, ∀j, ∀k, (7.35h)
qUPijk , q
DW
ijk ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀j, ∀k. (7.35i)
Linear Formulation of ΠBAPas
The set ΠBAPas is the same of the Passive offering strategy in Section 7.4.1, i.e.,
ρˆBAk =
∑
ijω
πDAi π
BA
ij π
E
ω
(
λ
(+)
ij q
(+)
ijω − λ
(−)
ij q
(−)
ijω
)
, ∀k (7.36a)
q
(+)
ijω , q
(−)
ijω ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω. (7.36b)
Linear Formulation of the Cost Function
The formulation of the cost function presented in Section 7.3.3 replaces constraint
(7.15e), i.e.,
cˆk =
∑
ijω
πDAi π
BA
ij π
E
ωcijωk, ∀k, (7.37a)
cijωk = C0uijωk + Cdijωk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.37b)
Linear Formulation of Ω
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The formulation of the Ω Section 7.3.2 substitutes constraint (7.15f), i.e.,
lijωk = lijω(k−1) + ηp
(↑)
ijωk −
1
η
p
(↓)
ijωk, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.38a)
L ≤ lijωk ≤ L, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.38b)
0 ≤ p
(↑)
ijωk ≤ P
(↑)
, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.38c)
0 ≤ p
(↓)
ijωk ≤ P
(↓)
, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.38d)
uijωkD ≤ dijωk ≤ uijωkD, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.38e)
dijωk − dijω(k−1) ≤ R
UP, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.38f)
dijω(k−1) − dijωk ≤ R
DW, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k, (7.38g)
uijωk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀j, ∀ω, ∀k. (7.38h)
7.5 Case Study
This section presents a case study to test the offering models of Section 7.4. The
scenarios to be used as input to the stochastic offering models are generated follow-
ing the methodology presented in Chapter 4. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the parameters
used to characterize the fundamental market model of Section 4.3. First, we generate
300 scenarios for λDAik and we select the 10 most representative ones. Then, for each
scenario λDAik , we generate 300 scenarios of λ
BA
ijk and keep the 6 most representative
ones.
TABLE 7.1: Parameters of the market price generation model
δ β µγ σ
2
γ λ
0
(e/MWh2) (e/MWh2) (e/MWh3) (e/MWh3) (e/MWh)
-6.67×10−3 1×10−4 2×10−8 3×10−9 -20
TABLE 7.2: Values of parameter αk
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
αk (e/MWh) 322 312 315 317 340 349 353 369
k 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
αk (e/MWh) 394 424 444 445 440 429 437 458
k 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
αk (e/MWh) 446 423 408 383 373 346 331 332
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The data of the conventional production unit are shown in Table 7.3. Similarly,
the characteristics of the storage unit are presented in Table 7.4. The optimization
models are implemented using GUROBI in PYTHON environment.
TABLE 7.3: Parameters of the conventional generation unit
D D RUP RDW C0 C
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (e) (e/MWh)
0 70 30 30 0 45
TABLE 7.4: Parameters of the electric storage unit
L L P
(↑)
P
(↓)
η
(MWh) (MWh) (MWh) (MWh)
0 80 30 30 0.90
7.5.1 VPP with wind farm
Figure 7.7 illustrates the 10 selected trajectories λDAik . Similarly, Figure 7.8 does for
the 6 scenarios λBAijk, for a given realization λ
DA
k . Note that the balancing market
shows high uncertainty up to 10 a.m. and from 4 p.m. to midnight. Differently, the
hourly intervals between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. show less uncertainty in the balancing
market price. Together with the market price scenarios, we generate trajectories of
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FIGURE 7.7: Day-ahead market price scenarios.
the power production of the wind farm. We randomly sample 300 scenarios and we
reduce to the 5 more significant ones. Figure 7.9 shows the 5 selected trajectories for
the wind power production, in p.u. The result is a scenario tree with 300 branches
(10× 6× 5).
168 Chapter 7. Trading of Virtual Power Plants
4 8 12 16 20 24
k (h)
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
(e
/M
W
h
)
λ
DA
λ
BA
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FIGURE 7.9: Wind power production trajectories, in p.u.
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We initially consider a wind farm of capacity E of 50 MW. With the Active strat-
egy the VPP offers its regulating energy in the balancing market, but it is not al-
lowed to deviate from its production schedule. Differently, with the Passive strategy,
the VPP deviates from its day-ahead contracted schedule, but it is prevented from
offering regulating power at the balancing stage. Finally, the Active/Passive strategy
is a combination of the Active and Passive ones. Indeed, the VPP can offer regulat-
ing energy for some trading intervals and passively deviate in the remaining ones.
The complementarity between the active/passive choice is imposed by the binary
variable ǫik. If ǫik = 1, the VPP is predicting to act as an active participant at the
balancing stage during the interval k, provided that the day-ahead scenario i real-
izes. For the same scenario, if ǫik = 0, the VPP is considering to behave passively
and deviate from its contracted schedule. Being ǫ∗ik its optimal solution, we com-
pute the probability that the VPP will be an active participant during the interval k
as
∑
i π
DA
i ǫ
∗
ik. Similarly, the probability of being passive is
∑
i π
DA
i (1 − ǫ
∗
ik). Those
probabilities are illustrated in Figure 7.10, the active one in green and the passive
one in red.
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FIGURE 7.10: Probability that the VPP is going to be active (blue) and
passive (red).
From midnight to 10 a.m., the VPP will decide to be either active or passive based
on the day-ahead market scenario realization. Indeed, in this time horizon, the bal-
ancing market price (see Figure 7.8) is quite uncertain, i.e., it is hard to guess if the
system is going to require upward or downward regulation. This makes a passive
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approach riskier, due to the possibility of incurring in penalties when the producer’s
deviation and the system imbalance have the same sign. However, even if uncertain,
the spread between the balancing price scenarios and the day-ahead realization is
narrow (both in upward and downward regulation), thus resulting in a small penal-
ization when occurs and, consequently, low profits from actively selling regulating
energy. For the same trading intervals, the uncertainty in the wind power produc-
tion is limited (see Figure 7.9) as likely occurs a low wind production. This would
benefit an active approach as the flexibility of the storage and the conventional unit
could be used to offer regulating energy and not to compensate the wind power
fluctuations, which are likely to be small. This trade-off is clear in Figure 7.10, as the
VPP decides to be active or passive depending on the amount of energy scheduled
in the day-ahead market. Then, from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. the VPP decides that it is
going to passively deviate from its day-ahead schedule, disregarding the day-ahead
market scenario realization. In this interval, the uncertainty in the balancing market
prices is limited as the realizations are likely to be close to the day-ahead market
price. This, together with an uncertain wind power production, makes a passive
approach more attractive in this time horizon. Finally, from 6 p.m. to midnight the
VPP is almost sure to sell regulating energy in the balancing market. This translates
in internally handling the wind power production fluctuations, which is extremely
uncertain in this time interval. Indeed, it can vary from around 20% to almost 80%
of the wind farm capacity. However, the balancing market prices are going to be
"far" from the day-ahead market ones with high probability. Accordingly, passive
deviations from the day-ahead schedule may incur in high penalties, while the sell
of regulating energy can be very profitable.
Table 7.5 shows the optimal day-ahead quantity offers qDAik for the hourly inter-
val k = 6 of the three offering strategy (i.e., Active/Passive, Active, and Passive). With
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TABLE 7.5: Optimal values of qDA
i6 for the three offering strategy (i.e.,
Active/Passive, Active, and Passive). The capacity of wind farm E is 50
MW).
i
λDAi6 q
DA
i6
(e/MWh) (MWh)
Active/Passive Active Passive
1 36.7 8.0 2.0 2.5
2 35.4 2.0 2.0 2.0
3 41.8 13.0 5.8 12.4
4 39.3 8.0 2.0 2.5
5 35.6 2.0 2.0 2.0
6 36.1 2.0 2.0 2.0
7 35.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
8 41.5 12.4 2.0 12.4
9 33.5 2.0 2.0 2.0
10 40.3 12.4 2.0 12.4
these results, the VPP builds its day-ahead offer curve. For the Active/Passive ap-
proach, they the amount of energy qDA,Act/Pas6 scheduled by the offer curve is
qDA,Act/Pas6 =

0, if λDA6 < 33.5
2.0, if 33.5 ≤ λDA6 < 36.7
8.0, if 36.7 ≤ λDA6 < 40.3
12.4, if 40.3 ≤ λDA6 < 41.8
13.0, if λDA6 ≥ 41.8,
(7.39)
and its associated offer curve is built with four price-quantity offer points, i.e., (e33.5/MWh,
2.0 MWh), (e36.7/MWh, 8.0 MWh), (e40.3/MWh, 12.4 MWh), and (e41.8/MWh,
13.0 MWh). Differently, for the Active strategy the quantity qDA,Act6 is given by
qDA,6 =

0, if λDA6 < 33.5
2.0, if 33.5 ≤ λDA6 < 41.8
5.8, if λDA6 ≥ 41.8,
(7.40)
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and the related offer curve is made by the two offer points (e33.5/MWh, 2.0 MWh),
and (e5.8/MWh, 5.8 MWh). Finally, for the Passive strategy qDA,Pas6 is evaluated as
qDA,Pas6 =

0, if λDA6 < 33.5
2.0, if 33.5 ≤ λDA6 < 36.7
2.5, if 36.7 ≤ λDA6 < 40.3
12.4, if λDA6 ≥ 40.3,
(7.41)
and its offer curve is generated by the price-quantity points (e33.5/MWh, 2.0 MWh),
(e36.7/MWh, 2.5 MWh), and (e40.3/MWh, 12.4 MWh).
A graphic representation of the offer curves of the three strategy is shown in Fig-
ure 7.11. Under all the three approaches the VPP is willing to produce 2.0 MWh pro-
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FIGURE 7.11: Illustration of the offer curves of the three strategies,
i.e., Active/Passive (blue), Active (green), and Passive (red), for the
hourly interval k = 6.
vided that λDA6 ≥ 33.5. Then, if λ
DA
6 ≥ 36.7 the Active/Passive and Passive strategies
schedule additional 6.0 MWh and 0.5 MWh, respectively. Differently, the Active strat-
egy increases its production from 2.0 to 5.8 MWh only if λDA6 ≥ 41.8. For the same
price interval (i.e., λDA6 ≥ 41.8) the Active/Passive approach schedules 13.0 MWh
and the Passive one 12.4 MWh. The Active strategy contracts a lower quantity in the
day-ahead compared to the Passive one. In this way, it can subsequently submits
upward regulation offers in the balancing stage. Consequently, in the Active/Passive
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strategy the VPP will be an active participant if the amount of energy scheduled
in the day-ahead market is low, and a passive one otherwise. Table 7.6 shows the
optimal day-ahead quantity offers qDAik for the hourly interval k = 15 of the three
offering strategy (i.e., Active/Passive, Active, and Passive). Under the Passive/Active
TABLE 7.6: Optimal values of qDA
i15 for the three offering strategy (i.e.,
Active/Passive, Active, and Passive). The capacity of wind farm E is 50
MW).
i
λDAi15 q
DA
i15
(e/MWh) (MWh)
Active/Passive Active Passive
1 67.4 97.9 105.4 112.4
2 58.2 91.1 92.1 91.1
3 68.5 97.9 105.4 112.4
4 65.3 97.9 105.4 106.5
5 75.1 121.1 105.4 121.1
6 61.5 91.1 92.1 106.5
7 62.9 91.1 92.1 106.5
8 65.9 97.9 105.4 106.5
9 63.7 91.1 92.1 106.5
10 80.3 121.1 105.4 121.1
strategy, the VPP builds its day-ahead offer curves with three price-quantity offer
points, i.e., (e58.2/MWh, 91.1 MWh), (e65.2/MWh, 97.9 MWh), and (e75.1/MWh,
121.1 MWh). Therefore, it schedules the following amount of energy qDA,Act/Pas15 :
qDA,Act/Pas15 =

0, if λDA15 < 58.2
91.1, if 58.2 ≤ λDA15 < 65.3
97.9, if 65.3 ≤ λDA15 < 75.1
121.1, if λDA15 ≥ 75.1.
(7.42)
Differently, the Active strategy offer curve is built with two offer points, i.e., (e58.2/MWh,
92.1 MWh), and (e65.3/MWh, 105.4 MWh). Accordingly, the quantity qDA,Act15 is
given by
qDA,Act15 =

0, if λDA15 < 58.2
92.1, if 58.2 ≤ λDA15 < 65.3
105.4, if λDA15 ≥ 65.3.
(7.43)
Finally, for the Passive strategy offer curve is composed by (e58.2/MWh, 91.1 MWh),
(e61.5/MWh, 106.5 MWh), (e67.4/MWh, 112.4 MWh), and (e75.1/MWh, 121.1
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MWh) and its related qDA,Pas15 is
qDA,Pas15 =

0, if λDA15 < 58.2
91.1, if 58.2 ≤ λDA15 < 61.5
106.5, if 61.5 ≤ λDA15 < 67.4
112.4, if 67.4 ≤ λDA15 < 75.1
121.1, if λDA15 ≥ 75.1.
(7.44)
A graphic representation of the offer curves for the three strategy is shown in
Figure 7.12. The VPP is willing to produce 91.1 MWh (Active/Passive and Active) or
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FIGURE 7.12: Illustration of the offer curves of the three strategies,
i.e., Active/Passive (blue), Active (green), and Passive (red), for the
hourly interval k = 15.
92.1 MWh (Active) provided that λDA15 ≥ 33.5. Then, if λ
DA
15 ≥ 65.3 the Active/Passive
and the Active approach contract additional 6.8 MWh and 13.3 MWh, respectively.
Differently, the Active approach increases its production to 106.5 MWh if λDA15 ≥ 67.4.
Finally, if λDA15 ≥ 75.1 the Active/Passive and the Passive approach further increase the
production level to 121.1 MWh. From Figures 7.11 and 7.12 we note that the Active
approach is less "reactive" to the day-ahead market price compared to the alternative
strategies and it is not willing to schedule an additional quantity for high values of
the day-ahead market price. Indeed, the position of the VPP after the day-ahead
market affects the capability of the VPP of internally compensate the wind power
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fluctuations. Therefore, its position is more constrained and driven by feasibility
limitations compared to the alternative strategies.
We tested and compared the expected profit of the three offering models, for
increasing values of the wind farm capacity E, i.e., 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 MW. The
results are shown in Table 7.7. It can be noticed that the Active/Passive strategy is
always able to increase the expected profit of the VPP.
TABLE 7.7: Expected profit for the three offering strategy (i.e., Ac-
tive/Passive, Active, and Passive), for different values of the capacity of
wind farm E.
E Expected profit µˆ
(MW) (103 e)
Active/Passive Active Passive
10 18.16 18.06 16.81
30 22.89 22.48 21.69
50 27.59 26.85 26.57
70 32.35 31.16 31.45
90 37.07 35.44 36.32
Then, Figure 7.13 illustrates the increase in the expected profit obtained using the
Active/Passive strategy compared to the Active and the Passive one. Figure 7.14 does
the same in percentage terms. When E = 10 MW, the increase of profit is of 0.6 %
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FIGURE 7.13: Difference between the profit with the Active/Passive
strategy and the profit with the alternative ones (i.e., Active and Pas-
sive), for values of E of 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 MW.
with the respect to the Active strategy and of 8.1 % to the Passive one. Hence, when
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FIGURE 7.14: Percentage difference between the profit with the Ac-
tive/Passive strategy and the profit with the alternative ones (i.e., Ac-
tive and Passive), for values of E of 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 MW.
the capacity is small, the VPP can internally handle most of the wind power devi-
ations and offers its regulating energy into the balancing market. Accordingly, the
increase in profit compared to the Active strategy is limited. For the same reason, the
Active/Passive strategy strongly outperforms the Passive one, as the last one can not
exploit the balancing stage for additional profits. This trend progressively changes
as the wind farm capacity E increases. As E grows, the VPP is more likely to set-
tle deviations in the balancing stage and has less flexibility to offer in the balancing
market as it is partly allocated for balancing the wind power fluctuations. Indeed,
when E = 90 MW the increase in profit of 4.6 % compared to the Active strategy and
of 2.1 % to the Passive one.
7.5.2 VPP with PV solar
This section considers the VPP composed of a conventional generation unit, the elec-
tric storage, and a PV solar unit. Figure 7.15 shows the 10 selected trajectories of the
day-ahead market price λDAik . Similarly, Figure 7.16 illustrates the 6 scenarios of the
balancing market price λBAijk, for a given day-ahead realization λ
DA
k . Together with
the market price scenarios, we generate trajectories of the power production of the
wind unit. We randomly sample 300 scenarios and we reduce to the 5 more sig-
nificant ones. Figure 7.17 shows the 5 selected trajectories for the PV solar power
production, in p.u. The result is a scenario tree with 300 branches (10× 6× 5).
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FIGURE 7.15: Day-ahead market price scenarios.
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FIGURE 7.16: Balancing market price scenarios for a given realization
of λDA
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(red).
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FIGURE 7.17: PV solar power production trajectories, in per unit.
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The capacity E of the PV solar unit is initially set to 50 MW. We run the three op-
timal offering strategies, i.e., Active/Passive, Active and Passive. In the Active/Passive
approach, the complementarity between the active and passive participation is en-
forced by mean of the binary variable ǫik (i.e., through the so-called Big-M approach).
Being ǫ∗i,k its optimal solution, the probability of the VPP to actively offer in the mar-
ket at k is evaluated as
∑
i π
DA
i ǫ
∗
ik. Consequently, its probability of being a passive
participant as
∑
i π
DA
i (1− ǫ
∗
ik).
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FIGURE 7.18: Probability that the VPP is going to be active (green)
and passive (red) in the balancing market.
Those probabilities, for the 24 hourly trading intervals, are shown in Figure 7.18.
The probability of being active is plotted in green, while the one of being passive in
red. From midnight to 6 a.m. and from 8 p.m. to midnight, the VPP decides that it is
going to participate in the balancing market by actively offering its available regu-
lating energy to the System Operator. Indeed, in these time intervals, the production
of the PV solar unit is certain (see Figure 7.17). These intervals correspond to the
time before the sunrise (i.e., from midnight to 6 a.m.) and after the sunset (i.e., from
8 p.m. to midnight), where the VPP is certain that its PV power production is going
to be null. Differently, from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. the VPP is almost sure that it is going to
passively deviate from its contracted schedule to compensate the fluctuations of the
PV solar unit. In this time horizon, the PV power production is very uncertain (e.g.,
at 2 p.m. it can vary from 20% to 70% of the unit capacity) and it is more convenient
for the VPP to settle deviations in the balancing market. Finally, from 6 a.m. to 9 a.m.
the VPP will decide to be active or passive depending on the day-ahead market price
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realization. Indeed, based on the amount of energy contracted in the day-ahead, it
would decide which of the two approaches is more profitable. In this time interval,
the uncertainty of the PV solar production is limited, as those are the first hours af-
ter the sunrise. This would suggest that an active participation may be preferable
as the VPP would easily handle the PV fluctuations within the cluster. However, in
this time horizon, the possibility of gaining extra profits from the balancing market
is low as the balancing market price scenarios are very close to the day-ahead one
(see Figure 7.16). Differently, from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m., the active participation is more
attractive since the balancing market price scenarios give the opportunity for extra
profits.
Table 7.8 shows the optimal day-ahead quantity offers qDAik for the hourly interval
k = 5 of the three offering strategy (i.e., Active/Passive, Active, and Passive). With
these results the VPP derives the offer curves submitted in the day-ahead market.
TABLE 7.8: Optimal values of qDA
i5 for the three offering strategy (i.e.,
Active/Passive, Active, and Passive). The capacity of PV solar unit E is
50 MW).
i
λDAi5 q
DA
i5
(e/MWh) (MWh)
Active/Passive Active Passive
1 45.3 0.0 0.0 40.0
2 43.5 0.0 0.0 40.0
3 48.0 40.0 40.0 70.0
4 48.4 40.0 40.0 70.0
5 46.8 40.0 40.0 40.0
6 42.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
7 45.6 0.0 0.0 40.0
8 46.7 40.0 40.0 40.0
9 45.7 0.0 0.0 40.0
10 36.4 -14.4 -14.4 0.0
Under the Active/Passive approach the quantity qDA,Act/Pas5 scheduled as function
of the realization of λDA5 is
qDA,Act/Pas5 =

−14.4, if λDA5 ≤ 36.4
0.0, if 36.4 < λDA5 < 46.7
40.0, if λDA5 ≥ 46.7,
(7.45)
and its associated offer curve is built with two price-quantity offer points, i.e., (e36.4/MWh,
-14.4 MWh) and (e46.7/MWh, 40.0 MWh). Note that (e36.4/MWh, -14.4 MWh) is
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a buy and not a sell offer. The amount of energy qDA,Act5 contracted with the Active
strategy is equivalent to qDA,Act/Pas5 in Equation (7.45), according to Table 7.8. Finally,
the quantity qDA,Pas5 scheduled by the Passive strategy is given by
qDA,Pas5 =

0.0, if λDA5 < 43.5
40.0, if 43.5 ≤ λDA5 < 48.0
70.0, if λDA5 ≥ 48.0,
(7.46)
while the two offer points (e43.5/MWh, 40.0 MWh) and (e48.0/MWh, 70.0 MWh)
build the associated offer curve.
Figure 7.19 provides a graphical interpretation of the offer curves derived by the
three strategy. The Active/Passive approach is shown in blue, while the Active and
the Passive one in green and red, respectively. The VPP, under the Active/Passive and
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FIGURE 7.19: Illustration of the offer curves of the three strategies,
i.e., Active/Passive (blue), Active (green), and Passive (red), for the
hourly interval k = 5.
the Active strategy, is willing to consume (buy) 14.4 MWh provided that λDA5 ≤ 36.4.
This energy is used to charge the electric storage unit. Then, with these strategies,
the VPP schedules to produce 40.0 MWh when λDA5 ≥ 46.7 and it does not produce if
36.4 < λDA5 < 46.7. The offer curves derived with these two strategies are equivalent
in accordance with the results shown in Figure 7.18. Indeed, the VPP decides to
be an active participant from midnight to 6 a.m.. Differently, the Passive strategy
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suggests to schedule 40.0 MWh when λDA5 ≥ 43.5 and to increase the production of
additional 30.0 MWh if λDA5 ≥ 48.0.
Table 7.9 presents the optimal day-ahead quantity offers qDAik for the hourly in-
terval k = 17 of the three offering strategy (i.e., Active/Passive, Active, and Passive).
With these results the VPP builds the offer curves to be submitted in the day-ahead
market.
TABLE 7.9: Optimal values of qDA
i17 for the three offering strategy (i.e.,
Active/Passive, Active, and Passive). The capacity of PV solar unit E is
50 MW).
i
λDAi17 q
DA
i17
(e/MWh) (MWh)
Active/Passive Active Passive
1 68.6 116.1 98.9 116.1
2 57.7 90.0 70.8 90.0
3 72.1 116.1 98.9 116.1
4 55.8 90.0 70.8 90.0
5 70.0 116.1 98.9 116.1
6 60.6 90.0 70.8 90.0
7 67.6 116.1 98.9 116.1
8 67.1 90.0 70.8 90.0
9 69.4 116.1 98.9 116.1
10 67.3 116.1 98.9 116.1
The Active/Passive approach schedules an amount of energy qDA,Act/Pas17 , depend-
ing on the realization of λDA17 of
qDA,Act/Pas17 =

0.0, if λDA17 ≤ 55.8
90.0, if 55.8 < λDA17 < 67.3
116.1, if λDA17 ≥ 67.3.
(7.47)
The offer curve composed of two price-quantity offer points, i.e., (e55.8/MWh, 90.0
MWh) and (e67.3/MWh, 116.1 MWh), summarizes Equation 7.47. Then, the amount
of energy qDA,Act17 contracted with the Active strategy is
qDA,Pas17 =

0.0, if λDA17 ≤ 55.8
70.8, if 55.8 < λDA17 < 67.3
98.9, if λDA17 ≥ 67.3.
(7.48)
and its associated offer curve is built with two price-quantity offer points, i.e., (e55.8/MWh,
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70.8 MWh) and (e67.3/MWh, 98.9 MWh). Finally, the offer curve obtained with the
Passive strategy is equivalent to the one obtained with the Active/Passive approach,
according the results in Table 7.9.
Figure 7.20 gives a graphical representation of the offer curves obtained with the
three strategies. The Active/Passive approach is shown in blue, while the Active and
the Passive ones in green and red, respectively.
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FIGURE 7.20: Illustration of the offer curves of the three strategies,
i.e., Active/Passive (blue), Active (green), and Passive (red), for the
hourly interval k = 17.
Based on the Active/Passive and the Passive strategy, schedules to produce 90.0
MWh when that λDA17 ≤ 55.8. Differently, the Active approach decides to operate
at 70.8 MWh when λDA17 ≤ 55.8. Then, the Active/Passive and the Passive strategy
increase the power production of additional 26.1 MWh, and the Active one of 28.1
MWh, provided that λDA17 ≤ 67.3. The offer curves obtained with the Active/Passive
and the Passive approach are equivalent in accordance with the results shown in
Figure 7.18. Indeed, the VPP decides to be a passive participant in this time period,
disregarding the day-ahead market price realization.
We test the three offering, for increasing values of the wind farm capacity E,
i.e., 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 MW. The results are shown in Table 7.10. Note that the
Active/Passive strategy is always able to increase the expected profit of the VPP.
Then, Figure 7.21 illustrates the increase in the expected profit obtained using the
Active/Passive strategy compared to the Active and the Passive one. Figure 7.22 does
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TABLE 7.10: Expected profit for the three offering strategy (i.e., Ac-
tive/Passive, Active, and Passive), for different values of the capacity E
of the PV solar unit.
E Expected profit µˆ
(MW) (103 e)
Active/Passive Active Passive
10 18.59 18.27 17.54
30 22.19 21.28 21.15
50 25.79 24.24 24.76
70 29.39 27.17 28.36
90 32.98 30.08 31.97
the same in percentage terms. When the PV solar unit in the VPP is of capacity
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FIGURE 7.21: Difference between the profit with the Active/Passive
strategy and the profit with the alternative ones (i.e., Active and Pas-
sive), for values of E of 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 MW.
E of 10 MW, the expected profit of the Active/Passive and the Active approach are
similar. Indeed, as the capacity of the PV unit is small, the VPP can easily handle the
PV solar fluctuations internally and offer the remaining flexibility in the balancing
market. The increase of profit due to the innovative Active/Passive approach is of
1.7% with respect to the Active strategy and of 6.0 % compared to the Passive one.
As the capacity of the unit increases, the Passive strategy gets more competitive than
the Active one, as it can exploit the flexibility of operation and contracts a more prof-
itable position in the day-ahead market. Differently, as E grows, the Active approach
is increasingly constrained in its operation. First, it has less flexibility to offer in the
balancing stage as it needs to allocate it to balance the PV unit fluctuations. Second,
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FIGURE 7.22: Percentage difference between the profit with the Ac-
tive/Passive strategy and the profit with the alternative ones (i.e., Ac-
tive and Passive), for values of E of 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90 MW.
the day-ahead position is more constrained by the feasibility of operation and not
driven by the market prices.
7.6 Summary
This chapter takes the perspective of a VPP offering in a two-settlement electricity
market where the balancing stage allows an Active/Passive participation of the VPP.
Indeed, the VPP can decide to actively offer its regulating energy in some trading
intervals while passively deviate from its schedule in the remaining ones. We start
defining the structure of the VPP, which is composed of a conventional production
unit, an electric energy storage, and a renewable energy generation unit (either a
wind farm or a PV solar unit). We present a MILP approach to represent the feasible
operating region and the cost function of the VPP. Then, the general price-taker and
risk-neutral offering strategy formulation of Section 3.4 is adapted to the VPP. We
consider three alternative offering strategies that the VPP may choose:
• An Active strategy, under which the VPP can only be an active participant in
the balancing stage but can not deviate from its schedule.
• A Passive strategy, based on a solely passive participation in the balancing mar-
ket.
7.6. Summary 185
• An Active/Passive strategy where the VPP can decide whether to be active or
passive in each trading interval.
We run a case study for the two VPP configurations, i.e., one with a wind farm and
the other with a PV solar unit. We show that the VPP has advantages by adopting
the Active/Passive approach. Indeed, it can decide to be Active in the hourly inter-
vals with a limited uncertainty in the renewable energy production and profitable
balancing market price scenarios. Differently, a Passive approach is more attractive
in the intervals where the balancing market price scenarios are "close" to the day-
ahead price realization, and the future real-time production of the stochastic sources
shows a high level of uncertainty. We test the three approaches for increasing values
of the renewable energy unit capacity. When the stochastic unit capacity is small,
the Active and the Active/Passive strategy bring comparable expected profits. Indeed,
the VPP can easily handle the wind or solar power fluctuations internally and of-
fer the remaining capacity in the balancing market. Differently, a Passive approach
is not profitable as the wind and solar real-time deviations are easy to compensate
within the VPP and there is no need of deviating in the real-time. Increasing the
installed capacity of the stochastic source, the Passive strategy becomes more attrac-
tive as it allows a more flexible operation of the VPP. Differently, under the Active
approach, the offering strategy is driven by ensuring a feasible operation since the
deviations need to be handled internally. This translates into being less focused on
maximizing the profit and more on guaranteeing a feasible solution. In this context,
the Active/Passive gives the possibility to always reach higher expected profits as it
can choose when it is more profitable to be active and when to be passive. This novel
participation strategy can be also interesting from a system perspective. Indeed, the
actual structure of electricity markets only allows a Passive participation of a VPP
including stochastic energy sources. With the proposed Active/Passive participation
the System Operator may have more flexible regulating energy to schedule in the
real-time.
The case study proposed in the thesis uses a limited number of scenarios and a
poor representation of the conventional production unit. Indeed, the complementar-
ity between the active and passive participation in Active/Passive strategy strongly
increases the computational time to solve the stochastic optimization model. Ac-
cordingly, we limit the size of the model to solve it in around 30 minutes. The exten-
sion to a more realistic case study (e.g., with 1000 scenarios) may require developing
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a heuristic algorithm able to guess a solution to be used as starting point for the
MILP solver. Differently, the computational time to solve the model may restrict its
applicability. Moreover, the inclusion of the intra-day trading floor may bring an ad-
ditional flexibility of operation to the Active/Passive strategy. Indeed, the VPP could
choose between the active and the passive participation closer to the real-time, when
more accurate forecasts are available.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis. Section 8.1 provides a summary of the work while
Section 8.2 gives some perspective for further research.
8.1 Summary
The thesis presents a comprehensive methodology to derive optimal offering and
operating strategies in electricity markets. Differently than most of the optimization
models available in the literature, which is tailored to a specific market structure or a
particular technology, the thesis proposes to build the optimal offering strategy of a
power producer with a modular approach. Indeed, we give the general formulation
of an offering strategy, which includes set of constraints associated with the trading
problem in the different market stages and with the feasible operating region and the
cost function of the power production unit. These sets of constraints are included
as "blocks" in the general offering strategy. The power producer can replace them
according to the electricity market structure considered or the specific production
unit.
Together with the general offering strategy, the thesis provides several formula-
tions of the trading problem for a price-taker and risk-neutral power producer in the
different market stages. For the day-ahead market trading problem, we start from
single price-quantity offers, and we extend it to non-decreasing offer curves. More-
over, we show how a stochastic programming approach can be used to formulate the
day-ahead market trading problem with offer curves as an LP model. We proceed
similarly for the trading problem in the balancing market of an active participant
that submits regulating offers to the System Operator. For the balancing market, we
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consider both a uniform and a pay-as-bid pricing scheme as some European elec-
tricity markets (e.g., in Italy and in Germany) are settled under a pay-as-bid pricing
scheme. In this context, an LP formulation for the trading problem in a pay-as-bid
balancing market under price uncertainty is novel in the literature, and it is a con-
tribution. Finally, we formulate the trading problem in the balancing market for a
passive participant that deviates from its contracted schedule. We consider a single-
and a dual-price imbalance settlement scheme.
Starting from the general formulation of the offering strategy, we take the per-
spective of different power producers, showing how they can build their offering
strategy from the general one. Initially, we consider a power producer that manages
a stochastic energy source, e.g., wind or solar power. We give an analytical formu-
lation of the quantity offer that maximizes the expected profit of the power pro-
ducer, for both the single- and the dual-price imbalance settlement scheme. Then,
we extend the analysis to two alternative settlement schemes of the Italian electricity
market. Such schemes, introduce a tolerance band that differentiates the penaliza-
tion of the portion of the imbalance within the band from the part that exceeds it.
We compute the optimal quantity offer maximizing its expected profit under those
alternative settlement schemes. Moreover, the thesis links the optimal market quan-
tity submitted in the day-ahead market with the expected real-time imbalance of the
producer, differentiating "helpful" imbalances (i.e., that reduce the system’s imbal-
ance) from "harmful" imbalances (i.e., that increase the system’s imbalance). We con-
clude that the imbalance settlement schemes with tolerance margins introduced by
the Italian electricity market may distort the optimal offering strategy of the power
producer. E.g., the tolerance band pushes the power producer to overestimate its
day-ahead market offer when the expected power production is low, compared to
a dual-price settlement scheme. Indeed, the market participant gains a wider tol-
erance band, which is proportional to the day-ahead quantity offer. This market
distortion leads to more significant imbalances of the stochastic producer in the real-
time (in expectation), which may lead to a higher balancing cost for the system.
Then, we take the perspective of a conventional power producer offering in a
two-settlement electricity market having the balancing market settled under a pay-
as-bid pricing scheme. We tailor the general offering strategy on the characteris-
tics of the conventional production unit. To our best knowledge, a MILP two-stage
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stochastic programming program for offering in an electricity market with a pay-as-
bid scheme at the balancing stage is not available in the literature. Indeed, we exploit
the novel LP formulation for the trading problem in pay-as-bid electricity markets to
cast the optimization problem with a MILP formulation, where the binary variables
are associated with the feasible operating region of the thermal unit. We test the
innovative offering model in a realistic case study against a sequential offering strat-
egy, which does not consider the balancing market when deriving the day-ahead
market offers. Oppositely, the two-stage stochastic offering model includes the fu-
ture decisions in the balancing market as recourse variables, thus co-optimizing the
trading in the two market stages. We show that a co-optimized strategy may be in-
creasingly important as the penetration of renewable energy generation in the elec-
tricity market increases. Indeed, lower market prices in the day-ahead may lead a
conventional producer that uses a sequential approach not to operate its production
unit in the day-ahead market (if the prices are lower than its marginal cost). How-
ever, it translates into few profits in the balancing market, e.g., it can not submit
down-regulation offers. Differently, based on a co-optimized approach the producer
may accept to produce in the day-ahead market in a "losing" position. Then, in the
balancing market, it can submit both up- and down-regulation offers and gain high
total profits.
Finally, we consider the optimal market participation of a VPP, i.e., a cluster of
conventional production units, renewable energy generation, and energy storages.
We propose an innovative Active/Passive offering strategy, assuming that the VPP
can offer regulating energy in the balancing market in some trading intervals and
passively deviate in the remaining ones. Differently, the offering models in the liter-
ature solely consider the VPP as a passive actor in the balancing stage. We formulate
the offering strategy as a three-stage stochastic programming problem with recourse
while imposing the complementarity between the active and the passive participa-
tion in the balancing market. We test the proposed model in a case study against an
Active (i.e., active-only participation) and a Passive (i.e., passive-only participation)
approach. We formulate those alternative models as a two-stage stochastic program-
ming problem with recourse. We analyze when the VPP may be interested in being
an active actor and when a passive one. Indeed, as an active participant, the VPP has
more favorable prices at the balancing stage while it is more constrained in the oper-
ation of the units as it needs to compensate the fluctuations of the stochastic energy
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source internally. Differently, as a passive actor, the VPP has penalized prices in the
balancing market, but its operation is flexible, and it can deviate from the day-ahead
contracted schedule. This innovative Active/Passive participation is interesting for
both the VPP, that increases its expected profit, and the System Operator, that may
have more regulating power available in the balancing market.
8.2 Perspectives for future research
Based on the methods and results provided in the thesis, continuing research in
this field is significant for ensuring a practical application of the presented models.
First, an extension of the work including a price-maker power producer and risk-
analysis would complete the work, as the thesis focuses on a price-taker and risk-
neutral power producer. Second, several alternative case studies can be generated
starting from the general formulation of the offering strategy. E.g., the proposed
co-optimized offering model in electricity markets having a pay-as-bid balancing
market could be tested on production units different than the conventional ones.
E.g., an efficient balancing market participation is significant for flexible production
units as electric storages. Consequently, an assessment of the effectiveness of the
proposed co-optimized offering strategy applied to an energy storage unit may be
of interest. Third, it may be interesting to use different uncertainty characterization
techniques to model the stochastic processes involved in the decision-making pro-
cess. E.g., linear-decision rules or interval optimization may extend the applicability
of the proposed offering models. Finally, an extension to the consumption side may
be timely. The rising amount of prosumers (i.e., a consumer/producer of electric
energy) may, indeed, lead to a re-organization of electricity markets towards more
consumer-centric structures.
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Appendix A
Stochastic Programming
A.1 Introduction
This Appendix presents the basic concepts of mathematical optimization and stochas-
tic programming, which are used and referred several times within the thesis. We
refer the interested reader to CITE for a more extensive and detailed coverage of the
topic.
A.2 Mathematical Optimization
The general form of a linear optimization problem is the following:
Max
x
c⊤x (A.1a)
s.t. Ax = b, (A.1b)
Dx ≤ f , (A.1c)
where x is the vector of decision variables. The matrices A and D and the vectors c,
b, and f are input parameters of the problem. Any vector x′ that satisfy constraints
(A.1b) and (A.1c) is a feasible solution of the optimization problem (A.1). The deci-
sion vector x∗ that maximizes the objective function (A.1a) is called optimal solution,
i.e., c⊤x∗ ≥ c⊤x′, for all the feasible solutions x′. In case the parameters A, D, c, b,
and f are perfectly known, the optimal solution x∗ can be obtain with a solution
algorithm for linear problems, e..g, the simplex method.
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A.3 Stochastic Programming
A.4 Single-Stage Stochastic Programming
When the input parameters of problem (A.1) are conditional to the realization σω of
a random parameter σ, we can write Aω = A(σω), Dω = D(σω), ..., cω = c(σω).
When the decision vector x has to be decide before the realization of the uncertain
parameter σ, the optimization problem (A.1) is called stochastic linear program. A
feasible solution x′ has now to satisfy (A.1b) and (A.1c) for each possible realization
of σ. In addition, the objective function (A.1a) becomes an uncertain variable itself
as cω is conditional upon the realization σω.
It is necessary to recast the optimization problem in a form so that it can be solved
by a solution algorithm for linear programming problems. Under a stochastic pro-
gramming approach, the continuous random parameter σ is approximated though
a discrete set Ω of possible scenarios, i.e., σ ∈ {σω, ∀ω ∈ Ω}, where each scenario ω
has an associated probability πω of occurrence such that
∑
ω πω = 1. Finally, we need
transform a random variable (i.e., the objective function) into a deterministic one. A
typical approach is to use the expectation, i.e., E
[
c⊤ωx
]
=
∑
ω πωc
⊤
ωx. However, other
rankings are valid, e.g., the worst case realization is a valid alternative when consid-
ering a risk-averse approach. Accordingly, a single-stage stochastic programming
problem can be formulated as follows:
Max
x
∑
ω
πωc
⊤
ωx (A.2a)
s.t. Aωx = bω, ∀ω, (A.2b)
Dωx ≤ fω, ∀ω. (A.2c)
Note that the way (A.2) is formulated forces the decision vector x to be independent
from the the scenario realization ω.
A.5 Two-Stage Stochastic Programming
The idea of Section A.4 can be extended to model multi-stage decision problems
under uncertainty. Indeed, we can model the sequence of events and decisions by
distinguishing between two types of decisions:
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• Here-and-now or first-stage decisions need to be taken before the realization of
the uncertainty, and we denote them with x.
• Wait-and-see or second-stage decisions can be fixed after the uncertainty real-
ization, and we denote them with y(ω) to highlight the dependency from the
realization ω.
A mathematical formulation of a two-stage stochastic linear programming problem
with recourse is the following:
Max
x
c⊤x+ E[Q(x, ω)] (A.3a)
s.t. Ax = b, (A.3b)
where
Q(x, ω) =
{
Max
yω
q⊤ω y(ω) (A.4a)
s.t. Tωx+Wωy(ω) = hω
}
, ∀ω ∈ Ω. (A.4b)
The objective function (A.3a) maximizes the sum of the first-stage cost, i.e., c⊤x and
the expectation of the recourse cost, i.e., [Q(x, ω)]. The subproblem (A.4) is to be
solved after the uncertainty realization and it is accordingly named recourse problem.
Alternatively, problem (A.3) can be expressed using stochastic programming in a
more compact formulation, i.e.,
Max
x,yω
c⊤x+
∑
ω
πωq
⊤
ω yω (A.5a)
s.t. Ax = b, (A.5b)
Tωx+Wωyω = hω, ∀ω. (A.5c)
The same idea can be used to model multistage (i.e., more than two) problems with
recourse. In this case it is important to impose the non-anticipativity constraints
aimed at ensuring that the decision sequence is respected. E.g., in case of a three-
stage problem with recourse, a first stage decision x will independent from both the
second-stage uncertainty realization ω1 and the third-stage one ω2. Differently, a
second stage decision yω1 will be dependent on ω1 but independent to ω2. Finally, a
third stage decision zω1ω2 can be chosen after the realization of both ω1 and ω2.
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